throughout these provinces, horses might, to a great degree, be dispensed with: but this was not the fact. We are, therefore, under the necessity of contemplating the supplies of provisions under two aspects: 1. The actual production of the district. 2. The means of obtaining it, by removal.

This distinction is felt by Lord Castlereagh; who writes to Maj. Gen. Leith, Aug. 26:

You will feel the importance, as our army will have to depend altogether upon the resources of the country in which they act for moving their supplies, of avoiding as far as possible, an extended line of operations. I state the embarrassment to be the transport of the provisions in the interior; as I can have no hesitation in undertaking to meet all the wants of the army whilst on the coast. He writes also to Gen. Moore, Sep. 26:With respect to provisions, the principle pon which I have acted has been to send hree months' provisions in victuallers, with very corps that has moved, exclusive of the rovisions in their transports, which may be wveraged at about ten weeks additional conumption. This supply, aided by the cattle o be procured for the troops when on shore, nay be deemed as considerably exceeding a upply for six months. And as provisions for 10,000 men for three months, are ordered to e embarked and constantly kept up as a deôt here, there will be no difficulty in sendng you, at the shortest notice, such supplies s you may think may be more conveniently atroduced by sea, and for which you may ot think it prudent to depend on the reources of the country. A large proportion of biscuit has been sent in the victuallers, hat you may be relieved from the inconveence of baking when the troops are in mo

ion.

I laboured under in a journey of more than 300 miles, from the necessity of riding post in a country so destitute even in the best times of the ordinary travelling accommodations, and to the customs and language of which I was so unaccustomed, were the occasion of my remaining two or three days longer on the road than I had calculated.

Gen. Blake has represented to me his inability to undertake an operation without the assistance of an advance of 1,000,000 reals (about £11,000) which he proposed to get St. Ander. by means of my signature from the frigate off

his want of 12,000 good serviceable pouches, Gen. Blake also stated to me very strongly with their belts (his new levies and volunteers being obliged to carry their ammunition in their pockets), as also of 40,000 great coats. thing of this sort certainly does appear absoAs this army is not allowed blankets, somelutely necessary in a country so subject to cold and rains in the winter as this is.

I asked General Blake, says Maj. Gen. Brodrick, (Sept. 17) whether he had any maga zines for the expedition now in hand. His reply was, that he depended chiefly on the country through which he passed for his supplies, but that he had been promised biscuit from Corunna to Ferrol, and that with the help of this he meant to establish magazines for about a fortnight on the sea-coast at Sant Ander, &c. But as he talked of the frigate at Sant Ander as a last resource, I cannot help thinking that his hopes of abundance rest very little on magazines. I was obliged to explain that something very far short of a day's supply to his army night produce a famine on board the frigate.

I lost not a moment, (says Sir Hew Dalrymple), on receiving Mr. Stuart's letter, to put in motion a corps of 14 or 1500 Spaniards, which has been acting with the Northern Portuguese army under the command of the Marquis of Valladares; this corps could neither march hence nor remain here, without an advance of 10,000 dollars, which the Portuguese government had not to bestow, and which I was therefore compelled to order the Deputy Commissary General to advance. The Marquis marched next day on his return to the North, in order to join General Blake without delay.

We find, the Marquis de Romana's army subsisted from the resources of Great Britain" by His Majesty's gracious permission."

We find, that Sir John Moore, at Astorga, met with "no provisions; the little which had been collected had been con

sumed by Sir David Baird's corps in their passage, and there is not two days' bread

to carry the army to Villa Franca.".... "There is no means of carriage: the people run away: the villages are deserted." Sir John hopes Lord Castlereagh will send flour from England.

We might quote many other passages to prove that those provinces of Spain, in which the military operations of the British army were expected to be most active, were suspected of incapacity in regard to supplies, by the British; but were described as fully adequate to the support of marching bodies, even by the best informed Spaniards.

It is certain that the enjoyments to which Britons are accustomed in their own country, are very different from those customary among the peasantry of Spain; and Lord W Bentinck appears to rejoice in "the appointment of Capt. Roche, to accompany the Spanish officers, and placed under the orders of Col. Lopez, going to Almeida, because, his knowledge of the details and wants of a British army,

SO DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE

SPANIARDS, will enable him to give very useful information" This distinction must be strongly attended to: for we find this very Col Lopez confidently assuring Gen. Moore, that he would not want supplies, -when leading his army into Spain, with out established magazines. We find the statements made by our officers to the government of Spain, answered by assurances that no want of provisions need to be feared: Gen. Castanos states to Lord W. Bentinck, that he had no apprehension of want of provisions: " Gen. Reding was not disposed to admit the possibility of any difficulty being found for the subsistence of the army on its march in small detachments;-he said the troops would be subsisted by the provinces through which they passed." It is true, that the government instituted a Board of Military Subsistence: but the operations of that Board do not appear to have been what Englishmen would describe as energetic.

On the subject of transport, wheelcarriages cannot be used among the mountains and such wheel carriages as that country affords, are heavy beyond any carriage in use among us, to which to compare them. The manner of hiring mules is thus described to Lord Castlereagh by Maj. Gen. Leith.

1

Adverting to your lordship's instructions, in which I am authorised to take such steps as may appear most expedient for the purchase of 1,000 horses, mules or cattle, for the transport of provisions and baggage, I beg leave to inform your lordship, that having collected the best information on that subject, I am clearly of opinion that hiring mules of burthen or draft, is the surest, most expeditious and economical mode of fulfilling the spirit of your lordship's instruc tions. The original expenditure for the purwould not be less than £40,000, to which chase of the proposed number of mules, would be added the expense of drivers, laying in forage, fartiers, deaths, &c. The sole expense of hiring will be at the rate of from 17 0 18 reals daily for each mule of burthen, including drivers, feeding, and every charge, or perhaps a trifle more, according to the lo cality, but not much exceeding the rate I have stated; for those which are to carry ammunition something more is given, that is to

say from 18 to 20 reals, and for mules of draft capable of moving artillery, from 20 to 25 reals (20 reals making a hard dollar). I have therefore taken upon me to make the best ar rangements I could for procuring 1,000 mules on the foregoing terms.

Here we pause: we desire our readers to reflect on the vast difference between the abundance of food which every part of the United Kingdom supplies; with the stores which are reserved throughout the year, in every part of our islands; and this scarcity, which is unable to meet any extra demand, in Spain. The ch mate of Spain is certainly superior to that of Britain: the soil is capable of yielding abundance of every necessary of life. The inhabitants are able, robust, fit for labour. Whence then is this vast difference? Part of the explanation of this question is to be found in the unlimited traffic of the British islands. Why should a Spaniard raise more than he can consume? Whi ther is he to send it, and receive an advantageous return-There is no SYSTEM established in his country for this purpose. It is evident that the intercourse of part with part is so confined, that it is extremely costly the expense of sending commodities to a distance where they might fetch their fair value, exceeds the profit which might be made on them, when sold. The CIRCULATION is languid, heavy, torpid: not to the discredit of individuals; but to the infinite degradation of the state, considered as a commonweal Hence the provinces might almost as

ings of intercommunity they are stran gers: they want SYMPATHY: they want UNITY they want that CENTRE from which benefits should diverge in every di rection throughout the body politic: and to which they should be returned. Nothing can be more striking than the fact that Portugal, though sovereign of the finest gold mines, must be supplied with bullion from Britain: that Spain though the very distributor of silver to all Europe, must be favoured with Britannico-Spanish dollars:―shall we add what other supplies we have sent ?—and then survey the whole spectacle!

Very earnestly do we recommend, to the Spanish government, a sedulous attention to the amelioration of the internal condition of their national affairs. That Buonaparte should prevail, and improve them by force, shocks every principle of patriotism and humanity: but, that his charges against some of the institutions of their country, contain much truth, every competent judge must acknowledge: Fas est et ab hoste doceri.

But, we must also take this opportunity of expressing our admiration, that amidst all these evils, and many others not enumerated in these Reports, the flame of opposition to Buonaparte should still burn in Spain. Not.what the Spani ards could not do, is so astonishing in our view as what they actually have done, and are doing. Perhaps this may receive some illustration from what we have hinted on the separated state of the provinces. That may be perfectly true of the patriotic exertions of some, which is not true when transferred to others of quiescent disposition. Those also, which are under the power of France may less think of endeavouring to relieve themselves from that power by vigorous efforts, than others may think of preserving themselves from Gallic domination. These may use their strength while they have it: while those, who have been enfeebled by violence, may find a kind of consolation in languor and apathy. At all events, Buonaparte has hitherto been foiled in Spain: that his unprincipled ambition may ultimately be disappointed, is the wish of every humane and intelligent mind.

This supposition may account for the contrariety between the opinions of Sir John Moore and Gen. Baird, which uni

lifeless, with that of other eye-witnesses, who affirm that they are zealous and hearty. "Mr. Vaughan, who has travelled over the greater part of Spain, describes the Southern and Eastern provinces as full of ardour and enthusiasm." Says Lord Castlereagh :

The Spanish troops (says Lord W. Bentinck) are described as full of enthusiasm and contempt of the French, but ill cloathed, and likely to suffer very much from the inclemency of the season; the French are remuch afraid of the Spaniards; that they have presented, on the other hand, to be very individually very much suffered is certain; they must also have been very much struck with the spirit, courage and unanimity, which they have witnessed. From the period of their leaving Madrid, there has been a want of energy and enterprize very uncommon in the French armies.

There have also been very striking instances of personal bravery manifested among the Spaniards:

The regiment of Gallician peasants, (says Capt. Carrol) dressed almost entirely in the costume of their native mountains, had to the order they received was "not to yield a sustain the principal attack of the enemy, foot of ground," they sustained an ince sant and heavy file-fire for two hours and a half, and perfectly obeyed the order they had received, not having yielded an inch of ground

to the enemy.

Many other traits of heroism, might be noticed.

The Spanish officers, no doubt, must be of different descriptions: some have been regularly educated to arts, as a profession; others being men of influence in their districts, are placed in command of their neighbours and associates without further recommendation that when well officered, the Spanish troops stand well to an attack: when an unpracticed officer is in command, his flurried feelings are injurious to his corps. -Is not this common to all armies?

We suppose,

The want of subordination in obedience, and of combination in command, appears to have been extremely detrimental to Spanish valour. No Commanderin-chief to give one impulse to the whole. No resources in case of accident; the Generals incredulous on the subject of reverses; apt to believe what is favourable, and to disbelieve what is disagreeable; the ministry (or Junta) deprived of the national resources, afraid to commit the

ROUSSEL and La Blottiere were engineers in the service of Louis XIV. The irst surveyed the country of Labour, the vhole of Lower Navarre, and part of the Higher Navarre, the district of Soule, Bearn, Bigorre, and part of Cominge nd of Guienne; the latter surveyed Rousillon, Cerdagne, Conque de Tremps, Conserana, part of Cominge, Guipuscoa, nd the valley of Bastan. Besides these ctual surveys that monarch had a collecion of the best Spanish maps, and what vas defective in the originals which he ommanded, he supplied from these soures of information.

The first peculiarity that strikes the eye n this map is, the position of the letters. Jsually geographers make a point of plaing the heads of their letters on maps to he North: but, as to a Frenchman France 3 every thing, these are so placed as to be post easily read, as it were, from the rench territory. The idea was, in fact, ut too well justified by the event, that

he accession of the House of Bour

on, virtually incorporated Spain with Trance. The prevalence of French inerest and intrigue was the consequence of he establishment of a French court; lthough the bulk of the Spanish nation, nost cordially hated the intruders. Spain vas a province of France; and might have been so still, had not Buonaparte, y his unprincipled tyranny, roused a part of the Spanish people to resistance.

But the chief value of this delineation rises from the accuracy, with which the 'yrennees and their branches are laid down n it. The intricacies of these mountains re great and to trace them completely, lemanded much skill, time and patience: The rule for ascertaining the boundary of The two kingdoms was, by following the course of the waters from the summits of he mountains: but, by this mean, each kingdom projected in some points into its eighbour; and these projections gave nany advantages to the possessor of them.

The branchings of the mountains infer the situation of the Passes, which lead between them and form the medium of These would be best known to the imintercouse between kingdom and kingdom. porters of contraband wares into each kingdom; and these smugglers (called in Spanish, Miquelets) would prefer for their purposes the most private and unfrequented ways. The difficulty of a passage would be, in fact, its recommendation, as it diminished the chance of a rencontre with the custom-house officers. But, passengers, in general, would choose more ready and easy roads; those laid out and appointed by authority. Of these, some were rendered passable at all seasons of the year; while others were passable only in summer time as the snows of winter presented insurmountable obstructions. Some were passable for horses and mules, only; others for wheel carriages, and heavy commodities. These latter, were of course, the best adapted to military movements; troduced by these only. and artillery with its stores, could be in

said on the Passes into Spain, for much that might be observed on this Map; at present we only add, that it appears from this authority, that there is a good road used by Buonaparte for the transport of from Bayonne to Irun ;-this has been his forces.-Another from Bayonne to Pampeluna, by the valley of Bastan ;another to the same city by St. Jean Pied de Port.-These are the chief, if not the only passable routes in the West: two of them meeting at Pampeluna, give great another road, nearly in the midst of the There is importance to that fortress. Isthmus, leading from Oleron; this, however, is not always practicable; and it passes through a difficult country. The passes on the East, are more open; and this part of Spain, does not present the same obstacles to an invading enemy as the West does. On the whole we adhere to our opinion already expressed, that without the command of the water, an attack on resisting Spain is military Quixotism.

We refer to what we have elsewhere

The history of this Map, with the causes of its being re-engraved and published in England, has appeared in the foregoing article. It is somewhat extended (southward), from the original; on the best authorities.