tional independence. At the time when the Piedmontese Government was standing forward to advise conciliation and concord, and asking leave to introduce troops into the northern Roman provinces, Castellani bestirred himself effectively to render its wishes and requests palatable to the rulers of Rome, and drew over to his own opinions Borgatti, the Deputy to the Foreign Minister, addressing him in these words:

"After the Pope was gone, you had but two courses open to you: the one revolution, the other accommodation. The first you have not adopted, and you have boggled at the last. Now, again, you have before you those two courses only. Time flies, and you should make your choice: either revolution, with its forced loans, taxes on absentees, military conscriptions, exceptional laws, and all the violences that violence begets; or an accommodation, that is to say, the Pope. The Pope you will have, either with your consent, under the requisite guarantees, if you accept Piedmontese intervention, and so prevent intervention from abroad; or against it, when you will become responsible either for a civil war, or for a foreign invasion, giving over the country to the tender mercies of a victor. But where are your forces for all this? You have not a brigade to rely Where is the enthusiasm of the masses? Not a shout is to be heard. Where are your arms? You have ordered the purchase of 10,000 muskets; and it will be two months before they get to Rome. Where is your money? Your coffers are already empty. Again, either you choose the aid of Piedmont, and obtain it; or you do not, and still, if it please, it will interfere, and that against you. Nay, if it should not, so much the worse for all parties, and for Italy, because do not flatter yourselves but that Austria will; and so, with her, will all the armed force of Europe. If now, as is your duty, you think more of Italy than of yourselves, remember for what cause Italy took arms; and if you really have her

on.

independence at heart, tell me in good faith, what part are you now acting in Italy and for Italy? I, who say it, am one you cannot suspect: here I have nothing to hope for myself, nothing to fear: I simply beseech you to reflect and feel that we are not Romans and Venetians, but Italians; and then to determine, whether you find in yourselves weight, force, and genius, sufficient for your own salvation, and for the deliverance of Italy, by means of revolution: but if you do not, then compound, so as to unite us all in a common purpose."

Affected and convinced, Borgatti declared he would exert himself to obtain the acceptance of the proposals of Piedmont; and then, in concluding what he had to say, Castellani used these words: "That will not suffice; you must get some strength for your Government. How will you manage this Constituent? Be on your guard, for the men of extremes are flocking in hither from all quarters, and are winning over your Deputies."

Concerning the Italian Constituent, of which it was said Rome should be the nucleus or fountainhead, Castellani, on the 29th of January, addressed the following dispatch to his Government :

"Before Venice sends here Deputies of her own, we must watch the turn of affairs. For should it be to mischief, as is likely, we might, without any present advantage, incur serious ulterior evil. Venice is simply struggling for independence, that is to say, in a cause respectable even to her enemy: whence it is probable her heroic defence may end in her freedom. But the Constituent, which they are about gathering here under the name of Italian, will be composed of representatives from countries that are internally in revolution against monarchy: hence, though it may profess to

meet in the same cause as Venice is now fighting, yet, on account of the unlimited powers it is sought to confer on the members, it cannot but assume a different aspect in the public opinion. Should, then, Venice give in her adhesion, and should the Tuscan movement, and that of Romagna, be put down by force, and the assembly, in consequence, dispersed, Venice would stand compromised for a cause which, considered strictly, is not identical with hers: and thus, in any future settlement of Italian affairs, the sympathy with her defence might fail her. I conceive, then, that we should at all events take time."

Thus did the Venetian Envoy conduct himself, according to the laws of honour and with a wise discernment, in the affairs of Rome; while he did not overlook the regards due to the Head of Catholicism, to whom, at the close of the year, he addressed his prayers and aspirations, on behalf of Venice and of Italy. His first care was to benefit his native city, plunged as it had been into peril and affliction, and to press the Provisional Government for pecuniary aid, in liquidation of the debt, which Rome had contracted for the pay and advances disbursed by Venice when the Pontifical army was serving beyond the Po. As early as August, Castellani had applied for it; and Cardinal Soglia, whom he had asked for 160,000 crowns, had replied that the Government apprehended a new Austrian invasion, if Rome should give open aid to Venice, and accordingly thought the better plan would be to pay over, secretly, a sum of money. to the Commission of Aids. Of Rossi, to whom he commended the care of Venice, Castellani had formed

a sound judgment, when, on the 23rd of September, he wrote in these words:

"I had this day an interview of an hour with the minister Rossi, and have to congratulate myself much on my reception. I found him a man of resolution. He avowed his interest in our cause; all the more, because a son of his is in our ranks. He admitted that he himself, though now old, and persuaded that the regeneration of Italy was to be gradually brought about, yet upon witnessing the enthusiasm of her communities, had come to think it would be achieved almost at a stroke. He lamented the unfortunate issue; and ascribed it to the utter want of some one great captain and statesman, and to the general lack of energy and good sense. When I observed that it was probably in his option to become the arbiter of Italian politics, he rejoined that he was a sincere well-wisher to Italy, and he did not dissemble his decided views. Then, speaking of our affairs, he remarked that the resort of such troops of volunteers to that quarter might seriously embarrass our finances, without in the least aiding the defence. As to assistance, he said they would do something."

From Mamiani, during the few days for which he continued in the Ministry of the 16th of November, Castellani had more considerable hopes, and was encouraged to believe positively that, at the very least, an arrangement would be made for taking the paper of the Venetian Exchequer as cash, in payment of taxes to the Papal treasury. But subsequently, when Mamiani fell sick, and the Ministry was changed before effect had been given to this determination, the new Ministers utterly declined to put it into execution. Of this Castellani complained, in a note addressed to Muzzarelli on the 2nd of January, in

which, after establishing the claim of Venice, relating the anterior circumstances, and making various fair proposals, he used these words: "I choose rather to believe, and, having regard to the political creed of the Ministers, I must believe, that the question has not been presented to them in its true light. Otherwise it would not seem possible that the Ministry could have rejected the propositions I put forward, so as to shut the door to all negotiation. . . . I conclude, however, that for the present, what has been said will suffice. The large additions I might make, I leave to your Excellency to apprehend. In the name of the Government and the country I represent, I repeat my request, that one or other of the plans referred to be adopted." But these representations were without effect, and Muzzarelli answered, "that the Government was compelled by an overpowering force of circumstances to postpone to a more favourable period the fulfilment of this its most sacred obligation." It was then that Castellani set on foot throughout the Roman States, a voluntary subscription of two pauls monthly, to which many agreed; but it yielded little, because the frauds were numerous and unavoidable.

Padre Ventura, the Sicilian Envoy, had, at the very commencement of the Pontificate of Pius IX., embraced the popular cause, as being that which, in his opinion, would most conduce to those triumphs of the Catholic Religion, that he earnestly desired. He was a lover of Italy and of freedom, but above all, of his own Sicily and he abhorred the domination of the