other powers of Europe, I do not find, that ever any of them gave themselves the leaft concern about it, unlefs when they were themselves attacked, or had a view of making fome advantage by the event of the war. Did ever the Dutch engage in any war merely for the fake of preferving the balance of power? Did they ever declare war, or provoke a declaration of war, upon that account alone? All the wars they had against Spain, were, we know, for the establishment or prefervation of their liberties. And if we examine the wars they have had against France, we Thall find, that they never began hoftilities till they were either attacked, or under a most just apprehenfion of being attacked. In the year 1672, it is well known, how they were attacked and almost ruined; and yet they concluded a separate peace at Nimeguen, without much regard to the balance of power, or to their allies. In the year 1689, they were upon the brink of being attacked by France before they declared war; and I am perfuaded, they would not have given any affiftance to the Prince of Orange, in his design upon England, if they had not forefeen, that they would be attacked by K. James, had he remained poffeffed of the crown of England. Then again in the year 1701, were not the French putting daily affronts upon them, and making continual incroachments upon their frontiers? which made it neceffary for them to provide for their future fafety by entering into the grand alliance. If we look into the conduct of the Germans, and the Spaniards, we shall find it the very fame. It was never the balance of power, but their own immediate fafety or intereft, that made them enter into any war against France. No nation but this has ever made the balance of power the chief object of their care; but we, in all our late meafures, feem to have thought of nothing elfe: and to this cant term we have lately added two others; which are, the neutrality of Italy, and the balance of power in the North; by which three conjuring terms, our minifters now find a pretence for engaging us in every war and in every treaty that happens in Europe.

In what I have faid, Sir, I would not
VOL. IX.

however be thought to mean, that we fhould give ourselves no concern about any thing that may happen upon the continent of Europe. For our own safety we ought to take care, that no one prince fhall have it in his power to give laws to all the reft. But then we ought never to give ourselves any concern, unless the balance be very apparently in danger; nor ought we ever to be the firft or the chief concerned in restoring that balance. And as to its being at prefent in danger, I do not think any man can really be under fuch an apprehenfion. Should France recover and keep poffeffion of all the Austri an Netherlands; fhould Don Philip be established in the poffeffion of all the Auftrian dominions in Italy, the great duchy of Tufcany not excepted, I do not think the balance of power would be in so much danger, as to make it neceffary for us to engage as principals for divesting them of either of thofe poffeffions.

I am surprised, Sir, that any Gentleman can pretend to be so blind, as not to fee the difference between the fituation the houfe of Bourbon is now in, and that which it was in at the end of K. William's and beginning of Q. Anne's reign. The whole power of the Spanish monarchy, as well as the French, was then under the fole and abfolute direction of one prince, and one too, who, from the whole tenor of his conduct, had appeared to be a great and an ambitious prince. When I fay this, every one muft fuppofe, I mean Lewis XIV. He had often given caufe to Europe to be convinced of his ambition; and therefore, when he got the whole Spanish monarchy under his direction, every prince and ftate in Europe had reafon to dread his power. But is the cafe now the fame with refpect to the kingdoms of France and Spain? Have they not of late years ten appeared to be under quite different directions? Is it not vifible, that nothing but their mutual intereft keeps them at prefent in conjunction? And, I am fure, no one can accufe the present King of France of ambition; nor has it yet appeared, that he is any way near fo great à man as Lewis XIV.

of

It is this, Sir, that makes the Dutch, and all the other ftates of Europe, fo litD

tle

tle apprehenfive of the balance of power being in any danger from the fuccefs the houle of Bourbon may have in the prefent war. I believe, many of them are more apprehenfive of the fuccefs of the house of Auftria and their allies. Some of them have very particular reafons for dreading any increafe of power in the house of Auftria; and I doubt much if the power of the crown of G. Britain be a matter of fuch indifference to fome others, as it was in former times. It is the business of the Queen of Hungary to pretend, that the balance of power is in danger, because the may get by the war: it is the bufinefs of the King of Sardinia to pretend the fame, because he has got an addition of a fine territory for making ufe of that pretence. But what have we got, what can we get, by the event of the war? England, furely, can get nothing by the event of the war upon the continent; and therefore, our allowing ourselves to be fo much governed by what fome of our neighbours imagine to be nothing but a pretence, may raife fufpicions in them, which must turn very much to our disadvantage, fhould we meet with great fuccefs in the war.

But fuppofing, Sir, that there were fome ground for this pretence; fuppofing the balance of power were really in fome little danger, what occafion have we, or rather what occafion had we to become principals in the war? Sir, whatever regard I may have for the memory of those great men that were in our councils at the end of K. William's or beginning of Q. Anne's reign, I must say, that, had I been in thofe councils, I fhould, even at that time, have voted against our engaging as principals, or declaring war either a gainst France or Spain. I do not queftion the abilities of any of the great minifters mentioned by the Hon. Gentleman; but I am afraid our councils were, at both times, influenced by fomething more than the true intereft of England. In the councils of princes it often happens, that the ablest men, instead of advifing, employ themselves chiefly in finding reafons for approving what has been advised by others. Both the Lords Somers and Halifax were of K. William's councils when the partition-treaty was approved of;

which was certainly one of the most pernicious treaties we ever made; a treaty which no one will now, I believe, pretend to justify; and a treaty which, as to its bad confequences, was never excelled by any, except a late famous treaty I could mention. The councils in K. William's time are not, therefore, to be deemed ininfallible, for no other reafon but because the Lords Somers and Halifax were in them. And as to the councils in Q.Anne's time, they were certainly influenced by the Duke of Marlborough, her chief favourite, who had an intereft in the nation's engaging as a principal in the war, because he could not otherwise expect to command the confederate army: therefore he could not judge without prejudice, as to the measures we were to take; and, confequently, his judgment at that time can never be of authority upon any future occafion.

I am, for thefe reafons, fufpicious, Sir, that private intereft, or perhaps a foreign intereft, prevailed at both thefe times over the publick or national interest; but whether it was our intereft or no to engage in that war as principals, it is very certain, that after we did engage as fuch, our confederates threw the largest share of the burden of the war upon our shoulders. The Dutch continued their trade both with France and Spain during the whole time of the war, and would engage in no new fubfidy or expence, unless we agreed to pay the greatest part of it; and the Emperor was more intent upon oppreffing his Protestant fubjects in Hungary, than upon profecuting the war we had engaged in for the benefit of his family; tho' experience has now fhewn us, how ufeful thofe fubjects might have been in the war, had he taken any measure for gaining their affections. But what was worse than all this, the Dutch obliged us to profecute the war in that method which was moft tedious and expenfive: for I will fay this in praife of the Duke of Marlborough, that, notwithstanding the advantages he made by the continuance of the war, he formed feveral plans that would have brought it to a speedy conclufion; particularly, after his taking Oftend and Newport, he proposed to pass

by

Paris.

by Dunkirk, and march directly to Calais; which, being then ill fortified, and worfe provided with a garrifon, he might have reduced in a few days; and from thence he proposed to march along the coaft, and, after having made himself master of Picardy and Normandy, to march directly to All this he might have done in one campaign; because there were no well fortified towns in his way, and, during his whole march, his army might have been plentifully provided, and greatly reinforced from England, by means of our fleet, which made us mafters of the channel. But by this plan the Dutch would have loft the advantage of serving our army with provisions, as well as fome greater advantages they expected; and therefore they pofitively refufed to join in it, under pretence that their country would, in the mean time, be over-run by the French army; tho' it was evident, that the Duke of Marlborough would have been at the gates of Paris, before the French army in Flanders could have made any great impreffion upon the Dutch frontier; and therefore that army would certainly have been obliged to march back towards Paris, in order to defend, if poffible, the capital of their kingdom. This anecdote with regard to the conduct of the last war, I have mentioned, Sir, to fhew, that we can never expect the affiftance of the Dutch in making an attack upon France from the duchy of Luxemburg; for they will make the fame objection against that plan, which they made against this of the Duke of Marlborough's; and with much more reafon; becaufe the distance between Luxemburg and Paris, is greater than that between Calais and Paris, the road is more intangled with fortified towns, and our army could not be fo cafily provided for upon its march: therefore we cannot expect the affiftance of the Dutch, unless we profecute the war in the Netherlands, in the fame manner in which they obliged the Duke of Marlborough to profecute the war in his time; and, as has been already observed, I doubt much if they will now agree to be at the expence of all the fieges.

Sir, it is not the behaviour of the Dutch

only, but the behaviour of every one of our allies in that war, that fhould make us cautious of engaging as principals in any war upon the continent; especially when the balance of power is not in ap parent danger; which is neither the cafe at prefent, nor can be the effect of the present war: therefore our fafety, so far as it may be affected by the overthrow of the balance of power, can at prefent be in no danger; nor can we, upon that ac count, be obliged to give the Queen of Hungary any greater affiftance than what is confiftent with a vigorous prosecution of our war against France and Spain, at sea and in America. Which brings me to confider our fafety, so far as it may be affected by this war. And in this refpect, indeed, our future fafety may be brought into great danger; but not by our gi ving too small an affiftance to the Queen of Hungary in the war upon the continent, but by our giving her too large an affiftance.

Tho' this may at firft view appear to be a paradox; yet, Sir, if we confider one obfervation I have already made, it will be found to be a clear demonftration. If we give the Queen of Hungary a very powerful affistance, and meet with great fuccefs upon the continent of Europe, it may encourage her to think of making new conquefts, and to infift upon our fupporting her in that, as well as in the defence of what fhe was formerly poffeffed of. We know by experience, that the court of Vienna are mighty apt to extend their views in proportion to their fuccefs. By the grand alliance, as concluded by K. William, they defired no more, nor did we engage for any more, than to procure to the Emperor, the Spanith Netherlands, the duchy of Milan, and the Two Sicilies, as a fatisfaction for his pretenfion to the Spanish succession; but after they had got this nation engaged as a principal in the war, and had met with fome fuccefs during the first campaign, nothing lefs would ferve them than the whole kingdom of Spain; which we engaged to conquer for the Archduke Charles, chiefly at our own expence; and we were fo infatuated as to continue in this refolution for fome time after the

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