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HOEVER reflects upon the conclusion of the several campaigns since the year 1775, will easily perceive that at the end of the last, the fortune of the several powers at war seemed more nearly upon a balance, than it had been at the close of any of the former. That campaign was rather less bloody, than that which immediately preceded it; and it was not concluded with any action of such an eclat, as could greatly raise, or depress the hopes of any VOL. II:

of the contending parties. All parties became more cautious; because it became every day more evident, that the fortune of war was not to be decided by any single stroke, however considerable. The prize was reserved for the player of the skilful game; for the most attentive patience; for the greatest depth of resources. An equality of this kind seemed at last to promise Europe some repose. All sides might now give and receive honourable and equitable terms; and peace

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might be settled on that footing, on which it has been usually made, for some time past, in our part of the world. But the great designs entertained by each power; revenge imbittered by the blows which all had felt in their turns; the consideration of the vast expences that fell upon all, and which a peace at that time would have made fruitless; even the hopes arising from the equivocal appearances of the last campaign, estranged every court from the disposition to peace. Insomuch that there were no terms directly offered by any of the belligerent powers; nor did any of the neutral interpose their mediation. Besides these, another cause operated powerfully; a great event was hourly expected about this time; an event which threatened to involve the Southern parts of Europe in the calamities of that war, that had so long wasted the Northern ; and which, whenever it should take place, threatened to render the political system infinitely more intricate, and probably to give the war quite a new turn.

The late king of Spain, by the force of a conjugal affection, rarely seen in that dignity, since the death of his queen, had been given up to a melancholy, which preyed up on his health, and affected his understanding. His death or incapacity appeared inevitable within a short time. The king of Naples, Don Carlos, was next in the order of succession. In the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, it had been agreed, that the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, should be restored to the house of Austria, in case Don Carlos should ever come to the crown of Spain. These countries were, at the end of that war, in the hands of the Empress Queen, or

her allies. Her Imperial Majesty had set up a claim to the reversion of these duchies, on the extinction of issue male in the house of Farnese. But the ambition of the Queen of Spain to make all her children sovereigns, put powerful bars in her way to it. This ambition was one of the causes, which made the last so general a war. The peace of Aix la Chapelle, which put a period to that war, after settling these contested duchies as an establishment for Don Philip, second son to the King of Spain, provided that whenever the event, which we have mentioned before, should take place, that is to say, the accession of Don Carlos to the crown of Spain, then the kingdom of Naples and Sicily should pass to the Infant Don Philip, and the duchies which formed his establihment should revert to the house of Austria.

The King of Naples, not with out reason, looked upon this article of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, as injurious to his rights; accordingly he never acceded to it. No method in, this case could be seen which might prevent matters from coming to extremities, except the situation of the Empress, engaged as she was with a powerful adversary, who kept her forces strained to the utmost pitch. She was in no condi tion to engage in a new war, however interesting the object might be. Her ally, France, who so ineffectu ally assisted her in Germany, could not probably assist her with more effect in Italy; she therefore seemed to have no other part left, than to acquiesce for the present, and wait in silence a more favourable oppor tunity to assert her claims. event of the King of Spain's death, hath since happened. It has produced none of those immediate ef

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Such were the inclinations of the powers at war, at the opening of this year: their strength seemed also very entire; in particular, the resources of the King of Prussia appeared astonishing, after the great blows he had suffered; and after the advantages he had gained, but gained at so high a price. He was still able to shew himself the father and benefactor, as well as the protector of his people. In the midst of the devouring waste of such an expensive war, from the funds of his economy he was enabled to remit the taxes to those parts of his dominions, which had suffered from the Russian barbarity; he even advanced money to those who had suffered the most considerably.

To take a nearer view of his situation, we must observe, that the whole kingdom of Prussia still remained in the hands of the Muscovites. The duchy of Cleves, together with his other possessions on the Rhine, could yield him nothing; him nothing; they were held by the French; but in these respects, his situation was not worse than it had been, almost from the beginning of the war. He had, to balance these losses, the rich country of Saxony, which he had twice in one campaign wrested from the hands of

the Austrians. Add to this, the renewal of the subsidy treaty with Great Britain, on the advantageous terms of the former year. These were undoubtedly great supports; and the King seemed as entire in power, and more advanced in reputation, than ever.

But, on a more critical examination, things had an aspect not quite so favourable. This appearance was rather specious than entirely solid; and whilst all without looked full and fair, within there was a decay of substance, and an hollowness that rung at the slightest touch. That incomparable body of troops, which, at the beginning of the war, had given him so great a superiority, no longer existed in the same persons. If his troops derived advantages from a long series of ac-1 tive service, these advantages were equally on the side of the enemy. His army had known what it is to be beaten; and it is no wonder, if a sort of weariness and despair be-' gan to creep upon them, after such an infinite train of unrewarded fatigues, when they saw that so many wonderful exploits had not yet ended the war in their favour. Many of his best generals had been killed in battle, or died, or had retired, or were disgraced.' The hoards which he had amassed before the' war, by this time must have been entirely spent; his dominions must have been greatly exhausted, both of men and money. Saxony could no longer yield such supplies as formerly. The indigence of the subdued inhabitants set bounds to the rapacity of the conqueror. The subsidy from Great Britain did a great deal; but it could not supply the deficiencies on this, and on every other side. These circumstances, probably, made the Kiug B 2 of

of Prussia more cautious and dilatory than usual.

The court of Vienna had as great burthens to sustain as the King of Prussia, and she had suffered much greater blows. That power has a strength, somewhat unaccountable and peculiar to herself. More deficient in pecuniary funds, than any other great power in Europe, she is better able to subsist, and to do considerable things without them. For, by a long habit, the whole state is formed to its necessities: and the subject is more ready to supply free quarter, and to endure military licence than any other. The country is abundantly fruitful in all its parts. And whilst the war is carried on near home, an arbitrary government, operating on so extensive an object, can hardly fail of such resources, as must serve an Austrian army; which is still paid, in a great measure, as Tacitus describes the troops of the ancient Germans to have been; they have a plentiful table in lieu of pay

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And indeed it must be owned, that there is no Sovereign, who is more highly honoured in his dominions, or obeyed with a greater mixture of love and reverence, by all his subjects, than her Imperial Majesty. So that having a very ample power, very willing obedience, a large territory, and many men, not sufficiently employed in the arts of peace, it perhaps may be guessed, in what manner she has been able to supply her many and great losses, and to continue a war, like the present, better than states more abundant in money. She is besides, and this is a matter of no small consequence, supported by the countenance, the authority, and the forces

of the Empire. And she has for her allies the first, and most formidable names in Europe. In the wars which this power carried on in the last, and in this century, though usually not very successful, she has always been the last to desire a peace; though frequently slow in her operations, she makes amends by an extraordinary perseverance.

This slowness could not escape general observation, in the actions of the last year. That the Austrians did not play, with sufficient spirit, the great game which was in their hands, after the battle of Hohkirchen and the entry of the Russians into the New Marche of Brandenburgh, seems hardly disputable. Perhaps it was that the Court of Vienna, by an error common to many courts, but particularly so to this, and often fatal to it, interfered too much and too minutely in the operations of the campaign.

It is not impossible that the character of Marshal Daun himself, might have had some share in this inactivity; a character almost in all things the direct reverse of that of his Prussian majesty. He saw that the King, active, resolute and `adventurous, wasted himself even by that activity and spirit, to which he owed his most brilliant successes. Should the Austrians carry on the war in the same spirit, they might suffer in the same manner, without being ever able to equal, much less to exceed that great Monarch, in a stile of action peculiarly his own. Daun therefore by principle, seems to have kept his army from coming to action, in order to oppose a strength entire, and recruited by a long rest, to that of the King of Prussia, wasted by the efforts it was

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obliged to make, incessantly and on every side. His design seemed to be, that the issue of the war should rather arise from the general result and concurrence of all the operations, gradually producing a solid though a slow advantage, than from the effect of a bold, quick, and masterly stroke. In fact, the Austrians felt all the benefits, and all the inconveniences which usually attend this sort of couduct, a conduct which probably lost them Saxony in the last campaign, and which has secured them the possession of what they now hold in that country. The Austrians and Prussians watched the time and one another, and came very late to action.

The court of Petersburg still adhered to its old system, in spite of the late ill success of her arms, and all the efforts of the British minister, to withdraw her from her alliance. If she had some loss of men, it was the least loss she could feel and she thought that whilst the war was carried on at the expence of others, the reduction of so near, so dreaded, and so hated a rival as the king of Prussia, and the opportunity of the forming her troops to service, and perfecting her officers, were objects of consequence enough to keep her closely attached to her first sentiments.

The Swedes preserved likewise the same connection; but they continued as before, an inconsiderable, and inglorious part of the war."

Holland preserved her neutrality; but it was a neutrality little respected, and indeed in itself little respectable. Divided in her councils, attentive only to private interests, she disgusted the English, and nei ther pleased nor served the French. For some of the subjects of that republic had carried on the trade of France in their bottoms, which sub.

jeçted them to frequent captures from the English men of war and privateers. This produced loud complaints in Holland, and warm remonstrances to the court of London. These complaints met with little attention, being in many respects but indifferently founded. The affair was drawn out in length, until the dispute was extinguished by the destruction of its object; some of the French co. lonies were reduced, and the trade in the others grown too small and too hazardous to be continued longer with any hope of advantage.

The affairs of France and England were partly connected with the general system, and partly distinct and independant. France perceived that the strength of the English, and the exertion of that strength, increased continually in America; she knew from the natural inferiority of her colonies, and the feeble state of her navy, that she could not in reason hope for great success in that quarter, for which reason, although she sent a fleet under Mons. Bompart into the West Indies, and some men of war, with as many store and transport ships as she could steal out of the river St. Laurence, her great efforts were to be made in Europe: she had two objects, the recovery of Hanover, and the invasion of these islands; in either of which, if she succeeded, there could be no doubt, but that it would prove a sufficient balance for all that she had suffered, or had to apprehend in any other part of the world.

With regard to the first object, though it was difficult to attain it, and though, if it should be attained, it did not promise to answer her purposes so well as the latter, yet it was upon that she chiefly depended, Hitherto indeed the success which France had in Germany, was not at

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