"to return upon its own footsteps, and trace back those operations which have employed it since it first began to "think and to act." The same author remarks, that, "if we could obtain a distinct and full history of all that "hath passed in the mind of a child, from the beginning of "life and sensation, till it grows up to the use of reason; "how its infant faculties began to work, and how they "brought forth and ripened all the various notions, opinions, "and sentiments, which we find in ourselves when we come "to be capable of reflection; this would be a treasure of "Natural History, which would probably give more light "into the human faculties, than all the systems of philoso"phers about them, since the beginning of the world." To accomplish an analysis of these complicated phenomena into the simple and original principles of our constitution, is the great object of this branch of philosophy; but, in order to succeed, it is necessary to ascertain facts before we begin to reason, and to avoid generalizing, in any instance, till we have completely secured the ground that we have gained. Such a caution, which is necessary in all the sciences, is, in a more peculiar manner, necessary here, where the very facts from which all our inferences must be drawn, are to be ascertained only by the most patient attention; and, where almost all of them are, to a great degree, disguised, partly by the inaccuracies of popular language, and partly by the mistaken theories of philosophers.

I have only to add, that, although I have retained the phrase of the Association of Ideas, in compliance with common language, I am far from being completely satisfied with this mode of expression. I have retained it, chiefly that I might not expose myself to the censure of delivering old doctrines in a new form.

As I have endeavoured to employ it with caution, I hope that it has not often misled me in my reasonings. At the same time, I am more and more convinced of the advantages to be derived from a reformation of the common language in most of the branches of science. How much such a reformation has effected in Chemistry is well known; and it is evidently much more necessary in the Philosophy of Mind, where the prevailing language adds to the common inaccuracies of popular expressions, the peculiar disadvantage, of being all suggested by the analogy of matter. Often, in the composition of this work, have I recollected the advice of Bergman to Morveau.* "In re"forming the nomenclature of chemistry, spare no word "which is improper. They who understand the subject "already, will suffer no inconvenience; and they to whom "the subject is new, will comprehend it with the greater "facility." But it belongs to such authors alone, as have extended the boundaries of science by their own discoveries, to introduce innovations in language with any hopes of success.

* "Le savant Professeur d'Upsal, M. Bergman, écrivoit à M. de Morveau dans les derniers temps de sa vie, ne faites graces à aucune denomination impropre. Ceux qui savent déja entendront toujours; ceux qui ne savent pas encore entendront plutôt." Methode de Nomenclat. Chémique, par MM. MORVEAU, Lavoisier, &c,

338

CHAPTER SIXTH.

OF MEMORY.

SECTION 1.

General Observations on Memory.

AMONG the various powers of the understanding, there is none which has been so attentively examined by philosophers, or concerning which so many important facts and observations have been collected, as the faculty of Memory. This is partly to be ascribed to its nature, which renders. it easily distinguishable from all the other principles of our constitution, even by those who have not been accustomed to metaphysical investigations, and partly to its immediate subserviency, not only to the pursuits of science, but to the ordinary business of life; in consequence of which, many of its most curious laws had been observed, long before any analysis was attempted of the other powers of the mind; and have, for many ages, formed a part of the common maxims which are to be found in every treatise of education. Some important remarks on the subject may, in particular, be collected from the writings of the ancient rhetoricians,

The word Memory is not employed uniformly in the same precise sense; but it always expresses some modification of that faculty, which enables us to treasure up, and preserve for future use, the knowledge we acquire; a faculty which is obviously the great foundation of all intellectual improvement, and without which, no advantage could be derived from the most enlarged experience. This faculty implies two things: a capacity of retaining knowledge;

SECT. 1.]

ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY, &c.

339

and a power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use. The word Memory is sometimes employed to express the capacity, and sometimes the power. When we speak of a retentive memory, we use it in the former sense; when of a ready memory, in the latter.

The various particulars which compose our stock of knowledge are, from time to time, recalled to our thoughts, in one of two ways; sometimes they recur to us spontaneously, or at least, without any interference on our part; in other cases, they are recalled, in consequence of an effort of our will. For the former operation of the mind, we have no appropriated name in our language, distinct from Memory. The latter, too, is often called by the same name, but is more properly distinguished by the word Recollection.

There are, I believe, some other acceptations besides these, in which the word Memory has been occasionally employed; but as its ambiguities are not of such a nature is to mislead us in our present inquiries, I shall not dwell any longer on the illustration of distinctions, which to the greater part of readers might appear uninteresting and minute. One distinction only, relative to this subject, occurs to me, as deserving particular attention.

The operations of Memory relate either to things and their relations, or to events. In the former case, thoughts which have been previously in the mind, may recur to us, without suggesting the idea of the past, or of any modification of time whatever; as when I repeat over a poem which I have got by heart, or when I think of the features of an absent friend. In this last instance, indeed, philosophers distinguish the act of the mind by the name of Conception; but in ordinary discourse, and frequently even in philoso. phical writing, it is considered as an exertion of Memory.

In these and similar cases, it is obvious that the operations of this faculty do not necessarily involve the idea of the past.

The case is different with respect to the memory of events. When I think of these, I not only recal to the mind the former objects of its thoughts, but I refer the event to a particular point of time; so that of every such act of memory, the idea of the past is a necessary con

comitant.

I have been led to take notice of this distinction, in order to obviate an objection which some of the phenomena of Memory seem to present, against a doctrine which I formerly stated, when treating of the powers of Conception and Imagination.

It is evident, that when I think of an event, in which any object of sense was concerned, my recollection of the event must necessarily involve an act of Conception. Thus, when I think of a dramatic representation which I have recently seen, my recollection of what I saw necessarily involves a conception of the different actors by whom it was performed. But every act of recollection which relates to events, is accompanied with a belief of their past existence. How then are we to reconcile this conclusion with the doctrine formerly maintained concerning Conception, according to which every exertion of that power is accompanied with a belief, that its object exists before us at the present moment?

The only way that occurs to me of removing this difficulty, is by supposing, that the remembrance of a past event is not a simple act of the mind; but that the mind first forms a conception of the event, and then judges from circumstances, of the period of time to which it is to be referred a supposition which is by no means a gratuitous one, invented to answer a particular purpose, but which, as far as I am able to judge, is agreeable to fact: