Skilful Workman, and not made by Chance ; and by what Medium foever they will prove this, I will undertake to prove, That God made the World, though we did not fee him make it.

But the present Enquiry is only this; Whether this be Human Reafon, the Natural Reafon of Human Minds? If it be, then Men who will be contented to reafon like Men, muft acknowledge and affent to this Argument from Effects to Caufes, which unavoidably proves a God and a Providence: And this is all I defire to be granted, That those who will follow the Notices and Principles of Human Reafon, muft believe that God made and governs the World: For I know not how to reafon beyond Human Reason; those who do, may please themselves with it.

Those who have found out a Reafon, which contradicts the Natural Principles of Reafon, muft reafon by themselves, for Mankind cannot reafon with them.

But let us confider how Atheists reason, when they have laid afide this Principle of Reason, from Effects to Causes.

They tell us, That a moft Artificial World may be made without Art, or any wife Maker, by blind Chance, without any defigning Efficient Cause: That Life, and Senfe, and Reason, may refult from dead, ftupid, fenfelefs Atoms; Well we hear this, and bear it as patiently as we can; but how do they prove this? Why, they fay, it may be; and they can go no farther: But how do they know this may be? Have they any fuch Notion in their Minds? Have they any natural Senfation that answers thefe Words? Does Nature teach them, that any Thing can

be

be without a Caufe adequate to the Effect? That any Thing can be wifely made without a wife Cause? That one contrary can produce the other? That fenfelefs, ftupid Matter can produce Life, Sensation and Underftanding? Can they then tell me, what it is that can't be? I defire to know by what Rule they judge, what may be, and what can't be And if they can find any can't be more abfurd and contradictious than their may be, I will renounce Senfe and Reason for ever. If nothing can be without a Caufe, according to the Reason of Mankind, this can't be; and therefore all that their may be's can fignify, is this, That if the Reason of Mankind deceive us, fuch Things may be, as the most unqueftionable Principles of Reafon tell us can't be. And this is the glorious Triumph of Atheistical Reafon; it can get no farther than a may be, and fuch a may be as is abfolutely impoffible, if the Reason of Mankind be true.

Set afide the Relation between Caufes and Effects, and all the Arguments from Causes to Effects, and from Effects to Causes, and there is an End of all Knowledge; and fet afide all those first Principles and Maxims of Reason, which all Men affent to at the first Proposal, the Truth of which they fee and feel, and there is an End of all Reafon : For there can be no Reasoning without the Acknowledgment of fome firft Principles, which the Mind has a clear, diftinct, and vigorous Perception of: And if Men will diftruft their own Minds, in fuch Things as they have an easy, natural Perception of, and prefer fome Arbitrary Notions, which feem abfurd Contradictions, and impoffible to the rest of Mankind, and which they can have no Idea of beyond the Sound of Words; they C may

may be Atheists, if they please, at the Expence of their Reafon and Underftanding; that is, they may be Atheists, if they will not judge and reafon like Men. But if we are as certain of the Being of a God, and of a Providence, as we are, that nothing can be without a Cause, we have all the Certainty that Human Nature is capable of.

CHA P. II.

The General Notion of Providence, and particularly concerning a Preserving Providence.

HA

Aving proved as largely as my prefent De fign required, That the fame God who made the World, is the Supream Lord and Governor of it; I proceed to confider the Nature of Providence.

The General Notion of Providence, is God's Care of all the Creatures he has made, which must consist in Preferving and Upholding their Beings and Natures, and in fuch Acts of Government, as the good Order of the World, and the Happiness of Mankind require; which divides Providence into Prefervation and Government, which muft be carefully diftinguifhed, in order to anfwer fome great Difficulties in Providence.

I begin with Preferving Providence, which commences from the first Inftant of the Creation: For as foon as Creatures are made, they need a Divine Power to preferve them. For this is the ftrict Notion of Prefervation, as diftinguished from a Governing Providence, That God upholds all Things in Being from falling back into their firft Nothing, and preferves their Natural Virtues, Powers and Faculties, and enables them to act, and to attain the Ends of their feveral Natures: Which diftinguishes this Preferving Providence from thofe many Acts of Prefervation which belong to Government Such as Preferving the Lives of Men from unfeen Accidents, and visible Dangers, nay, of Beasts and of Birds too, as our Saviour affures us, That not a sparrow falls to the ground without our Father : In which Senfe, the Pfalmift tells us, That God preferves both man and beasts, fupplies them with Food, and all other Things neceffary to Life, and preferves their Lives from Violence or Accident, as long as he fees fit.

10. Matt. 29.

36. Pfal. 6.

This Preservation, as diftinguish'd from Government, St. Paul exprefly teaches, 17. Acts 28. For in him we live, and move, and have our being. We were not only made by him, but we live, and move, and have our Being in him; as the Apostle to the Hebrews tells us of Chrift, That be upholds all things by the word of his Power, 1. Heb. 3.

The Schools have divided this into Two diftinct Acts. 1. God's Upholding and Preferving the Being and Natures of all Things, 2. His Co-operating with all Creatures, and by a perpetual Influx and Concourse, actuating C 2

their

their Natural Powers to perform their Natural Actions; that is, That we have our being in him, and that we live, and move, and act in him, or by a new Influx of Power from him.

As for the first, the Prefervation of all Things in Being; Befides thofe Texts of Scripture, which exprefly attribute this to God, the Schools urge feveral Arguments for the Proof of it, which I think may be refolved into this one; That whatever does not neceffarily exift by the internal Principles of its own Nature, muft depend on its Caufe, not only for its Being, but for its Continuance and Preservation. For there is no Medium between neceffary Exiftence, and Dependance on its Caufe.

The very Notion of a Creature does not only include in it, its being made, but its Dependance on its Maker for its Continuance in being: For whatever does not neceffarily exift, muft not only be made at first, but must be upheld and preferved in Being; for it can no more preserve, than it can make it felf. It was nothing once; and what was once nothing, may be nothing again, and therefore cannot fubfift of it self, but in Dependance on its Maker.

It is not with the Being and Natures of Things, as it is with the Works of Art, which tho' they cannot make themselves, yet when they are made can fubfift without the Artist that made them. As a House cannot build it felf, but when it is built, it continues of it felf, as long as the Materials and Workmanship laft, when the Workman has left it: For the Workman does not give Being to the Materials, but only to the Form, which fubfifts in the Matter, and that in its firft Caufe: But whatever receives its Being from another, as all Crea

tures