For the regulation of past accounts, I fhall therefore propofe fuch a mode, as men, temperate and prudent, make ufe of in the management of their private affairs, when their accounts are various, perplexed, and of long standing. I would therefore, after their example, divide the publick debts into three forts; good; bad; and doubtful. In looking over the publick accounts, I should never dream of the blind mode of the exchequer, which regards things in the abftract, and knows no difference in the quality of its debts, or the circum#tances of its debtors. By this means, it fatigues itfelf; it vexes others; it often crushes the poor; it lets escape the rich; or in a fit of mercy or careleffnefs, declines all means of recovering its just demands. Content with the eternity of its claims, it enjoys its epicurean divinity with epicurean languor. But it is proper that all forts of accounts fhould be closed fome time or other-by payment ; by compofition; or by oblivion. Expedit reipublica ut fit finis litium. Conftantly taking along with me, that an extreme rigour is fure to arm every thing against it, and at length to relax into a fupine neglect, I propofe, Sir, that even the best, foundest, and the most recent debts, fhould be put into inftalments, for the mutual benefit of the accountant and the publick,

In proportion, however, as I am tender of the paft, I would be provident of the future. All

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money that was formerly imprefted to the two great pay-offices, I would have imprested in future to the bank of England. Thefe offices should, in future, receive no more than cafh fufficient for finall payments. Their other payments ought to be made by drafts on the bank, expreffing the fervice. A checque account from both offices, of drafts and receipts, fhould be annually made up in the exchequer, charging the bank, in account, with the cash-balance, but not demanding the payment until there is an order from the treasury, in confequence of a vote of parliament.

As I did not, Sir, deny to the paymafter the natural profits of the bank that was in his hands, fo neither would I to the bank of England. A fhare of that profit might be derived to the pub. lick in various ways. My favourite mode is this; that, in compenfation for the use of this money, the bank may take upon themselves, first, the charge of the mint; to which they are already, by their charter, obliged to bring in a great deal of bullion annually to be coined.

In the next place, I mean that they should take upon themselves the charge of remittances to our troops abroad. This is a fpecies of dealing from which, by the fame charter, they are not debarred. One and a quarter per cent. will be saved instantly thereby to the publick, on very large fums of money. This will be at once a matter of economy, and a BLIO

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confiderable reduction of influence, by taking away a private contract of an expensive nature. If the bank, which is a great corporation, and of course receives the leaft profits from the money in their custody, fhould of itself refuse, or be perfuaded to refuse this offer upon those terms, I can speak with fome confidence, that one at least, if not both parts of the condition would be received, and gratefully received, by feveral bankers of eminence. There is no banker who will not be at least as good fecurity as any paymaster of the forces, or any treafurer of the navy, that have ever been bankers to the publick: as rich at least as my lord Chatham, or my lord Holland, or either of the honourable gentlemen who now hold the offices, were at the time that they entered into them; or as ever the whole establishment of the mint has been at any period.

Thefe, Sir, are the outlines of the plan I mean to follow, in fuppreffing thefe two large fubordinate treafuries. I now come to another fubordinate treasury; I mean, that of the paymaster of the penfions; for which purpose I re-enter the limits of the civil establishment-I departed from those limits in pursuit of a principle; and following the fame game in its doubles, I am brought into those limits again. That treasury, and that office, I mean to take away; and to transfer the payment of every name, mode, and denomination of penfions,

fions, to the exchequer. The prefent course of diverfifying the fame object, can anfwer no good purpose; whatever its ufe may be to purposes of another kind. There are alfo other lifts of penfions; and I mean that they fhould all be hereafter paid at one and the fame place. The whole of that new confolidated lift, I mean to reduce to 60,000l. a year, which fum I intend it shall never exceed. I think that fum will fully anfwer as a reward to all real merit, and a provifion for all real publick charity that is ever like to be placed upon the lift. If any merit of an extraordinary nature should emerge, before that reduction is completed, I have left it open for an address of either house of parliament to provide for the cafe. To all other demands, it must be answered, with regret, but with firmnefs," the publick is poor."?

I do not propofe, as I told you before Chriftmas, to take away any penfion. I know, that the publick feem to call for a reduction of fuch of them as fhall appear unmerited. As a cenforial act, and punishment of an abuse, it might anfwer fome pur pofe. But this can make no part of my plan. I mean to proceed by bill; and I cannot ftop for fuch an enquiry. I know fome gentlemen may blame me. It is with great fubmiffion to better judgments that I recommend it to confideration; that a critical retrofpective examination of the pension list, upon the principle of merit, can never ferve for my bafis.It cannot anfwer, according

to

to my plan, any effectual purpose of œconomy; or of future permanent reformation. The procefs in any way will be entangled and difficult; and it will be infinitely flow: there is a danger that if we turn our line of march, now directed towards the grand object, into this more laborious than ufeful detail of operations, we shall never arrive at our end.

The king, Sir, has been by the constitution ap pointed fole judge of the merit for which a pen fion is to be given. We have a right, undoubt edly, to canvass this, as we have to canvass every act of government. But there is a material difference between an office to be reformed, and a pension taken away for demerit. In the former cafe, no charge is implied against the holder; in the latter, his character is flurred, as well as his lawful emolument affected. The former process is against the thing; the second against the person. The penfioner certainly, if he pleases, has a right to ftand on his own defence; to plead his poffef fion; and to bottom his title in the competency of the crown to give him what he holds. Poffeffed, and on the defensive as he is, he will not be obliged to prove his fpecial merit, in order to juf tify the act of legal discretion, now turned into his property, according to his tenure. The very act, he will contend, is a legal prefumption, and an im plication of his merit. If this be fo, from the na. tural force of all legal prefumption, he would put

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