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THE GOVERNOR GENERALSHIP OF INDIA.

In the negociations between Lord Grey's administration and the Court of Directors of the East-India Company, which preceded the new charter Act, one of the most essential points discussed, upon which, in fact, the whole political branch of the question principally turned, was the power to be possessed by the Court itself, under the altered form of Indian government, Either impelled by a suspicion that there was some design, on the part of the Whig ministers, to possess themselves indirectly of the patronage which they openly renounced (admitting that there might be some objection to such patronage being dispensed by the Ministers of the Crown), or stimulated only by the conviction that the independence of the Court of Directors was an indispensable condition in the proposed theory of government, the Court vigorously resisted the attempts made to impair its future efficiency, and obtained distinct and repeated declarations from the King's Government, that there was not the least ground for any suspicion that "the object of the Government was to extend its own powers, and to depress and degrade those of the co-ordinate authority;" and that it formed no part of the scheme "in the slightest degree to weaken the authority, impair the dignity, or endanger the independence of the Court."*

The most important political function attached to the Court of Directors, as the organ of Indian government, is the appointment of governors of India, especially of the governor-general. The slightest diminution of the power heretofore possessed by the Court, in the original nomination or recal of these high functionaries, would tend directly and materially to "weaken its authority, impair its dignity, and endanger its independence." The first » draught of the new scheme of Indian government gave to the Board of Control a velo on the recal of governors. This pretension, however, was subsequently abandoned, and the appointment of governors remained substantially unaltered, namely, the original nomination was vested in the Court of Directors, subject to the approbation of the King, with an uneon. trolled power in the Court of recalling them.

The reason of the condition, that these appointments should be approved by the Crown, is clearly this, that the King's Government

* Letter from the Right Hon. C. Grant, 27th June 1833.

Asiat Journ. N.S.VOL. 18. No.69.

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should not be absolutely without the means of preventing a selection notoriously improper, if the Court of Directors should so far abuse its trust as to make such a nomination. Previous to the Act of 1813, the appointment of governors was not subject to the previous approbation of the Crown, which, however, possessed authority to recal or remove the servants of the Company, for which the veto provided a better substitute.

A case has now occurred, in which a noble individual was selected by the Court of Directors, solely on grounds of public expediency, and nominated as governor-general of India. The nomination was actually approved by his Majesty, and the individual was sworn into his office. Prior to his departure for India, a change took place in the administration; another party acquired the reins of government, and, for no other reason, the appointment which had been approved by his Majesty on the 5th of February, was vacated by his Majesty on the 5th May. We may assume it to be admitted on all hands, that there is no exception to the vacated appointment on the ground of the fitness (in the ordinary sense of the term) of the individual appointed, and that the noble individual by whom he is to be superseded is not his superior in point of talents and capacity. The sole ground upon which the substitution has been justified in the House of Commons is, that one of the personages referred to does, and the other does not, possess "the confidence of his Majesty's Ministers."

Although there are other incidents in this transaction, which must not be lost sight of, connected with a previous attempt to force upon the Court of Directors an individual whose appointment (considered wholly apart from capacity or qualification) would have been extremely objectionable, we prefer putting the case in the preceding simple form; and we ask whether, under the circumstances stated, this act of the Whig Ministry does not "weaken the authority, impair the dignity, and endanger the independence of the Court;" and whether the use necessarily made of the King's name and authority in this transaction, be not calculated to lessen the respectability of the Crown in the eyes of the nation?

If the King's Ministers can always exercise the right of interfering with the nomination of the high officers of the Indian government, so far as to insist that all such officers must be selected out of their own political party, they will, in effect, appropriate to themselves indirectly the whole patronage of India, and convert it into an arena for jobs and intrigue. Hitherto, as Mr. Tucker has observed, "India was of no party, and the Court of Directors were considered to be perfectly independent of all political influence; but we are now to introduce the badges of party into India; promotion in the service will be sought as the reward of political subserviency, and distinction and office will be bestowed to purchase the base and sordid services of political partisans in England. By rendering the governors of India the mere dependent nominees of the Ministry, holding office during pleasure, the administration of the day will acquire a power and influence which will enable it to assume and dispense the local patronage of India, clandestinely, without responsibility, and (when bad men bear

sway) for corrupt purposes, to obtain political power in this country, in utter contempt of the provisions of the Legislature, both as they relate to Indian patronage, and to the objects of those more recent enactments which profess to secure purity of Parliament."

We now lay before our readers a faithful epitome of the correspondence between the India Board and the Court of Directors, relating to the appointment of a successor to Lord William Bentinck: papers which were refused to the House of Commons by the Ministers, but which have been produced and printed by the Court, in compliance with a resolution by ballot of the Court of Proprietors.

On the 27th August 1834, the Chairman of the Court of Directors (H. St. George Tucker, Esq.) laid before the Court a letter from Lord Wm. Bentinck, which had been delivered to him (sealed), in duplicate, by the President of the India Board (Mr. C. Grant), on the 21st. The letter, which was dated Bangalore, 16th March 1834, tendered his lordship's resignation of the offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief; the state of his health compelling him, in a great measure, to this resolution."

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From the minutes of secret courts held on the 3d, 10th, and 17th September, it would appear that communications had been passing between the Chairman and the President of the India Board on the state of the Indian government. The nature of these communications will be inferred from the debate in the Court of Proprieters, on the 15th July last, a report of which is published in our present number.

On the 26th September, the Chairman moved, and the Court adopted, a resolution to the effect, that as Sir Chas. T. Metcalfe had been appointed, with the approbation of his Majesty, to act provisionally as governor-general of India, on the death, resignation, or coming away, of Lord Wm. Bentinck, and adverting to the character and talents of Sir Charles, it would be inexpedient at present to make any other arrangement for supplying the office of governorgeneral.

This resolution was forwarded to Mr. Grant, who conveyed, in return, the decided opinion of his Majesty's Ministers, "that, in reference to the present state of India, no time should be lost in appointing a permanent successor to Lord Wm. Bentinck, as governor-general of India." He adds, "With respect to the appointment to that office of any servant of the Company, however eminent his knowledge, talents, and experience may confessedly be, his Majesty's Ministers agree in the sentiments of Mr. Canning, expressed in a letter from him to the Court on the 25th of December 1820, that the case can hardly be conceived, in which it would be expedient that the highest office of the Government in India should be filled otherwise than from England, and that one main link, at least, between the systems of the Indian and British Governments, ought, for the advantage of both, to be invariably maintained."

The Chairs, in reply, state that "it would have been most satisfactory to the Court if the King's Ministers had thought proper to advise his Majesty to give his royal approbation to the appointment of Sir Charles Metcalfe to the office of governor-general, upon a footing more permanent than that which the Court had themselves proposed." They express deep regret that Sir Charles is considered ineligible on grounds which would exclude the whole service of India, to whose merits, talents, and tone of character, Mr. Canning himself

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