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and, withal, a fine portrayal of two contrasting race types, make the book a notable one.

To make a bridge between the philosophies of Carlyle and Tolstoi is the aim of Mrs. May Alden Ward's "Prophets of the Nineteenth Century." It contains sympathetic and discerning sketches of three lives, Carlyle's, Ruskin's and Tolstoi's, and the significance of their message, the influence of one man upon another being interestingly set forth. Crisp and compact, with a pleasant narrative style and in a convenient pocket size, the timely little volume will find acceptance. Little, Brown & Co.

A book to be devoured by the average girl is "Memory Street," by Martha Baker Dunn, which L. C. Page & Co. publish. The heroine, who tells the tale herself, first appears as an entertaining and weirdly intelligent child, with the determination to avoid the evils of matrimony, but her progress is marked by acquaintance with a number of young men who in fiction or out of it would be considered decidedly pleasant fellows, and her original intentions undergo a change. An old mansion house, one hero who vibrates between England and America, picnics and parties, a delightful fairy godmother and a whole company of well-bred people, make the book a pleasant one; but there is also an earnest note under all the sprightliness which gives it additional worth.

A narrative that was new and exciting three-quarters of a century ago, and will be almost as new and decidedly as fascinating to its present-day readers, is the "Historical Memoirs of Alexander I and the Court of Russia," by the Comtesse de Choiseul-Gouffier. It is fact rendered more entertaining than fiction. The Comtesse, who was an intimate friend of the Emperor, and

whose book is the source from which many historians have drawn their personal sketches, wrote with a vivid admiration for the man whom she makes a hero, and with a charm that it is impossible to escape. Many people of note, Russian, Polish or French, figure in these captivating pages, which are interesting in their unconscious revelation of the writer herself as in their deliberate and sometimes even amusing hero-worship. The translation, by Mary Berenice Patterson, is excellent. A. C. McClurg & Co.

The following graphic description of Tolstoi's literary habits is given by the German journal, Die Woche:

Tolstoi takes the utmost pains with his work. His manuscripts are written five or six times, and sometimes he writes single chapters ten times over before he is satisfied with them. His corrections are a torture for compositors, since he fills page after page with new words and sentences, and also makes numerous erasures and other alterations. The last proof shows as much evidence of careful study as the first one, and it is not too much to say that every line which he writes is rather wrung from him than voluntarily given to the printer. Countess Sophie is the most severe critic of his works, and her judgment has much weight with him. He has thrown aside a completed romance because she did not like it, and nothing will induce him to publish it. He also likes to read his new works, before they are published, to a few intimate friends, and the suggestions which he receives on such occasions cause him to make several alterations. Thus, in the hope of obtaining some useful suggestions, he read "The Power of Darkness" to a group of peasants, but he was most painfully surprised to discover that the most startling scenes in the book, scenes which he himself could not read without tears, only evoked loud laughter from them.

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Emperor Alexander I, and the Court of Russia, Historical Memoirs of. By Mme. la Comtesse de ChoiseulGeuffier. Translated by Mary Berenice Patterson. A. C. McClurg & Co. Price, $1.50.

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Our heavy task in South Africa must not render us blind to the coming crisis in Afghanistan, and we ought to feel grateful to the Ameer Abdurrahman for publicly reminding us that it is "a time for action and not for mere talk." The proximity of Russian troops to Herat, however, is not a more pressing cause of anxiety than the difficulty of discovering some solid basis for complete confidence and harmonious action between the Afghan ruler and ourselves. The Ameer is very keenly alive to the perils of the hour. No one can say that he underrates them, but, unfortunately, the suggestions made to him by the government of India, with the object of providing against possible contingencies, are not acceptable to him, because they hurt his susceptibilities, and seem to detract from the security of his sovereign position. Lord Curzon has, throughout the correspondence, been most anxious to conciliate the Ameer; yet there is no question that our neighbor is at this moment somewhat sore with us, or, to say the least, in an irritable mood. It is not that he has any sympathy with Russia, but the first object of his policy throughout his rule has been the maintenance of his independent sovereignty, and that seems to him sometimes to be threatened as much by English requests as Russian menaces.

The present situation is one when these views are uppermost in the mind of our ally. He has been very much disturbed by Russian movements on his frontier. He has had fears that Russia might make a swoop on Herat during the winter, when it would be difficult to send reinforcements to that quarter. He has several times asked the Indian Government what he should do to meet the danger he anticipates, and the only reply accorded him is to advise him to sit tight and do nothing. That this counsel is not to his fancy is well known. He is convinced that Russia means to advance, and he holds that the only way to check her progress is to roll her back along the track she has traversed. We probably all share his opinion about Russia's intentions, but we have not yet brought ourselves to the mood to adopt what he considers the only true remedy. On the contrary, we think that there are several preliminary matters in regard to which the Ameer might do very useful work if he would only listen to our advice and our demands. We have suggested to him that it would be prudent to allow the continuation of our railway to Candahar, and the construction of a telegraph to Herat and other places in his territory. The Ameer's reply to these proposals is a flat refusal, and he goes on to say that "his people (which

means himself) look upon railways and telegraphs as a source of ruin." His irritation does not stop here, for he insinuates that the suggestion should never have been made, and he pronounces it most impolitic. It must be admitted that in all this the Ameer has been quite consistent with his past declarations. In his "Nasab-i-Namsheh," published in 1886, he said railways were not wanted in Afghanistan, and in replying to the Russians when they suggested continuing the Kushk railway to Herat, he declared that "our camels and pack-horses suffice for our trade." On the other hand, how is Afghanistan to remain outside the World's movement by adhering to an exclusive policy which even China has been compelled to abandon? The Ameer is a very clever man, and there must surely be some way of inducing him to sanction measures that are intended to benefit his country quite as much as ourselves. The common ground between us must be sought for an identity of interest. He has a dynasty to perpetuate; we have an Empire to pre

serve.

The pressing and immediate matter which we have to decide is, what policy do we intend to carry out in Afghanistan? Everything hinges on that question. We cannot expect the Ameer to make sacrifices for us while he is uncertain as to whether we mean to uphold the unity of his kingdom for himself and his successors. At present the only assurance he holds is, that we "will help Afghanistan to resist unprovoked aggression." But the Ameer is not satisfied with this arrangement, because he sees that Russia is acquiring, by means of military camps on his frontier in railway communication with their base on the Caspian, a position which, at the given moment, will enable her to invade his country with a certainty of success, unless England arrests the Russian advance with a clear

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have constructed, by agreement with Russia, a frontier for Afghanistan on parchment, but the Ameer knows as well as the man in the street that we have never told Russia that its infraction would be instantly followed by a declaration of war. The Russian Government is aware of the probability of our doing so, but there are circumstances under which it might be willing to incur the risk, and the result might justify its belief that England would not fight for the possession of Herat. Certainly the only way to prevent Russia falling into the error, if it proved one, would be to make her realize beforehand that we will oppose with all our power an attack upon that famous fortress.

Practically speaking, we have the choice between only two policies in Afghanistan. One is the maintenance of its integrity-even without unity. The other, after some preliminary stages, would result in the division of the country between Russia and ourselves. It is high time for us to make a choice between these two courses, and to begin to apply the measures necessary to ensure the success of the policy that we decide to adopt. I hope to make it clear, before the end of this article, that the maintenance of the integrity of Afghanistan is a far safer and more honorable policy than that of its partition.

If we decide for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Afghanistan under the present Ameer, his heir Habibullah and their successors, a clear and unequivocal notification of the fact should be published. The new convention should not be pigeon-holed in a Secret and Political Department, but announced in the light of day as

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the principle by which our conduct would be guided, and with which we should expect Russia to conform. In place of the vague and unmeaning promise of "support against unprovoked foreign aggression," which is all he has at present, the Ameer would receive a definite guarantee of the preservation of his sovereignty, and of its continuance in his dynasty. The ambiguity as to our future policy would be removed in a sense favorable to the aspirations of the Afghan ruler, and on our taking a step from which there could be no going back, the suggestions now made only to be rejected would wear a different aspect in his eyes. Having taken this decided step in the direction of permanently attaching the interests of the two countries together, several concessions of a minor character, but much desired by Abdurrahman, could be made to him. Among these I will only specify the gratification of his longexpressed desire to have a diplomatic agent in London. In view of the greater objects to be attained, the Government of India might well waive its old opposition to the scheme on the ground that it enabled the Ameer to go over the head or behind the back of the Viceroy.

The advantages of the policy of maintenance are clear. It conciliates the Ameer and removes his doubts. It convinces the people of Afghanistan that we have no designs on their country, and that we are ready to assist them against any Russian invasion. From our own point of view it has the two immense advantages of arresting the Russian advance at the farthest possible points from the Indian frontier and of uniting all the tribes and races of Afghanistan in opposition to it. The stimulating effect of such a decision on the courage and confidence of the Princes and all the Imperial armies of India would be incalculable, and the inevitable loss of prestige by a tame and

unopposed cession of Herat and Balkh would be averted.

In

Turning to the other side of the picture, the drawbacks of the new arrangement would chiefly consist in our being compelled to face the facts of the situation, and to announce to the world beforehand that we were prepared to oppose the realization of Russia's designs on Afghanistan as threatening the security and peace of India. reality, this plain speaking would not add to the general information except by showing that instead of postponing our measures until the crisis was upon us, we had anticipated it by preparing beforehand a plan of combined action with our allies. There would be no risk of Russia resenting it, because she is not ready for war; and there would be no legitimate ground of offence in England and the Ameer investing with greater precision their already existing agreements of 1881, 1885 and 1893. If Russia did resent it, we should only learn the truth a little sooner and have to face what we must some day, viz., a struggle for the preservation of India. To take Afghanistan under our protection in the form of a dual alliance, which will be alone agreeable to the Ameer, requires that moral courage

which was lacking after Majuba Hill, and for which the country has since had to pay such an enormous penalty in blood and treasure.

For the alternative policy of dividing Afghanistan there is not an argument to be advanced of which the writer would not feel secretly ashamed. But it is necessary to show that it would be disadvantageous as well as despicable, for the Imperial spirit aroused by events in South Africa may again become sluggish and induce our rulers to acquiesce in injuries and affronts as some of them have done before. The ever-growing burden of "the weary Titan" will always provide Little-Englanders with an argument in favor of

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