that they have produced an infinity of contrasts, resemblances, and parts and counterparts, the most profound and curious; to which, indeed, there is nothing similar, or equally indicative of powers of invention, in the whole range of poetical and novel-writing fancy! Is this to be believed? Was it in this wild exercise of human energies, that "Paradise Lost" was composed; or that the mighty apparatus for the building of London-bridge was constructed?

But another infidel-or perhaps the same-may, by some sudden change of opinion, ascribe this great effect to the matchless talent of the writers; for though sometimes they are denounced as fools and miserable scribblers, yet when a purpose must be served, they are found to be men of wonderful sagacity, and very ingenious authors.

We ask, Where did Moses and the apostles find the model of their scheme? Or, could poor, uneducated, obscure men, or, indeed, any men whatever, invent the whole of such a mighty plan? Whoever possessed the knowledge of human nature, of laws, of morals, and of human concerns in general, necessary to the creation of this stupendous fabric? As to the power, in particular, of imagining supernatural beings, how paltry is the genius of Shakspeare, compared with that of these supposed impostors! They were, no doubt, sensible men; but will this alone account for the prodigious range and depth of thought displayed in their writings?

Michaëlis mentions an Italian writer, who conjectures, that four superior persons in the fourth century might possibly invent the New Testament, and interpolate some passages in Tacitus and Suetonius, and forge all the Fathers! How prodigious is the credulity of the sceptic! One would expect to meet, in the works of this Italian, with the assertion, that Columbus invented America, made it, placed it in the Western Ocean; and then returned with a lie in his mouth, telling the people of Europe that he only discovered it!

Once more: The deist will urge, that our plan of trying Scripture, by its application to nature, is favourable to his own system; as it discovers, in his opinion, the inequality of the former to the wants of the latter, its many inconsistencies with reason and the existing state of things.

We have anticipated this objection in the outset of the argument, and, in part, supplied an answer to it, when speaking

of some inexplicable relations in the second section. The infidel objects to the entire system, because of apparent inconsistencies connected with a limited number of facts and doctrines. Should we admit these instances, there still would be an important balance in our favour, as the objection relates merely to certain details, and not to the substance and design of the whole. This design and this substance are, beyond all question, suited to the wants of nature; and quite within the limit of omnipotence to effect; and nothing better or nobler, as we have shown, can be imagined; and all this must be granted, whether revelation be truth or an imposture. Why, then, should particular cases overturn our conviction of the general excellence?

Will the friends of deism renounce their system, on account of the undeniable inconsistencies connected with it? For example: They oppose Christianity, because, among other reasons, it has not been universally made known. This, it appears, they consider a real objection. But does it not apply to their own five, or seven, or other number of articles? Are all men agreed on these; or do all men know them; or is it possible that all men should, each for himself, discover them? Yet in their writings they insist on such agreement, and knowledge, and discovery, as the essential conditions of a genuine religion; as may be seen by consulting Herbert, and Blount, and several other authors on the infidel side of the question. But will they venture to say, that these conditions are fulfilled in deism? If not, why should they require from us that abandonment of the system which they allow not in their own case ?

But we do not admit the inconsistencies to which the infidel refers. We repeat with confidence, that the writers on the Evidences abound with the most able and complete replies to every single case of the numerous difficulties long since urged and aggravated by infidels of all descriptions. Until argumentative rejoinders be produced, the cases, therefore, must be deemed as perfectly unexceptionable.

The same character, indeed, will apply to every other case. From what has been advanced in the whole course of this Argument, we may infer the perfect fitness and harmony of each and all of the relations involved in the scheme of Scripture. be asked by the deist, "How do you know this to be

It

may

true, when the great majority of these relations have not been so much as named?" We reply, How do you know that all the stones on the surface of the globe, if thrown into the air, would fall back again to the earth, and each with the very same regular increase of swiftness? Have all these been tried as to this property? Or, is this requisite to prove the question? Certainly not. A sufficient number of instances are known to establish the belief, that the law of gravitation is universal and invariable, however certain appearances may indicate the contrary.

In the broad blue mist of twilight, which sometimes beclouds the distance of a landscape, perhaps an elevated rock or tower seems to disdain the ground, and to hang in the sky, perfectly independent of this lower world. Would this phenomenon, scen for the first time, and unexplained, induce any one but a child to suspect the certainty of the gravitating principle? Would the infidel consider this to be a real exception to the myriads of instances included in his own experience? Would he now feel some hesitation to leap a ditch, lest this law should unhappily suspend its operation, and leave him hanging in the air, without the hope of deliverance? On the contrary, he would, no doubt, conclude this to be a mere appearance, though quite mysterious; especially as he would recollect many similar deceptions in other subjects, such as the apparent crookedness of an oar, when dipped in the water. For, though an infidel will not, in regard to religion,-that most suspected of all questions, -allow of difficulties, as he does in other studies, yet, as to the case alluded to, he would naturally, in the absence of all prejudice, draw satisfaction, as to practical purposes, from his own proper knowledge, and from a rational comparison of different subjects with each other.

The known instances in Scripture, then, of useful adaptation and of harmony, are, as we have shown, of a character so important, are so numerous and so various, and yet so uniformly preserve the principle of coalescence, that the whole of the unexamined cases have equal claims to credibility. That these cases are part of the same wise and benevolent contrivance, is evident from their close and extensive intermixture with those of which we have just been speaking. To separate the two classes from each other, would be to tear, and render of no value, the seamless garment of the whole.

VIII. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

IT may not be improper briefly to resume, at present, some things already but imperfectly considered.

In the course of this inquiry much has been advanced, to show profound and benevolent contrivance as universally characteristic both of the scheme and record of Divine revelation. Much more has been suggested for the exercise of the inquisitive mind, in the farther prosecution of this fruitful and important subject. The common opinions laid down in a former section, or any other just and proper principles on which the reader shall be pleased to fix, may, as there observed, be taken, each in succession, and applied, as far as rationally applicable, to any, or to all, of the parts of the Bible, or any, or all, of the properties or circumstances of each part. In this way,-in all fair and reasonable ways, indeed,-let the witness be tried, even by an enemy, and twisted, and tested, and cross-examined, till inquisition be exhausted; and we verily believe, that not a single inconsistent, or untrue, or prevaricating answer will be given.

Of those opinions, to shorten the labour, let the more essential be selected. For example: Justice, truth, holiness, and goodness, as attributes of God, and as virtues in human society, are always of indispensable consequence, while each presents in itself a principle of beautiful harmony. Justice is harmony, and so of the rest. Let it be asked, "Do these concur and prevail in all that is revealed of God?" mentioning the instances. Put the same question in regard to the fact of furnishing a revelation, or a dispensation of Divine influence in man, or a ministration of the truth by the ordinances of the Gospel. Inquire, "Is the whole or any part of religion calculated to promote those admirable virtues in our personal and relative character?" And so of other cases, till the evidence accumulate, and place the general subject in a blaze of excellence, and on a rock of eternal certainty.

But a variety of methods for closely sifting the question, in the use of these or such like means, might also have been proposed. For instance: The different species of reasoning in common use will, in many respects, apply to the point at issue. Why may we not reason from the effect to the cause, as well in regard to the world of revealed truth, as to that of matter and of mind around us? Is there not a wisdom and a grandeur

in the outline of revelation, indicating, equally with the solar system, a Divine Mind as its only sufficient cause? And might not this train of thought be pursued through innumerable instances of manifest design connected with the Scriptures, as Dr. Paley has done in reference to nature?

This truth is also obvious, if we reason, on the same subject, from the cause to the effect; that is, from our reasonable notions of God and his perfections, to the scheme of revelation, as a regular and consistent result.

We say "reasonable notions," not natural. For, what would be our natural notions, in this case, apart from the influence and suggestions of revelation and tradition, it would be difficult to say. But, though from these sources we derive, sometimes insensibly, those very principles on which we reason to the being and attributes of God, yet the reasoning is legitimate; for, the question is not, whence these principles were received, but whether they be just and solid. Had revelation never appeared, and tradition never shed her light, it would, perhaps, have been a most difficult undertaking, if not impossible, to demonstrate, by any kind of proof, the existence and perfections of a First and Infinite Cause. But now that the subject is suggested, no demonstration is more easy.

It is, therefore, only among those who have either directly or indirectly received the assistance of revealed truth, that any rational and consistent process of this reasoning may be found. As to those who have not been thus enlightened, nothing can be more unsatisfactory, or, sometimes, more absurd, than their notions of the existence, but especially concerning the perfections, of God. And some of the most powerful minds have denied his being altogether.

The truth is, if we must never be indebted to effects, which we intend to prove from their causes, there could be no such thing as an argument a priori in regard to the Creator; for, the man who attempts it is himself an effect of the power of that Almighty Being, whose existence he is about to prove; and to prove, not from any effect whatever; for he supposes none to exist, not even his own reasoning powers, but from widelydifferent premises.

The writers on the Evidences are constantly, and very properly, asserting, that it is at least highly probable, and reasonably to be expected, that God should make himself known by some.