ticular form which this union happens in the case of any community to assume, determines many of the most important circumstances in the character of the people, and many of those opinions and habits which affect the happiness of private life.

These observations which represent politics as a branch of moral philosophy have been sanctioned by the opinions of all those authors, both in ancient and modern times, by whom either the one or the other has been cultivated with much success. Among the former it is sufficient to mention the names of Plato and Aristotle, both of whom, but more especially the latter, have left us works on the general principles of policy and government, which may be read with the highest advantage at the present day. As to Socrates, his studies seem to have been chiefly directed to inculcate the duties of private life; and yet in the beautiful enumeration which Xenophon has given of his favorite pursuits, the science of politics is expressly mentioned as an important branch of the philosophy of human nature. "As for himself, man, and what related to man, were the only subjects on which he chose to employ himself. To this purpose, all his inquiries and conversations turned on what was pious, what impious; what honorable, what base; what just, what unjust; what wisdom, what folly; what courage, what cowardice; what a state or political community; what the character of a statesman or a politician; what a government of men, what the character of one equal to such a government. It was on these and other matters of the same kind that he used to discourse, in which subjects those who were knowing he used to esteem men of honor and goodness, and those who were ignorant to be no better than the basest of slaves." *

In modern times the intimate relation between ethics and politics, and the easy transition by which the one perpetually leads the thoughts to the other, may be distinctly traced in the speculations of Grotius, of Locke, of Fenelon, of Montesquieu, of Turgot, of Smith, and

* Mrs. Fielding's Translation of Xenophon's Memorabilia.

(with a very few exceptions) of all that class of writers in France who were distinguished by the name of Economists. I mention these examples chiefly to show that it is not in consequence of any capricious and arbitrary arrangement that these two branches of science are referred to the same academical department in some of our modern universities; and to illustrate, by an appeal to literary history, the imperfection of those systems of politics which are not founded on the previous study of the nature and duties of man.

APPENDIX I

(See p. 221.)

ON MAN'S FREE AGENCY.

SECTION I.

Preliminary Observations.—Explanation of some Ambiguous Terms.

ALL the foregoing inquiries concerning the moral constitution of man, proceed on the supposition that he has a freedom of choice between good and evil, and that, when he deliberately performs an action which he knows to be wrong, he renders himself justly obnoxious to punishinent. That this supposition is agreeable to the common apprehensions of mankind will not be disputed.

From very early times indeed the truth of the supposition has been called in question by a few speculative men, who have contended that the actions we perform are the necessary result of the constitutions of our minds, operated on by the circumstances of our external situation; and that what we call moral delinquencies are as much a part of our destiny as the corporeal or intellectual qualities we have received from nature. The argument in support of this doctrine has been proposed in various forms, and has been frequently urged with the confidence of demonstration.

This question about predestination and free will has furnished, in all ages and countries, inexhaustible matter of contention, both to philosophers and divines. In the ancient schools of Greece it is well known how generally and how keenly it was agitated. Among the Mahometans it constitutes one of the principal points of division between the followers of Omar and those of Ali; and among the ancient Jews it was the subject of endless dispute between the Pharisees and the Sadducees. It is scarcely necessary for me to add, what violent controversies it has produced, and still continues to produce, in the Christian world.

As this controversy, like most others in metaphysics, has been involved in much unnecessary perplexity by the ambiguity of language, a few brief remarks on some equivocal terins connected with the question at issue may perhaps add something to the perspicuity and precision of the following reasonings. In stating these remarks, however, I shall not scupulously confine myself to such as are to bear on my intended argument, but shall avail myself of every opportunity that may occur of correcting those inaccurate modes of speaking which have any connexion, however distant, with this important article in the Philosophy of the Human Mind.

The word volition is defined by Locke to be "an act of the mind, knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from any particular action.". Dr. Reid defines it more briefly to be, "the determination of the mind to do or not to do something which we conceive to be in our power." He remarks, at the same time, that "this definition is not strictly logical, inasmuch as the determination of the mind is only another term for volition. But it ought to be observed, that the most simple acts of the mind do not admit of being logically defined. The only way to form a precise notion of them is to reflect attentively upon them as we feel them in ourselves. Without this reflection no definition can enable us to reason about them with correctness."

It is necessary to form a distinct notion of what is meant by the word volition, in order to understand the import of the word will; for this last word properly expresses that power of the mind of which volition is the act, and it is only by attending to what we experience, while we are conscious of the act, that we can understand any thing concerning the nature of the power.

The word will, however, is not always used in this its proper acceptațion, but is frequently substituted for volition; as when I say that my hand moves in obedience to my will. This indeed happens to the names of most of the powers of the mind; that the same word is employed to express the power and the act. Thus imagination signifies both the power and the act of imagining; abstraction signifies both the power and the act of abstracting, and so in other instances. But although the word will may, without departing from the usual forms of speech, be used indiscriminately for the power and the act, the word volition applies only to the latter; and it would undoubtedly contribute to the distinctness of our reasonings to restrict the signification of the word will entirely to the former.

It is not necessary, I apprehend, to enlarge any more on the meaning of these terms. It is to be learned only from careful reflection on what passes in our own minds, and to multiply words upon the subject would only involve it in obscurity.

There is, however, a state of the mind perfectly distinct, both from the power and the act of willing, with which they have been frequently confounded, and of which it may therefore be proper to mention the characteristical marks. The state I refer to is properly called desire, the distinction between which and will was first clearly pointed out by Mr. Locke. "I find the will," says he, "often confounded with several of the affections, especially desire, and that by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them."-" This," he justly adds, "has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter, and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided." The substance of his remarks on the appropriate meaning of these two terms amounts to the two following propositions. 1. That at the same moment a man may desire one thing and will another. 2. That at the same moment a man may have contrary desires, but cannot have contrary wills. The notions, therefore, which ought to be annexed to the words will and desire are essentially different.

It will be proper, however, to state Mr. Locke's observations in his own words: "He that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his own mind when he wills, shall see that the will or power of volition is conversant about nothing, but that particular determination of the mind, whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop to any action which it takes to be in its power. This well considered plainly shows, that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire, which, in the very same action, may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our wills set us upon. A man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish not to prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary. A man who, by a violent fit of gout in his limbs, finds a want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands, (for, wherever there is pain there is a desire to be rid of it;) though yet, while he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humors to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove this pain. Whence it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind; and, consequently, that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from desire."

It is surprising how little this important passage has been attended to by Locke's

successors."

Inclination is another word with which will is frequently confounded. Thus, when the apothecary says in Romeo and Juliet,

"My poverty, but not my will consents;

Take this and drink it off; the work is done;"

the word will is plainly used as synonymous with inclination; not in its strict logical sense, as the immedate antecedent of action. It is with the same latitude that the word is used in common conversation, when we speak of doing a thing which duty prescribes against our own will; or when we speak of doing a thing willingly or unwillingly.

According to Mr. Belsham, " Volition is a modification of the passion of desire." (Elements, 227.) In another passage we are told by the same author, that "volition has been proved by Dr. Hartley to be a case of association;" (Ibid. 175,)— a proposition which to my mind is quite incomprehensible.