Limiting Government: An Introduction to ConstitutionalismCentral European University Press, 01.01.1999 - 292 Seiten This book discusses the mechanisms to restrict government power through social self-binding, including different forms of the separation of powers and constitutional review. Written in non-technical language and using the most important English, American, French, and German examples of constitutional history, the book also examines East European (in particular, Russian) and Latin American examples, in part to illustrate certain dead-ends in constitutional development. |
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Seite x
... and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all , or is less urgent and palpable ( The Federalist Papers No. 25 ) . Since rigidity is brittle and flexibility is resilient , rigidly 30.
... and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all , or is less urgent and palpable ( The Federalist Papers No. 25 ) . Since rigidity is brittle and flexibility is resilient , rigidly 30.
Seite xiv
... exist primarily as a nega- tion . However , at those unique times of creating new political , social , or national structures , the importance and the problematic nature of fun- damental choices become clear . After having not even ...
... exist primarily as a nega- tion . However , at those unique times of creating new political , social , or national structures , the importance and the problematic nature of fun- damental choices become clear . After having not even ...
Seite 12
... exist in the collective memory . The constitutional text , where it exists , can help us to recognize these abuses . It is relatively easy to recognize interpretations that deviate from the possible meaning of the text and practices ...
... exist in the collective memory . The constitutional text , where it exists , can help us to recognize these abuses . It is relatively easy to recognize interpretations that deviate from the possible meaning of the text and practices ...
Seite 14
... exists and things will happen to him . A constitution is what it becomes during its life ; but if we wish to define it , we ... exist , like the British , Israeli , and New Zealand unwritten constitutions . Similarly , the 11 A Bundestag ...
... exists and things will happen to him . A constitution is what it becomes during its life ; but if we wish to define it , we ... exist , like the British , Israeli , and New Zealand unwritten constitutions . Similarly , the 11 A Bundestag ...
Seite 16
... exists . The newborn baby cries out ; consequently it lives . Other constitutions are written in order to delude the public ; the " great " Stalinist Constitution of 1936 was created to beguile the world . The world , or parts of it ...
... exists . The newborn baby cries out ; consequently it lives . Other constitutions are written in order to delude the public ; the " great " Stalinist Constitution of 1936 was created to beguile the world . The world , or parts of it ...
Inhalt
42 THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF PARLIAMENT | 121 |
43 UNICAMERAL VERSUS BICAMERAL SYSTEMS | 149 |
44 THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS | 155 |
THE EXECUTIVE POWER | 173 |
52 WHO OR WHAT IS THE HEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE? | 175 |
53 THE PREROGATIVES OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER | 183 |
54 THE MYTH OF RESPONSIBILITY | 194 |
55 THE INTERNAL DIVISION OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER | 198 |
THE TAMING OF DEMOCRACY | 49 |
22 MAJORITY RULE | 55 |
23 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO DEMOCRACY | 57 |
24 REFERENDUM AND DESTABILIZATION | 64 |
DANGEROUS LIAISONS CHECKS AND BALANCES AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS | 69 |
32 SEPARATION AND DEPENDENCE IN CREATION AND TERMINATION | 77 |
33 SEPARATE OPERATIONS AND JOINT DECISIONS | 89 |
34 ADDITIONAL COUNTERBALANCING FACTORS | 94 |
35 WHEN DOES THE COUNTERWEIGHT BECOME EXCESSIVE WEIGHT? | 97 |
36 SEPARATION AND FREEDOM | 99 |
PARLIAMENTARISM AND THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH | 103 |
THE RULEOFLAW STATE AND ITS EXECUTORS | 205 |
62 THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE | 218 |
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION | 225 |
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS | 245 |
82 DEFINING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS | 255 |
83 WHAT DO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IMPLY? | 271 |
RECONCILING THE STATE WITH FREEDOM IN CONSTITUTIONALISM | 277 |
85 WHAT PURPOSE DO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SERVE IF ABUSED? | 283 |
86 HOW PRECISE SHOULD THE DEFINITION BE? | 286 |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism András Sajó Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 1999 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
accepted According administration amendment American appointed Assembly authority Belgian Constitution branches of power British budget cabinet checks and balances citizens committees Congress consti Constitution of 1958 Constitutional Court constitutionalism debate decisions Declaration delegation democracy democratic determine dissolve elected electoral equal executive branch executive power exercise federal freedom French Constitution function fundamental rights German Basic Law German Constitutional Court government's guarantee human rights Hungarian Constitution independent individual institution issue judges justice legislative power legislature liberties limits majority mandate matters means ment minority nation no-confidence organs parlia parliament parliamentary systems party person political popular popular sovereignty practice president presidential presidential system prevail prime minister principle procedure protection referendum regulations representation representatives Republic responsibility restricted role Rousseau rule of law Sajó separation of powers social sovereignty state's Supreme Court theory tion tional tradition tutional U.S. Congress U.S. Constitution unconstitutional violated vote Weimar Constitution
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 30 - Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests ; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens...
Seite 129 - That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.
Seite 110 - Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests ; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates ; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole ; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.
Seite 30 - By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
Seite 7 - ... there are particular moments in public affairs, when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn.
Seite 103 - Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment ; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
Verweise auf dieses Buch
Trust in Public Institutions in South Africa Steinar Askvik,Nelleke Bak Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2005 |