$290

Considerations on the Rate of Interest, &c.

ble, the great anxiety of the legislature, as we have seen, was to render them redeemable. Now that annuities are universally made redeemable, the only object of making them irredeemable would be to lower the market rate of interest: an object which, in the present state of things, must necessarily prove unattainable. It is not to be denied, that annuities ought to be placed on some footing which would make them accord better with the existing laws against usury, whilst they are suffered to remain in the statute book. But to render annuities irredeemable, would only increase the evils under which borrowers now labor, if even the legal rate of interest were not reduced. But if that measure were to be followed up by a reduction of the rate of interest below the market rate, the landed interest could not stand the shock. In the present state of commerce, when we speak of the market rate of interest, we look in point of fact to the general rate, as well in this as in other states; for the average value of our money is fixed by the general operations of the monied interest throughout all commercial nations. Our own funds, therefore, may safely be considered as the just standard of the market rate of interest. Now at this moment more than 5 per cent. can be obtained in the funds. If, therefore, the rate of interest were to be reduced to 4 per cent. all the loans to individuals would be promptly called in; for it would be impossible to ask the legislature not only to reduce the rate, but also to allow debtors time to pay their debts. The money so called in would of course be invested in the funds. This would occasion a rise in the funds; and that would probably drive men to lend their money to foreign states, where more interest could be obtained. The landed interest would not only be compelled to pay off their existing debts, but would be prevented from obtaining any further loan. It would be idle to talk of the future or probable benefits of a system which would at once paralyze the hand of the agriculturist throughout the kingdom.

END OF NO. XIII.

A

PLAN

FOR THE

Reform of Parliament

ON

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES.

The proceeding upon somewhat conceived in writing, doth for the most part facilitate Dispatch, for though it should be wholly rejected, yet that Negative is more pregnant of Direction, than an Indefinite. Bacon's Essays.

LONDON:

NO. XIV.

Pam.

VOL. VII.

U

PREFACE.

ALTHOUGH the subject of Parliamentary Reform has, for several years past, been so frequently discussed, yet it is somewhat singular, that no plan for this purpose, founded on the original principles of the English Constitution, has ever been offered to the legislature. This circumstance must plead as an apology for the present attempt, of which the object is, to correct the principal defect in the present constitution of the House of Commons, namely, the want of that responsibility, to which every man, exercising any species of political power ought to be subject. The fact is that a majority of the members of the House of Commons, instead of representing numerous and respectable bodies of men, to whom they would be accountable for their conduct, are returned by the proprietors of burgage tenure boroughs, or elected by a small number of persons, influenced and directed by some individual, or what is worse, are indebted for their seatsat o their own money : by which means they are totally independent of, and uninfluenced by, public opinion. Instead of being obliged by the fear of losing their scats in Parliament, to consult the welfare of their constituents, and of the public, they naturally consider how they may best advance their own interests, or those of their patrons, by their conduct in Parliament. Nor can it be matter of surprise that while seats in the House of Commons are notoriously obtained for money, they should become a matter of mere speculation and traffic. The influence which the crown possesses,

in consequence of its patronage, is not only perfectly constitutional, but essentially necessary to the existence of our constitution. This influence should not however be permitted to extend to the nomination of the members of the House of Commons. It is surely sufficient that the crown should nominate a great number of the House of Lords. When Augustus assumed the privilege of appointing the Roman Senators, he destroyed the republic so completely, that no attempt to restore it was ever afterwards made. Hence Mr. Gibbon observes that "The principles of a free constitution are irrecoverably lost, when the legislative power is nominated by the executive." Vol. I. 97.

I agree with Mr. Hume and Mr. Paley that if the House of Commons was totally independent of the crown, and unconnected with the House of Lords, there is every reason to suppose it would overturn the constitution. But on the other side, if the House of Commons should become, in a great degree, dependent on the crown, and the aristocracy, the constitution would be equally overturned. The question therefore is, what degree of independence the House of Commons ought to possess, to preserve the true balance of the constitution.

In the present plan, the prerogatives, and patronage of the crown remain untouched. Besides it would possess a considerable influence in the elections for towns. And as the representation of the landed interest would be given entirely to property, the House of Lords must have an immense weight in the elections for counties. There can therefore be no doubt, but that a House of Commons elected upon the plan here proposed, would be strongly influenced by the crown, and closely connected with the House of Lords.

REFORM OF PARLIAMENT.

Defects in the Representation of Counties.

Or the many defects and abuses complained of, in the representation of the people, the following appear to be the principal.

1. The restrictions on the proprietors of land, as to the tenure by which they must hold, and the nature of the interest which they must have, to intitle them to vote for county members.

2. The lowness of the qualification arising from the immense depreciation of the value of money since the fif teenth century.

3. The undue influence which private persons have acquired in the smaller corporations.

4. The absolute interest which private persons have acquired in the burgage tenure boroughs.

5. The prevalence of bribery in the great corporations and popular boroughs.

6. The gross inequality in the representation in general, but particularly the inequality between the number of representatives for boroughs, and those for counties.

All these evils have arisen from the neglect of the legislature in not attending to the inmense changes, which time has made in the tenures by which lands are held, and in the personal rights, wealth, and manners of the inhabitants of this country. A reform therefore in the representation of