embalmed, their repofitories must in time have been more spacious than the dwellings of the living. I suppose only the rich or honourable were fecured, from corruption, and the reft left to the course of

nature.

"But it is commonly supposed that the Egyptians believed the foul to live as long as the body continued undiffolved, and therefore tried this method of eluding death."

"Could the wife Egyptians, faid Nekayah, think fo grofsly of the foul? If the foul could once furvive its feparation, what could it afterwards receive or fuffer from the body?"

"The Egyptians would doubtlefs think erroneously, faid the aftronomer, in the darkness of heathenifm, and the firft dawn of philofophy. The nature of the foul is ftill difputed amidst all our opportunities of clearer knowledge: fome yet fay, that it may be material, who, nevertheless, believe it to be immortal."

"Some, answered Imlac, have indeed faid that the foul is material, but I can fcarcely believe that any man has thought it, who knew how to think; for all the conclufions of reafon enforce the immateriality of mind, and all the notices of fenfe and investigations of fcience concur to prove the unconsciousness of matter.

"It was never supposed that cogitation is inherent in matter, or that every particle is a thinking being. Yet, if any part of matter be devoid of thought, what part can we fuppofe to think? Matter can differ from matter only in form, denfity, bulk, motion,

and

and direction of motion: to which of thefe, however varied or combined, can consciousness be annexed? To be round or square, to be solid or fluid, to be great or little, to be moved flowly or swiftly one way or another, are modes of material existence, all equally alien from the nature of cogitation. If matter be once without thought, it can only be made to think by fome new modification, but all the modifications which it can admit are equally unconnected with cogitative powers.'

"But the materialifts, faid the aftronomer, urge that matter may have qualities with which we are unacquainted."

"He who will determine, returned Imlac, against that which he knows, becaufe there may be fomething which he knows not; he that can let hypothetical poffibility against acknowledged certainty, is not to be admitted among reafonable beings. All that we know of matter is, that matter is inert, fenfelefs, and lifelefs; and if this conviction cannot be oppofed but by referring us to fomething that we know not, we have all the evidence that human intellect can admit. If that which is known may be over-ruled by that which is unknown, no being, not omniscient, can arrive at certainty."

"Yet let us not, faid the aftronomer, too arrogantly limit the Creator's power."

"It is no limitation of omnipotence, replied the poet, to fuppofe that one thing is not confiftent with another, that the fame propofition cannot be at once true and falfe, that the fame number cannot be even and odd, that cogitation cannot be conferred on that which is created incapable of cogitation."

"I know

"I know not, faid Nekayah, any great ufe of this question. Does that immateriality, which, in my opinion, you have fufficiently proved, neceffarily include eternal duration ?"

"Of immateriality, faid Imlac, our ideas are negative, and therefore obfcure. Immateriality feems to imply a natural power of perpetual duration as a confequence of exemption from all caufes of decay: whatever perishes is deftroyed by the folution of its contexture, and feparation of its parts; nor can we conceive how that which has no parts, and therefore admits no folution, can be naturally corrupted or impaired."

"I know not, faid Raffelas, how to conceive any thing without extenfion; what is extended must have parts, and you allow, that whatever has parts may be destroyed."

"Confider your own conceptions, replied Imlac, and the difficulty will be lefs. You will find fubftance without extenfion. An ideal form is no lefs real than material bulk: yet an ideal form has no extenfion. It is no lefs certain, when you think on a pyramid, that your mind poffeffes the idea of a pyramid, than that the pyramid itself is ftanding. What space does the idea of a pyramid occupy more than the idea of a grain of corn? or how can either idea fuffer laceration? As is the effect, fuch is the cause as thought, fuch is the power that thinks; a power impassive and indifcerptible."

"But the Being, faid Nekayah, whom I fear to name, the Being which made the foul, can deftroy it."

" He,

"He, furely, can deftroy it, anfwered Imlar, fince, however unperishable, it receives from a fuperiour nature its power of duration. That it will not perish by any inherent caufe of decay, or principle of corruption, may be fhewn by philofophy; but philosophy can tell no more. That it will not be annihilated by him that made it, we must humbly learn from higher authority."

The whole affembly stood awhile filent and collected. "Let us return, faid Raffelas, from this fcene of mortality. How gloomy would be there manfions of the dead to him who did not know that he should never die; that what now acts fhall continue its agency, and what now thinks fhall think on for ever. Thofe that lie here ftretched before us, the wife and the powerful of ancient times, warn us to remember the fhortnefs of our prefent ftate: they were, perhaps, fnatched away while they were bufy like us in the choice of life."

"To me, faid the princefs, the choice of life is become less important; I hope hereafter to think only on the choice of eternity."

They then haftened out of the caverns, and, under the protection of their guard, returned to Cairo.

CHAP. XLVIII.

THE CONCLUSION, IN WHICH NOTHING IS CONCLUDED.

IT

T was now the time of the inundation of the Nile: a few days after their vifit to the catacombs, the river began to rife.

They were confined to their houfe. The whole region being under water gave them no invitation to any excurfions, and, being well fupplied with ma→ terials for talk, they diverted themselves with comparifons of the different forms of life which they had obferved, and with various fchemes of happiness, which each of them had formed.

Pekuah was never fo much charmed with any place as the convent of St. Anthony, where the Arab reftored her to the princefs, and wifhed only to fill it with pious maidens, and to be made priorefs of the order: fhe was weary of expectation and difguft, and would gladly be fixed in fome unvariable state.

The princefs thought, that of all fublunary things, knowledge was the beft: fhe defired firft to learn all sciences, and then purposed to found a college of learned women, in which fhe would prefide, that, by converfing with the old, and educating the young, she might divide her time between the acquifition and communication of wisdom, and raise up for the next age models of prudence, and patterns of piety.

The prince defired a little kingdom, in which he might adminifter juftice in his own perfon, and fee

all