prices proportionate to that to which itself is arbitrarily fixed, viz. 31. 17s. 101d. an ounce. As soon as the credit currency carries prices beyond that range, the gold must go away. Thus the disappearance of it last autumn is accounted for, and which, indeed, is only a repetition of what has before occurred, and must again and again be repeated, as often as the credit currency again expands.-The predicament then we are in, is, of having one LEGAL measure of value, and another PRACTICAL measure of value, the legal being wholly unsuited to that in which all our mighty concerns have been created, of course eternally warring with that practical measure of value towards which the necessities of every interest are constantly struggling: this continued struggle, which cannot cease, has produced, and must reproduce, the alternations we have so much reason to deplore. Whatever may have been the reasons which induced the Legislature to pass the Act of 1819, erroneous as I ever thought they were, they originated, I believe, in a strong sense of national faith, and an ardent desire to uphold, to the very letter, the engagements the country entered into with the public creditor; but in that effort to preserve the letter of the bond, the true spirit of it was lost sight of the substance put to imminent hazard; and if the attempt be persevered in, both debtors and creditors will be involved in one common ruin. I ask you, my Lord, if, in the recent dismay that seized the country, the run had been made on the Bank of England, what the consequences must have been? And I insist on it we must ever be subject to such a catastrophe so long as that difference exists between the LEGAL GOLD STANDARD OR MEASURE OF VALUE, AND THE PRACTICAL MEASURE OF VALUE produced by that credit currency, which is indispensably necessary to carry on the CONCERNS OF THE COUNTRY. A short view of the different measures of the last few years, will show that you,-I mean always your Lordship and your Colleagues, have yourselves forced the expansion as well as the contraction of the currency, and consequently the alternations you so much deplore. You cannot deny, that the Act of 1819 necessarily first caused a sudden and very great contraction of the currency. I know it is attempted to make a stalking-horse of the Bank, and charge the Directors with an excess of caution; but if they were more cautious than necessary, who can blame them? And who can deny that the Act of 1819 rendered unavoidable, under any circumstances or management, a very great contraction of the currency? It had not long passed before you began to see that it could not be carried into effect. You would not say so, you would not admit the error, and rectify it, but you tried seVOL. XXVII. NO. LIII. Pam. P cretly to counteract its effects, and for a time succeeded. And here, my Lord, I must say I think a very mistaken policy seems to have guided your conduct: there is but one line for a Minister of this country to pursue, and that is, to tell the people the truth: they never have been told the truth respecting the currency from the year 1797 to the present moment: the last deception has been this adoption, and as I shall show, counteraction of the old standard, or measure of value, almost at the same moment. I say, no sooner was the Act of 1819 passed, than it was found so to reduce the quantity, and raise the value of money, that the productions of industry could not find a price adequate to the cost of production: universal unexampled distress ensued, and every thing was at a stand. Various then were the measures you had recourse to, in order to force out a paper currency which should be more abundant, consequently of lower value, and consequently give higher money prices for commodities and labor, and you succeeded. In the first place stands,-though not in point of date, I believe, yet in point of effect,-the Act legalizing the issue of one-pound notes; then the Act to borrow of the Bank about two millions per annum for about twenty years, to pay the half-pay of army and navy; in the third place, you persuaded the Bank to lend several millions on mortgage to the landowners, at 4 per cent.; to lend also to the fundholders on mortgage of consols, and, I believe, two millions to the East India Company: you induced them to lower their rate of discount from 5 per cent. to 4, which rate, in December last, they advanced again to 5 per cent. these measures were obviously calculated and intended to increase the circulating medium; and they did so increase it immensely, and of course created a very different measure of value from that of the legal metallic measure. You thus accomplished the object; the country revived; and you triumphed in her renewed prosperity, as if it were of your own creating that you did most sincerely and feelingly rejoice in her returning happiness, I do not for a moment doubt; but, my Lord, you were entitled to no other merit in relieving the country, than temporarily removing the All In the distress of 1822, one of the means of relief brought forward, and much relied on by his Majesty's Government, was, a loan of four millions from the Bank, for the express purpose of increasing the amount of Bank notes in circulation. "The chief object which his Majesty's Government have in view, is not so much the adoption of this or that particular measure, as the adoption of any measure which will have the effect of getting these 4,000,000 into general circulation."-See a Speech of Lord Liverpool, 26 Feb. 1822. And again-"This sum, be it remembered, is not wanted for the supplies of the year; it is not wanted for any Government services : the only object of his Majesty's Government is, to extend and quicken the general circulation." overwhelming pressure of that ruinous measure which you had yourself imposed on us, and to the fatal pressure of which we are again and again liable. The fact is, the country has never known a moment's happiness or security since the Act of 1819, EXCEPT when its effects have been counteracted by such measures as I have just adverted to. And now, my Lord, I ask you to reflect on the danger to which the country has been, and must continue to be, exposed under such circumstances. We acquire, by means thus described, a currency adequate to our necessities, but which, convertible on demand into a currency of so much higher value, is consequently built on a principle which not only renders it at any moment liable to be withdrawn as it just has been, inducing therefore continual fluctuations, but NECESSARILY every hour exposes it to the most imminent danger of tumbling to pieces. The character which long habit has given to the Bank note alone saves us. I have the most perfect faith in the solidity of the Bank, but like not it should undergo such trials; nor can I think it will be eventually proof against the Act of 1819, if persevered in. But, my Lord, the bare possibility of what might occur should prevent you from subjecting the country to the risk of such a catastrophe. We have undergone most painful distresses; we have yet escaped the crisis to which we are every hour subject. Do not, my Lord, bazard any longer our safety; I trust, at all events, that you and your colleagues were and are prepared to give to the Bank the best protection possible, should anything occur to make it at all necessary. Sometimes I am inclined to doubt, in spite of all the measures taken to counteract the fatal error of 1819, whether you are fully aware of the dreadful consequences to which this country is exposed under its blasting influence. I still more doubt whether you have courage to face the public in avowal of that error, which the horrid sufferings of the people must have made you reflect on with pain, though they may not have made you fully sensible of the cause. I believe that the House of Commons is still blind to it; but the public out of doors have their eyes fixed on it, and are pretty well open to the light that breaks in on them; and they would support you in the necessary steps to be taken to retrieve the mischief, and save us from ruin. The question has been heretofore vulgarly and maliciously treated as a question more particularly affecting the landed interest: they were indeed at one time sinking, and many, many thousands perished under the baneful effects of that measure, as the commercial and manufacturing now are, and the agricultural will again very soon all the industrious classes are alternately, if not altogether, the victims of it; not one class only, but all; and one of the first perceptible and certain effects of draining away the currency, is the throwing all the laborious and industrious classes out of employ, as is the case at this moment. I will endeavor to show how this is effected; but here I cannot help first expressing my astonishment, that any increase of the value of the currency should ever have even been considered as a desirable or justifiable measure; nay, that in this country, looking to its debts, taxes, and extensive individual concerns, and extensive credit currency, that it should ever have been imagined to be practicable at all: to think of adding at one blow, as the late Mr. Ricardo at last admitted was the case, even 10 per cent. to all the public and private debts and taxes of the country, was monstrous beyond anything that ever was heard of; but when we know that it was in effect nearer doubling the debts and taxes, it does surpass all imagination to conceive by what delusion Ministers could have been led to try it on the country. Dreadful indeed was the first and subsequent trial; they soon found it necessary to try every way to escape out of it, as I have shown, and they succeeded for a time, and may partially again. The purchase of five millions of Exchequer-bills by the Bank is intended to bring out more Bank notes and accomplish that object, and the one-pound Bank notes the same; but, if they succeed, they are again certain, under the influence of the Act of 1819, of another drain of gold from the Bank, and another contraction of its notes, and another scene of misery and danger, more imminent as it is repeated; and the SAFETY of the Bank is all the time compromised, and with it.that of the country. I intreat your Lordship to consider, that the entire commercial, manufacturing, and agricultural capital of the country, is in a state of permanent activity, if I may so express myself. Every man has his capital out in some employment, the success of which is calculated on and dependent on a certain return which he knows to be necessary, and which he has a fair and rational ground to expect; and another depends on him, and another and another to an almost unlimited extent. They may and can generally guard against a trade mistake,-I mean, a different price than what they had imagined, arising out of a different proportion of supply and demand from what they expected; or, if in error, they suffer, and perhaps many with them, and there is calamity, but it is partial and not national, and that of which they have no right to complain: but, in a contraction of the currency, an entire change in the MONEY VALUE of every commodity takes place, such as they could neither see nor provide against; down go the prices, no return answers their expectations, failures must be the consequence, extensive as are the ramifications of commercial credit, dependencies not confined to this country; and the capital which gave employment to labor and industry is locked up, effectually for the time, if not lost. We have it admitted now, by Mr. Huskisson and others, that, in the course of last year, the bullion money went out of the country, and the Bank contracted its issues. Mr. Huskisson will also no doubt admit, that this joint reduction of money, of gold and paper, suddenly and materially raised the value of the currency, and sunk, of course as materially, the money value of commodities; and why look further to account for the failures that took place, when in such an unlooked-for change so ample and so sufficient a cause is obviously seen? There may have been some trifling contributory and accidental causes to hasten the convulsions that followed; but I think your Lordship must now admit, that the CONTRACTION of the currency has been the real cause of the mischief and dangers that followed: over-trading speculations may and might have produced considerable distress, but nothing like that which shook the country to its very centre. I know that a great deal is said about over-trading, and thus creating a supply of commodities beyond demand; and such certainly appears at first view to be the case: there is in truth a superabundance of commodities, relatively to the circulating medium, or the means of distributing of those commodities. A given quantity of commodities requires a certain proportionate quantity of money to distribute them: the commodities cannot suddenly increase to be so superabundant as appears at present; but the circulating medium or money may be, as it just has been, so suddenly reduced, as to be totally disproportioned to the commodities, and afford no adequate means of their distribution. Such was the case, no doubt, in 1816. I did not see it fully then; I had not turned my attention sufficiently to the subject; the contraction of the currency was then a secret transaction, nor had Peel's Bill at that time passed; it was a contraction only preparatory and in expectation of its passing. However, everything then fell in price, more particularly at that time the products of agriculture; and redundance was the cry. In the very next year, 1817, this redundance disappeared as suddenly with re-appearance of money: in the end of 1819, redundance of corn again—20, 21, 22, redundance of all productions of industry-end of 1823, 24, 25, re-appearance of money, and nothing further said about redundance-in the end of 1825, money again diminished, and commodities again superabound. There has then been in each of these cases, a redundance relatively to the reduced quantity of money, but not otherwise. There cannot be in any other way a |