Limiting Government: An Introduction to ConstitutionalismCentral European University Press, 01.01.1999 - 292 Seiten This book discusses the mechanisms to restrict government power through social self-binding, including different forms of the separation of powers and constitutional review. Written in non-technical language and using the most important English, American, French, and German examples of constitutional history, the book also examines East European (in particular, Russian) and Latin American examples, in part to illustrate certain dead-ends in constitutional development. |
Inhalt
1 | |
5 | |
7 | |
9 | |
15 CONSTITUENT POWER | 17 |
16 WHAT PRECEDES A CONSTITUTION? ORDER AND ACCEPTANCE | 23 |
NEUTRALITY OR COMMON OBJECTIVES? | 29 |
18 THE LEGAL NATURE OF A CONSTITUTION | 39 |
42 THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF PARLIAMENT | 121 |
43 UNICAMERAL VERSUS BICAMERAL SYSTEMS | 149 |
44 THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS | 155 |
THE EXECUTIVE POWER | 173 |
52 WHO OR WHAT IS THE HEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE? | 175 |
53 THE PREROGATIVES OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER | 183 |
54 THE MYTH OF RESPONSIBILITY | 194 |
55 THE INTERNAL DIVISION OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER | 198 |
THE TAMING OF DEMOCRACY | 49 |
22 MAJORITY RULE | 55 |
23 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO DEMOCRACY | 57 |
24 REFERENDUM AND DESTABILIZATION | 64 |
DANGEROUS LIAISONS CHECKS AND BALANCES AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS | 69 |
32 SEPARATION AND DEPENDENCE IN CREATION AND TERMINATION | 77 |
33 SEPARATE OPERATIONS AND JOINT DECISIONS | 89 |
34 ADDITIONAL COUNTERBALANCING FACTORS | 94 |
35 WHEN DOES THE COUNTERWEIGHT BECOME EXCESSIVE WEIGHT? | 97 |
36 SEPARATION AND FREEDOM | 99 |
PARLIAMENTARISM AND THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH | 103 |
THE RULEOFLAW STATE AND ITS EXECUTORS | 205 |
62 THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE | 218 |
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION | 225 |
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS | 245 |
82 DEFINING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS | 255 |
83 WHAT DO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IMPLY? | 271 |
RECONCILING THE STATE WITH FREEDOM IN CONSTITUTIONALISM | 277 |
85 WHAT PURPOSE DO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SERVE IF ABUSED? | 283 |
86 HOW PRECISE SHOULD THE DEFINITION BE? | 286 |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism András Sajó Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 1999 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
accepted According administration amendment American appointed Assembly authority Belgian Constitution branches of power British budget cabinet checks and balances citizens committees Congress consti Constitution of 1958 Constitutional Court constitutionalism debate decisions Declaration delegation democracy democratic determine dissolve elected electoral equal executive branch executive power exercise federal freedom French Constitution function fundamental rights German Basic Law German Constitutional Court government's guarantee human rights Hungarian Constitution independent individual institution issue judges justice legislative power legislature liberties limits majority mandate matters means ment minority nation no-confidence organs parlia parliament parliamentary systems party person political popular popular sovereignty practice president presidential presidential system prevail prime minister principle procedure protection referendum regulations representation representatives Republic responsibility restricted role Rousseau rule of law Sajó separation of powers social sovereignty state's Supreme Court theory tion tional tradition tutional U.S. Congress U.S. Constitution unconstitutional violated vote Weimar Constitution
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 7 - ... there are particular moments in public affairs, when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn.
Verweise auf dieses Buch
Trust in Public Institutions in South Africa Steinar Askvik,Nelleke Bak Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2005 |