SCOTS MAGAZINE. APPENDIX, 1 7 5 5. CONTENT S. POLITICS. Speeches on the motion for an ad- || CONTESTS in our American colonies. Contests drefs in anfwer to the King's fpeech, by Pomponius Atticus 617. T. Sempronius Gracchus 621. and Quintus Mucius 624. Articles of the TREATY between Great Britain and Ruffia 625. Reciprocal stipulations of the treaty of 1742 ib. Secret articles of the treaty 1755 626. -between Great Britain and Heffe-Caffel 626. Remarks on the conftruction of COLLECTIVE NOUNS, in defence of Mr Blacklock 627. An effay on SELF-LOVE, in imitation of Lord Bacon 627. POETRY. To Florella, putting on a flowered hat 628 The METEOROLOGICAL journal 628. in Jamaica 635. A difpute between the affembly of Penfylvania and the Governor 636. State of the prefent difputes in that province, as related for the Governor 639. and as related for the affembly 640. T. W.'s account of the action at Lake George; of the first engagement 641. of the second 642. and of the third 644. Extracts of the FORM OF PRAYER compofed for the faft of Feb, 6. 1756, by his Majesty's fpecial command 645. The portions of fcripture appointed for the leffons, epiftle, and gofpel 645, 6. Two collects for the day 645. Two at the end of the litany 646. A prayer for all the reformed churches ib. burgh 648. INDEX to the Debates, Essays, History, &c. to the Poetry, &c. Speeches by the Indian chiefs of the SIX NA-LIST of the fubalterns of the new regiments 647. TIONS, at Albany, in 1754. Hendrick's MORTALITY-BILLS for London and Edinfpeech 629. Abraham's fpeech 630. Another speech by Hendrick 631. The rejoinder of the Six Nations 632. A fpeech by the River or Stockbridge Indians 633. CHARACTERS of fome of our leading men in North America 634. -to the Marriages, Births, Deaths, and Preferments. -to the Books. Proceedings of the POLITICAL CLUB, continued from p. 577. The debate on the motion for an addrefs, The Speech of Pomponius Atticus, who fame with what it is at prefent. It has been the fame ever fince the revolution and before that time it cannot be faid that we had ever any fixed conftitution. It was always precarious, and met with fome alteration, not only under every new fovereign, but almoft under every new adminiflration. Therefore I hope I fhall no more hear of our returning to our ancient method of addreffing, as the prefent method is what has been obferved ever fince we can be faid to have had any fixed conftitutional fort of government. And whatever the Hon. Gentleman who spoke laft may think of 4 X what what his Majefty has been pleased to tell us of the profeffions of friendship lately made by the court of Spain, it muft give a pleasure to every man who wishes well to this kingdom, and is not biaffed in his judgment by fome private intereft of his own: for as the Spaniards, as well as we, muft, or at least always ought to be jealous of the power of France, it is our mutual intereft to unite together; and in the prefent conjuncture, when there is fuch an appearance of a war between France and us, it must in a particular manner be agreeable to us, to find that Spain is not like to join with France against us, notwithstanding the known connection and near relation that there is ftill, to our misfortune, between the fovereigns of thefe two powerful monarchies. The imparting of this piece of advice was therefore, Sir, fo far from being unbecoming, that it was a fresh inftance of his Majefty's goodness, and of the conftant defire he has to contribute, as much as he can, to the ease and happinefs of his fubjects: I mean, fuch as are not led by their private intereft to wish for a war with Spain; for that there may be fuch amongst us, every one must grant, who confiders what rich prizes may be taken in time of war from the Spaniards, and what profits may be made by forcing a trade with their dominions in America. This, it is true, will always put a great deal of money into the pockets of fome private men a mongst us; but the people of this country in general will get more by the trade between the two nations in time of peace, because of the great concern our merchants always have in the Spanish flota, galleons, and regifter-fhips. For this reafon, a friendship and good correfpondence with Spain must be agreeable to the people of this nation in general. And we are not to judge of the effect of the order lately fent by the King of Spain to his governors in America, from what was the effect of the like order fent two years ago; for we know, that minifters often take private methods for rendering the orders of their fovereign ineffectual: therefore in all fuch caics the complexion of the court for the time being is to be confidered; and it is well known, that the complexion of the court of Spain two years ago was not fo favourable for this nation as it is at prefent: nay, it may even be fufpected, that two years ago M Enfenada might send private orders to the Spanish governors in America, for defeating the pu blic orders fent to them by his mater; and every thing that has been lately done, or attempted to be done by the Spaniards in America, must have proceeded from the influence of the fame minifter: fo that for the future we have reafon to expect better treatment in that part of the world; and confequently we have, from what is paft, no reason to doubt the fincerity of the profeffions of friendship now made by the court of Spain. I am, from many circumstances, Sir, perfuaded, that the profeffions now made by the court of Spain are hearty and fincere: and I think I have great reafon to rejoice in that perfuafion; for if France alone be more than a match for this nation, furely the moft fanguine amongft us could not expect, that we should be able to ftand fingle and alone in a war against France and Spain. Against both united together, I do not think we could ftand, fingle and alone, even in a fea-war; because of the neceffity we fhould be under of dividing our naval ftrength, by having a ftrong qua dron in the Mediterranean, another in the West Indies, and a third upon our own coaft, befides the great number of cruifers and convoys we should always be obliged to have at fea, for protecting our own commerce, and for ruining that of our enemies. Against France alone, I fhall grant, we may be at prefent fufficiently able to carry on a feawar; becaufe our naval ftrength is, I believe, at prefent very much fuperior to theirs: but I am not fo fanguine as to fuppofe, that we could preferve that fuperiority during a long war, if France fhould continue free from any war upon the continent of Europe. They might refolve to fufpend carrying on any com merce in their own fhipping for three or four Four years; they might refolve even to Leave their colonies in America a facrifice to us for that time; and to keep all heir fhips of war in port, where we could not deftroy any of them, until they had got fuch a number of fhips new built as might render them fuperior to us at fea. That they might be able to accomplish this in three or four years time, no one can doubt, who confiders the abfolute power and the vast revenue which the French monarch is poffeffed of; and one general and complete naval victory would enable them, not only to recover all they had loft in America, but also to extort from us as much as they pleased to demand in that part of the world. This, I fear, Sir, would be the confequence of our ftanding fingle and alone for three or four years in a war against France: and this confequence we could not prevent; because we could not hinder neutral powers from carrying any fort of naval ftores to France, as no naval ftores of any kind are by any treaty comprehended among thofe goods that in time of war are to be deemed contraband, but, on the contrary, are by moft treaties exprefsly declared not to be contraband. Nay, iron, copper, and brass, are likewife declared not to be contraband; fo that, in time of a war with us, the French might not only build as many fhips of war, but caft as many cannon for the ufe of thofe fhips as they pleafed. Therefore, in my opinion, we have no way of preventing the French becoming an overmatch for us, even at fea, but by cultivating and engaging fuch an alliance upon the continent of Europe, as fhall give them fo much to do in defending themselves at land, that it fhall not be in their power to fpare money enough for repairing, much lefs for increafing their naval ftrength. It was by this means, Sir, that we got the better of them both in K. William and Q. Anne's wars. For at the beginning of both they were very near an equal match at fea for the Dutch and us united together. Every one knows, that, in the year 1690, they obtained a complete victory over the combined fquadrons of England and Holland near Beachy-head, by our court's fending a rash and ridiculous order to our admiral, the Lord Torrington, to engage the enemy, though greatly fuperior to him in ftrength. But, luckily for us, the French court committed the fame mistake in 1692; by which means we got an opportunity to pay them back with ufury at La Hogue, the little advantage they had gained over us at Beachy-head; and as they were then vigorously attacked by our allies at land, they could not spare money for repairing, much less for increafing their navy before the end of that war. Again, Sir, in Q. Anne's war, at the beginning of it, they appeared formidable even at fea, and in 1704 engaged the united fquadrons of England and Holland in the Mediterranean near Malaga. Here, indeed, they did not obtain any victory, as the Hon. Gentleman feemed to infinuate; though they were fuperior in ftrength, as I could prove by an old ballad, which fhews that it was a drawn battle: but they might have continued to be formidable at fea, if the glorious victory which the Duke of Marlborough obtained that fummer at Blenheim had not put an end to all their naval projects; for from that time they were under fuch difficul ties to defend themfelves at land, that they were obliged to leave their men of war to lie rotting in their harbours, and thought of nothing but annoying our trade by their privateers. As they fuffered fo much in that war, and as it was foon after followed by a long minority, they could not for many years think of reeftablishing their navy; and their minifters probably judged very wifely, that there was no fupporting a refpectable navy, without a great number of thorough-bred feamen, which no country can have without an extenfive commerce, or great fisheries. For this reafon they applied themselves chiefly to thefe two improvements, and had brought both to a very great height before the beginning of laft war; but had neglected to re etablish their navy; which neg. lect lect they were foon made fenfible of, as neither commerce nor fisheries can be protected in time of war without an equality at leaft of naval power. This they faw they could not aim at whilft they were engaged in fuch a heavy war at land; and therefore they endeavoured to put an end to it as foon as they could. Thus, Sir, we may fee, that in all the wars we have been lately engaged in against France, our preferving a fuperiority at fea did not proceed from our preventing their getting a fufficient fupply of naval ftores, but from our preffing them fo hard at land, by means of our allies upon the continent of Europe, that they could not spare money enough for purchafing that fupply. And to fuppofe, that the other nations of Europe, or even those who are our firmett allies, would bear our telling them, that they must not trade with France, or any of the French dominions, becaufe of their being all blockaded by us at fea, is really, in my opinion, a fuppofition too chimerical to be entertained by any fober mind. The very attempt would unite most of the ftates of Europe in a confederacy for pulling down the overgrown naval power of England: and I hope it will not be so much as fuppofed, that we are able to carry on even a naval war againft all the maritime powers of Europe; for every nation that borders upon the fea, may in fome degree be called a maritime power, as every one of them has at leaft fome feamen, if not fome ships of war; and even our navy, formidable as it is, would be in a most dismal and dangerous fituation, if it had not a port in Europe to retire to upon occafion, except thofe belonging to ourselves alone. From what I have faid, Sir, I think it is evident, that if we fhould ftand fingle and alone in a war against France, they might in three or four years become fuperior to us at fea; and the moment they did fo, we muft fubmit to a carte blanche; because they could then bring their numerous land-armies into this ifland, and might make a conqueft of it in one fingle campaign. For preventing this, we have no way left, but reforting to that which is now, and I hope will always be at our command, a powerful confederacy upon the continent of Europe: and whatever the melancholy apprehenfions of fome gentlemen may fuggeft, I make no doubt of our being able to support it as long as we fhall have occafion; for France is involved in debt as well as we are, and the people of France do not feem to be fo unanimous or fo zealous for a war upon the prefent occafion, as the people of this country appear to be: and I muft fay, that both are very much in the right; because the people of France know, that they are contending for boundless waftes, from whence neither they nor their pofterity can draw much advantage for ages to come; whereas we are contending for the prefervation and fecurity of a well-cultivated country, inhabited by our own countrymen, and of infinite prefent advantage to the people both of Britain and Ireland; nay, of fuch advantage, that many thoufands, in both islands, owe the whole of their fubfiftence to our colonies and plantations in America. For this reafon, Sir, I was glad to hear, that our colonies were able to fupport themselves. I therefore hope they will not stand in need of much affistance from us; but if they should, we must give it. Even for them we must fight as if we were fighting pro aris et facis; for it is to them we owe our wealth and our naval ftrength. Our trade thither is the chief nursery for our feamen; and the imports from thence, by being again exported, is what alone keeps the general balance of trade in our favour. Thefe imports have been increafing for many years: I hope they will continue to increafe both in quantity and kind: and I am glad to find, that we have lately had a new fort of import fent us from thence; I mean that of confummate politicians; though I am afraid | we fhall never get much by the export of this commodity. The The fpeech of T. Sempronius Gracchus, fued, among which I must reckon the The speech of T. Sempronius Gracchus, eftablishment of our prefent royal family who spoke next. Mr President, the chief. But, as in all human affairs, among thefe good confequences, fome Among the many paradoxes I have bad ones have crept in ; and among there heard upon different occafions from the mouth of the Hon. Gentleman who fpoke laft, no one ever surprised me more than to hear, that we had no fixed constitution before the revolution. I shall readily grant, that almost every adminiftration has in fome refpects acted contrary to our conftitution: but a breach of our conftitution is not furely to be called an alteration of our conftitution; for if it were, I am afraid it could not be justly faid, that we have had a fixed conftitution fince the revolution, any more than before, as minifters have fince frequently acted contrary to our conftitution; which the Hon. Gentleman, from his long and great experience, must be fully fenfible of. This doctrine has indeed prevailed a great deal too much of late years; but I am very much furprised to hear it maintained or propagated by one who pretends to be a friend to the revolution, and to the royal family now upon our throne. What was the cause of the revolution? Was it not because the prince then upon the throne had acted contrary to, and was endeavouring to fubvert our conftitution? How could this be true, if we had then no constitution? Thus, Sir, fome gentlemen are ignorantly or very unadvifedly endeavouring to undermine the very foundation of the revolution; for if we had then no conftitution, the king upon the throne must have been abfolute, and confequently the revolution could have been nothing but a rebellion. But it is certain, Sir, that we had a constitution, and a molt regular and wife constitution, not only before the revolution, bat ever fince we had a monarchy; and the end of the revolution was, to restore and secure that conftitution for which our ancestors had fo often facrificed their blood; and I hope their lateft pofterity will always be ready to follow their example. This, I fay, Sir, was the end of the revolution; and a great many good confequences have enVOL. XVII. I muft reckon this complaifant method of addreffing at the beginning of every feflion: for however much it may be fanctified by custom, it would look very odd in the eyes of all foreigners, to fee the Commons of England, in their addrefs to their fovereign, approving by the lump of all the measures pursued by his minifters, and in a week or two afterwards impeaching those minifters for thofe very measures: which may happen to be the case in some future feffion of parliament, if this complaifant me. thod of addreffing fhould be continued ; for at the opening of a feffion, and before any lights have been laid before parliament, no one can fay, whether the minifters may or may not deferve to be impeached, for fome of the measures hinted at in the fpeech from the throne, and perhaps hinted at on purpose to obtain the ufual lumping approbation. For this reafon, Sir, though I highly approve of the revolution, and upon a more folid foundation than any gentleman can have, who thinks we had no conftitution before that time; yet I cannot approve of this method of addreffing. And as little can I approve of another doctrine now advanced by fome amongst us, and ftrongly inculcated by the Hon. Gentleman who spoke laft, which is, That we can by no means be able to stand single and alone in a waragainst France; because, faid he, though we be at prefent fuperior to them in naval power, yet during the course of the war they would increafe their navy, and if not diverted by any war upon the continent of Europe, they might in three or four years increase it so much as to become fuperior to us at fea. Sir, if there were the leaft foundation for this doctrine,. I should think this nation in a moft wretch-ed and lamentable fituation: for if the French could in the time of war with us fo much increase their navy, furely they could with more ease and conveniency increase it in time of peace; and confequently, 4 Y |