Duke shut himself up in council with his confidants. They were pinched by the unforeseen event, and by that very trust in the sincerity of the Prince which the Tuscan Delegates evinced; and they advised him to give a public engagement to uphold the free institutions. Accordingly Leopold II. issued a Proclamation, in which he formally promised it; and sent Serristori as his Commissioner, to Florence, to give proof of his good faith, and provisionally to govern the State. Now, if this kind of restoration did not suit the Court of Tuscany, much less was it palatable to those of Rome and Naples: to them it seemed a perfect scandal, that the Grand Duke should recover a lost Crown in such a manner and with such engagements. To the Duc d'Harcourt, on the contrary, it appeared a fortunate chance, and he hoped that the example of Tuscany would be wholesome, both for the people of the Roman State, and for the clergy: he trusted, that if France should arouse vigour in the former, and apprehension in the latter, by a prompt military demonstration on Roman ground, the schemes of the Conferences at Gaeta would prove abortive. He therefore lauded the Tuscans for effecting the restoration, and the Grand Duke for upholding the Constitution; and, with a view to his pet idea of a restoration of the Pope by means of the Constitutionalists acting under the countenance of France, he once more sent M. Mercier to Rome with instructions to recommend and pave the way for it. In these proceedings of the Minister of France, the Roman Court found cause for anxiety; and repined

at the diplomatic finesse which procrastinated its triumphs. The Holy Father said to an individual, "One of these days, I will act in my own way, and make an end of this scandalous affair."

M. Mercier, when he had got to Rome, resumed his communications with a few Constitutionalists. He announced the early arrival of French troops at Civita Vecchia, to hinder Austria, as he said, from domineering in the Roman States, and erasing every vestige of freedom. He besought them to try if it were possible to effect a restoration with the aid of the National Guard, and of the Carabineers, whom some reported to be ready for it. He advised them to obtain the signatures of Municipalities to manifestoes, requesting the countenance of France, to give steadiness to the Papal Throne on the basis of the free institutions. But when asked whether the Pope and the Court of Rome were parties to this course, he answered no: and betrayed the fact, that he was seeking for the co-operation of the Constitutionalists only in order to render it easy for the French Government to make a case for an armed intervention. He argued, it is true, that, when the restoration should have been completed by the hands of the people, and on the condition of a representative government, and when France would have engaged her own name, honour, and arms, in such an achievement, the people might feel secure of their liberties. But he deceived himself, as did every other statesman who, when once the cause of Italy had been so utterly ruined, still hoped to overcome the stubbornness of

the Papal Court. If France had really wished to help Italy, to acquire there influence and gratitude, and to make provision for her own honour and interest, she should not have come to Rome in April, but should have carried her arms long before into Upper Italy: for Austria is to be combated on the Mincio and the Adige, not on the Tiber. As long as Austria is safe on the side of Piedmont, and France allows this her vanguard to be worsted, Austria will be mistress of Lower Italy, the humbled handmaid of her conquests. Even had these projects of a restoration by the people been feasible, which they were not, by what means could France have inclined the Pope to a liberal policy? And, if he had not chosen so to bend, would France have ventured on resuming the very war against him, that the Roman Republic was now waging? Nor could the Constitutionalists countenance such an enterprise in the teeth of their Sovereign, of the clergy, and of their party, without any guarantee on the part of France. They undoubtedly believed, that the Republic was not founded on the opinion and assent of the community, but they likewise knew, that the clerical government was to such a degree detested by the educated laity, the high-minded youth, and all who were warmed with the sentiment of nationality, that the mere dread of contributing to its reinstatement, would have restrained every man of liberal principles from any sort of co-operation in the scheme meditated by France. They thought, further, that if France should come down into Italy in arms for the Pope,

without guaranteeing the representative institutions, she not only would ill consult her own character and influence, but would revive the credit of the Republican Government, which economical distresses, the unpunished enormities of the sectarians, and the infatuation of its heads, had reduced to such weakness, that it was going to pieces of itself.

As to the Municipalities, from which was sought an expression of confidence in France, the Constitutionalists considered it would be hard to get, partly because for a long time the policy of France has not been of a nature to invite the friendship and confidence of the Italians, partly because, in some of the towns, the Clubs and the Sects had the upper hand ; but most of all, because no man could rely on either the good sense or the liberal feeling of the clergy, while France would not enter into any pledges either for them or for herself. The Municipal Councils had been chosen according to the terms of the measure promulgated by the Provisional Government; and as all orders of the community had shared in the elections, their composition was the best possible. most universally, the moderate party had prevailed, especially in the larger cities; nor did the Republic find its passionate admirers there; but public opinion in them was likewise adverse to the dominion of the clergy, which had left the very worst recollections behind it, along with that inheritance of feuds and ignorance, whose bitter fruits were now being pulled. A few Constitutionalists, however, were disposed to use efforts for inducing the Municipalities to express

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desires conformable to that which Mamiani had expressed to the Duc D'Harcourt: a protest against all foreign invasion, and an appeal to France for the maintenance, and for guarantees, of the free institutions. But these efforts had scarcely been begun, when they were interrupted by the headlong torrent of events.

Leghorn, the first to worry Tuscany with her tumults, and now latest and solitary in her frenzy, would not agree to the restoration of the constitutional monarchy; preferring to it anarchy within the circuit of her own walls, and beyond them the risk of a civil war, as well as the attacks of Austria, whose troops had come down to Massa and Carrara, and were astir upon the old frontier of Tuscany: a very marvel of a plea for the Court, to give decorum to its request for succour, for Austria to stretch down to the Mediterranean, and for France to fold her arms. And France, content simply to get into Italy without lighting up an European war, surrendered Tuscany to Austria, who allowed her in return the boast and the honour of a share in the Catholic crusade.