ART. IV. - EDWARDS AND THE THEOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND.

THE fundamental principle of the philosophy of Edwards, that which seems to have governed the rest, and determined his whole scheme, was on the subject of causation. He denies that the creatures are endowed with any properly causative force; and attributes all effects to God, as the immediate and only cause. We design, in this article, to examine this principle, and trace its relation to his theology, and to subsequent theological developments in New England.

Edwards' theory is very fully stated, in the argument on identity, which occurs in his treatise on Original Sin. An English writer in the controversy with Taylor, of Norwich, spoke of human depravity as "a natural consequence and effect of Adam's first sin." Upon this Taylor says, "Here 'R. R.' supposes the course of nature to be a proper cause, which will work, and go on by itself, without God, if he lets or permits it; whereas the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is no cause, or nothing. If he shall say, 'But God first sets it to work, and it goes on of itself,' I answer;-that the course of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than at first produce itself, is absolutely impossible. But suppose it goes on by itself, can it stop itself? Can it work any otherwise than it doth? Can the course of nature cease to generate? Or can it produce a holy instead of a sinful nature, if it pleases? No advocate for original sin will affirm this. Therefore if it is a cause, it is a passive cause, which cannot stop, or avoid producing its effects. And if God sets it to work, and it cannot cease working, nor avoid producing its effects till God stops it, then all its effects in a moral account however must be assigned to him who first set it to work. And so our sinfulness will be chargeable upon God."*

The position thus assumed by Taylor-that God is the only cause, is by Edwards admitted, and vindicated with zeal, as will be abundantly seen in what follows. He undertakes to show that there is no real identity possible, in things which exist in different time and place that the moon for example which exists at the present moment, has no identity with that which existed

*Taylor's Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin. Newcastle, (Eng.) 1845. p. 189.

one moment since, or shall exist the next instant. It is not the same; but each is a new and distinct creation; and identical in no sense, except that God has determined them to be accounted one. The cause of the continued existence of every created substance "must be one of these two; either the antecedent existence of the same substance, or else the power of the Creator.* But it can't be the antecedent existence of the same substance. For instance, the existence of the body of the moon at this present moment, can't be the effect of its existence at the last foregoing moment. For not only was what existed the last moment, no active cause, but wholly a passive thing; but this also is to be considered, that no cause can produce effects in a time and place in which itself is not. 'Tis plain, nothing can exert itself or operate, when and where it is not existing. But the moon's past existence, was neither where nor when its present existence is.

Therefore the existence of created substances, in each successive moment must be the effect of the immediate agency, will and power of God." He then supposes the objection, that "the established course of nature is sufficient to continue existence, where existence is once given;" to which he replies, that the course of nature is nothing, separate from God, and that, "as Dr. Taylor says, 'God the original of all being, is the only cause of all natural effects.' "A father, according to the course of nature begets a child; an oak according to the course of nature produces an acorn or a bud; so according to the course of nature, the former existence of the trunk of the tree is followed by its new or present existence. In the one case and the other, the new effect is consequent on the former, only by the established laws and settled course of nature; which is allowed to be nothing but the continued immediate efficiency of God, according to a constitution that he has been pleased to establish. Therefore as our author greatly urges, that the child and the acorn, which come into existence according to the course of nature, in consequence of the prior existence and state of the parent and the oak, are truly immediately created or made by God; so must the existence of each created person and thing at each moment of it be from the immediate continued creation of God. It will certainly follow from these things that God's preserving created things in being, is perfectly equivalent to a continued creation, or to his creating those things out of nothing, at each moment of their existence." Hence he concludes "that God's upholding created substance, or causing its existence in each successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing, at each moment. Consequently God produces the effect as much from nothing, as if there had been

* *B *

*The Italics throughout are Edwards' own.

nothing before. So that this effect differs not at all from the first creation, but only circumstantially; as in first creation there had been no such act and effect of God's power before; whereas his giving existence afterwards, follows preceding acts and effects of the same kind, in an established order."

"Now, in the next place, let us see how the consequence of these things is to my present purpose. If the existence of created substance, in each successive moment, be wholly the effect of God's immediate power in that moment, without any dependence on prior existence,as much as the first creation out of nothing, then what exists at this moment by this power, is a new effect; and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established method. And there is no identity or oneness in the case, but what depends on the arbitrary constitution of the Creator, who by his wise sovereign establishment so unites these successive new effects, that he treats them as one, by communicating to them like properties, relations and circumstances; and so leads us to regard and treat thein as one. When I call this an arbitrary constitution, I mean, that it is a constitution which depends on nothing but the divine will; which divine will depends on nothing but the divine wisdom. In this sense, the whole course of nature, with all that belongs to it, all its laws, and methods, and constancy, and regularity, continuance, and proceeding, is an arbitrary constitution. For it don't at all necessarily follow, that because there was sound, or light, or color, or resistance, or gravity, or thought, or consciousnesss, or any other dependent thing, the last moment, that therefore there shall be the like at the next. All dependent existence whatsoever is in a constant flux, ever passing and returning; renewed every moment, as the colors of bodies are every moment renewed by the light that shines upon them; and all is constantly proceeding from God, as light from the sun. In him we live, and move, and have our being.'

"Thus it appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing as any identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different times, but what depends on God's sovereign constitution. And so it appears, that objection we are upon, made against a supposed divine constitution, whereby Adam and his posterity are viewed and treated as one, in the manner and for the purposes supposed, as if it were not consistent with truth, because no constitution can make those to be one which are not one; I say it appears, that this objection is built on a false hypothesis; for it appears that a divine constitution is the thing which makes truth, in affairs of this nature."

To render his meaning if possible still more clear and explicit, he illustrates it in a marginal note. The rays of the sun falling on the moon, and reflected from it, are none of them the same for

*

two consecutive instants of time. "Therefore the brightness or lurid whiteness of this body is no more numerically the same thing with that which existed in the preceding moment, than the sound of the wind that blows now, is individually the same with the sound of the wind that blew just before. * * And if it be thus with the brightness or color of the moon, so it must be with its solidity, and every thing else belonging to its substance, if all be, each moment, as much the immediate effect of a new existence or application of power. The matter may perhaps be in some respects still more clearly illustrated by this: The images of things in a glass. * * The image constantly renewed by new successive rays, is no more numerically the same, than if it were by some artist put on anew with a pencil, and the colors constantly vanishing as fast as put on. * * And truly so the matter must be with the bodies themselves, as well as their images. They also cannot be the same, with an absolute identity, but must be totally renewed every moment, if the case be as has been proved, that their present existence is not, strictly speaking, at all the effect of their past existence; but is wholly every instant, the effect of a new agency or exertion of the power of the cause of their existence. If so the existence caused is every instant a new effect; whether the cause be light, or immediate divine power, or whatever it be."*

* * * *

Certain words and phrases are used by Edwards in a peculiar sense in this connection. One of these is 'nature.' This word is frequently employed by writers in a loose and inaccurate way, as expressing the mere energies of the characteristics of substances. But does it mean nothing more? We believe that both in the usage of accurate writers, and in the common apprehension, it includes also the idea of power. It expresses the attributes or powers, in their relation to the substances, viewed as potential causes, whence they derive their several energy and direction. Such is the sense in which it is invariably employed in the Scriptures. Thus, Rom. 2:14,"When the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves. Which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness." In this place, the apostle by 'nature' indicates a power within, which he otherwise calls "the law written in their hearts," the minister of which is "conscience," testifying against the corruptions which they love, and in behalf of God's sovereignty and holiness, which they reject. So in 1 Cor. 11: 14, "Doth not even nature itself teach you, that if a man have long hair, it is a shame unto him;" to nature is here attributed the potentiality of a teacher. Again, Eph. 2: 3, "Ye were by nature children of wrath." Here nature

*Edwards on Original Sin. Part 4, ch. 3.

is the designation of a power, which Paul elsewere (Rom. 7:25) calls "a law of sin;" and which generates death. In the same sense the word is used by Augustine, and by Calvin, and other Reformed writers. This definition however is in direct antagonism to the whole view here taken by Edwards; and he consequently adopts a different one, and employs the word accordingly."Nature is nothing, separate from the agency of God;" and "the settled course of nature" is "nothing but the continued immediate efficiency of God." Of the propagation of corruption, he says, ""Tis as much agreeable to an established course and order of nature, that since Adam, the head of the race of mankind, the root of the great tree with many branches springing from it, was deprived of original righteousness, the branches should come forth without it. Or, if any dislike the word nature, as used in this last case, and instead of it, choose to call it a constitution, or established order of successive events-the alteration of the name won't in the least alter the state of the present argument.. Where the name, nature, is allowed without dispute, no more is meant than that established method and order of events, settled and limited by divine wisdom."*

'Constitution' is another word employed by our author in a peculiar sense. By it he does not mean, a system of fundamental principles, adopted at the beginning, by the Creator, in harmony with which he, in creating the universe, made and endowed the creatures; but an act of mere executive sovereignty, in order of nature subsequent to creation, by which he is supposed by decree to constitute or make the creatures to be something else than essentially and creatively they were. Thus, the color of the moon, its solidity, and every thing else belonging to its substance, he affirms to be at each moment a new and immediate effect of creative power, which "differs not at all from the first creation, but only circumstantially; as in first creation there had been no such act and effect of God's power before; whereas his giving existence afterwards follows preceding acts and effects of the same kind in an established order." Thus" what exists at this moment, by this power, is a new effect, and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence; though it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established method." But by a sovereign act of God, these things, thus created different and distinct, are decreed to be one. This decree is what Edwards calls, a constitution, and is, he says, "the thing which makes truth in affairs of this sort." In reference to the Pelagian objection to the propagation of sin, he says that it "supposes there is a oneness in created beings, whence qualities and relations are derived down from past existence, distinct from, and prior to any oneness that can be sup

*Edwards on Original Sin. Part 4, ch. 2.