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ters, upon which he would manifeft his fincere defire to give the King of Poland real marks of his friendship, and concert with him those measures which the cir cumstances of times should render neceffary. This his Polish Majesty abfolutely rejected. The Pruffian monarch having before this time conceived an opinion of dangerous defigns formed by the court of Drefden against him, he refolved not to leave the Saxons at liberty behind him, in a place where they could wait for a favourable opportunity of joining the Auftrians, or harafs him in his retreat if he fhould fight an unfortunate battle, or iffue from their faftness upon some part of his territories if he should advance far into Bohemia. Mean while, notwithstanding the inferiority of the Saxon army, which we never heard reckoned a bove 18,000 men, the fituation of the ground it poffeffed was fo advantageous, that it could not have been forced without great lofs. It was therefore determined to form a blockade, and to treat this ftrong camp rather in the manner of a town befieged, than like a poft, which might be attacked according to the rules of war carried on in an open country. In fhort, it was thought, that ftarving the Saxon troops was the fafest way of obliging them to furrender.

The blockade of Pirna being effectually formed, his Pruffian Majefty refolved to have an army of obfervation, to prevent any fuccours being fent from the Auftrian army in Bohemia. Twentynine battalions and feventy fquadrons, commanded by Marshal Keith, entered Bohemia, which took the caftle of Ketfchen, making 100 Auftrians prifoners. Towards the end of September the King of Pruffia had certain advice, that Marfhal Brown had received orders to difengage the Saxons. His army was incamped at Budin, near the conflux of the Egra with the Elbe. Upon this his Pruffian Majefty fet out for his army in Bohemia. Having reached it on the 28th, that army fet forward next day. On the 30th, towards the evening, they perceived the Auftrian camp in the plain of Lowofitz, that town being in front, its right joining the Elbe, and Sulowitz

being on its left. The Pruffians took poffeffion of the neighbouring heights, and of all the paffes leading into that plain. Next day, being the ift of October, about feven in the morning, an action began between the two armies, which lafted till three in the afternoon. During that whole time the cannonading was inceffant on both fides. All re lations agreed in reprefenting this battle as one of the moft obftinate that had happened of a long time. In the iffue both fides claimed the victory: but the public could not be perfuaded that they had equal reafon; for it could not be de. nied, that Count Brown marched back next day to his old camp at Budin, quite disappointed of the important defign he had in view, which was, to march forward and relieve the Saxons. The Auftrians faid their whole lofs in killed and wounded did not amount to 2000 men; and that the lofs of their enemies must have been much more confiderable, befides fome hundreds of prisoners taken from them. The Pruffian accounts made the lofs of the Auftrians amount to between 6 and 7000 men killed and wounded, befides 500 prifoners. In a late relation of the affair, faid to be written by the King of Pruffia himself, the number of killed on his fide is reckoned at 653 men, and the wounded 800. It is there acknowledged, that Marshal Brown made about 249 prisoners. The Auftrian army was computed at about 60,000 men, but we have not feen any number condefcended on by themselves. Some relations gave out the Pruffians for 25,000, others for 35,000. The account faid to be writ ten by the King of Pruffia bears, that his troops were really one third inferior to the Auftrians in number, yet ftill thought themselves fuperior in force.

His Pruffian Majefty receiving advice, that a detachment of 6000 men had been made from the Auftrian army, and that it was marching towards the frontiers of Saxony, he fet out from Lowofitz on the 13th of October, with fifteen fquadrons of dragoons, and arrived at his o ther army on the 14th at noon. The Saxons, though much diftreffed for want

of

of provifions, had remained fafe in their camp of Pirna; but under this difadvan tage, that their poft, by its natural fi. tuation, was fcarcely more difficult to be forced than to be got out from. On the 11th the Saxons began to form a bridge over the Elbe under the cannon of Konigstein. It is fuppofed that this outlet had excited the attention of the Saxons, as being the most eafy for receiving the affiftance they expected from the Auftrians, if they could but get it clearly paffed. At the fame time, as they could not but know the natural difficulties in their way, they appear to have been very much in the dark as to the difpofitions made by the Pruffians on that fide, especially after the arrival of Marshal Brown, with his fmall body, in the neighbourhood. The Pruffian of ficers, inftead of obftructing the forming of their bridge, fuffered them quietly to finish it. On the evening of the 12th the Saxons began their march; and were permitted to crofs the river without moleftation. Next morning they found themselves inextricably intangled. The way they intended to proceed was furrounded with steep rocks, except fome paffes, which the Pruffians had strongly barricadoed with felled trees, well lined with troops. The Auftrians could do nothing towards their affiftance, with out attempting to fight double their numbers. It was in vain for them to think of returning to Pirna, though the fear of abfolute famine had not forbidden them, as the Pruffians on that fide had already occupied it. Marfhal Brown, finding he could do no fervice in the cafe, and perceiving the danger he at the fame time was in, began a retreat towards Bohemia on the 14th; in which his detachment fuffered confiderably before it got to any diftance. In this forlorn fituation the Saxons remained till the 15th, when the King of Poland, who had continued in Konigstein, permitted them to surrender themfelves prifoners of war. Next day they were conducted to the camp of his Pruffian Majefty, into whofe fervice most of the foldiers entered, the officers being allowed to go to their places of refidence, on

their parole not to ferve against him. It may appear ftrange, that these troops fhould inlift with a neighbouring prince, contrary to the known inclination of their own fovereign. But the wonder will be lefs, when it is recollected, that though the Elector of Saxony's father embraced Popery, with a direct view, as was firmly believed, of being elected King of Poland, and his prefent Polish Majefty cannot hold that kingdom without profeffing the fame religion, yet his electoral fubjects are generally Proteftants; that he is particularly connected with France by the marriage of his daughter to the Dauphin; that the Saxons, as much as many others, dread the union of the houses of Auftria and Bourbon, as dangerous to their religious liberties; and that his Pruffian Majefty is commonly looked upon as being at the head of the Proteftant interest in Germany.

The King of Poland being allowed either to remain in the fortress of Konigftein, to which a neutrality was granted during the war, or to go to whate ver other place he pleased, he fignified his defire of removing into his kingdom. Horfes being provided for him, both in Saxony, and in those parts of the Pruffian monarch's dominions through which he was to pafs, he accordingly fet out for Warfaw on the 18th, accompanied by his two fons; the Pruffian troops being withdrawn from all the places on the road, and all becoming regard fhewn to the perfon of his Polish Majefty.

After the Saxons had furrendered, his Pruffian Majefty returned into Bohemia, in order to bring back his army to winter in the Saxon dominions. On the 25th Marshal Keith broke up his camp at Lowofitz, his rearguard not feeing the face of an enemy, and the 30th re-entered Saxony; where the troops were cantoned between Pirna and the frontier along the Elbe. One post was attacked by the Auftrian pandours; but they were repulfed with lofs, and purfued a confiderable way. This is the account given in the piece faid to have been written by his Pruffian Majefty. According to the Auftrian relation of

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the affair, the march back was not al- ter, all the armies, Auftrian and Pruf-
lowed to be performed near fo quietly. fian, were diftributed into winter-quar-
They faid, that as the Pruffians retired, ters. The King of Pruffia returned to
Gen. Hadick always followed and ha- Drefden on the 14th, and took up his
raffed them; that he took many prifon- refidence at the house of Count Bruhl,
ers and very much baggage; and that the Saxon prime minister.
8000 Auftrian horfe, falling upon the
rearguard, cut 500 Pruffians to pieces.
It is really amazing, and mortifying, to
obferve, in what oddly different ways
perfons of otherwise the most respectable
characters are capable of relating the
fame facts. The inconfiftencies in the
accounts of this retreat, and thofe of
the battle of Lowofitz, given by the
two fides, are almoft equally glaring;
and the falsehoods on one fide or other
must have been advanced, with respect
to fome particulars, in defiance of the
certain knowledge of many in both ar-
mies. In the different accounts of the
battle there were feveral plain inconfift-
encies, which cannot appear from fo
fummary a relation as we are here ob-
liged to give.

Befides the troops which his Pruffian Majefty led into Saxony, he had also an army in Silefia, commanded by Marshal Schwerin, which advanced towards an Austrian one under Prince Piccolomini. The Pruffian troops had fome skirmishes with parties of the Austrians; in which, according to their own accounts, they had plainly the advantage; and foraged under the walls of Konigfgratz, within fight of Prince Piccolomini. This was all Marshal Schwerin could do. The camp of Konigfgratz was fituated at the conflux of the Adler with the Elbe, the Auftrians were intrenched, and this poft was too difficult to be attacked in front. The Pruffians on that fide therefore acted only as an army of observation. About the fame time that the Pruffians at Lowofitz were quitting Bohemia, Marshal Schwerin began to return into Silefia. Some thousands of Hungarians having followed him to Scalitz, a body of his troops attacked, and drove them to fome diftance; after which he continued his march unmolefted. On the 2d of November he re-entered the county of Glatz, and put his troops into places of cantonment. Not long af.

We have here thrown the operations of the war together; but feveral other important matters had happened before this time, which deserve particular notice. Before the Pruffian monarch fet out for his army in Bohemia, he had fo peremptorily demanded from the Queen of Poland the keys of her hus band's archives, that the found herself obliged to comply; and the ufe intended had been made of thofe keys. Upon this the Saxon minifters at foreign courts pathetically reprefented, that the King of Pruffia, covering himself under the name of friendship, but being governed folely by his conveniency, had, by armed force, made himself mafter of all the towns of Saxony, dismantled places, fortified others, difarmed the inhabitants, carried off magiftrates to serve as hostages for unjust and enormous contributions in provifions and forage, feized the public coffers, broken open the arfenals and transported the artillery and arms to Magdeburg, and, to crown all thofe oppreffions, that the archives of ftate had, by menaces and violence, been forced from the hands of the Queen, notwithstanding the fecurity which her Majefty might promife herfelf under the protection of all laws human and divine, and notwithstanding the reiterated affurances given her in the King of Pruffia's name, that not only her perfon and refidence fhould be abfolutely fafe, but that even the Pruffian garrifon fhould be under her orders. From this time forward his Pruffian Majefty spoke without referve of the defigns which the Saxon miniftry had concerted with the courts of Vienna and Petersburg, for ftripping him of Silefia, and effectually crushing his power for ever. He faid they had negotiated with the Imperial minifters on an eventual partition of his Majesty's dominions, and were to have for their fhare the duchies of Magdeburg and Croffen, with the circles of

Zullichau

Zullichau, Corbus, and Schwibus; but, with the confent of the principal parties, were not to appear in the affair, till the reduction or difperfion of his Pruffian Majefty's forces fhould permit them to take off the mask with fafety. He afferted, that in confequence of the primary refolution to which he had been forced for his own prefervation, he had only taken from the court of Saxony the means to hurt him; in doing which he had used all the moderation that circumftances would allow. He declared, that the Queen of Poland had been treated with all the refpect due to her rank; and that only proper reprefentations had been used to induce her not to oppofe the taking out of the chancery-cabinet at Drefden, without meddling with the other archives, certain papers, of which his Majesty had copies before, but which he had thought proper to feize, in order to verify the dangerous defigns of the Saxon minifters against him, by ha ving in his cuftody the originals, of which they would otherwife have denied the exiftence. Not long after, the King of Pruffia published a long memorial, particularly fetting forth the fecret intrigues of the courts of Vienna and Dresden against him, from the treaty of Drefden concluded between their Pruffian and Polish Majesties in the month of December 1745 to the middle of Auguft laft, the methods they had taken to raife and foment jealoufy and difguft in the mind of the Empress of Ruffia against his Pruffian Majefty, and the reasons evincing a concert between those three powers to ftrip him of Silefia, and reduce him within narrower bounds. To that he annexed copies of the original papers found in the chancery of Drefden; and, indeed, they exhibit a scene of politics horrid and fhocking to honeft minds [xviii. 594.651.]. The King of Pruffia fays, that his Britannic Majefty, who had close connections with fome of those courts, would never be concerned in this mystery of iniquity. He would furely then have abominated the fhameful means which his Pruffian Majefty's memorial gives us as thofe ufed to promote it. We have not feen any answer

to that paper. The King of Pruffia ob→ ferves, in another piece, that it is not furprifing fome perfons fhould make no answer to demonftrations, but by invectives.

In a declaration which his Pruffian Majefty had just before caufed be delivered to the diet at Ratisbon, he said, that if ever the ftates of the empire, and in particular those of the Proteftant religion, were in danger of oppreffion, they were fo then; when not only the house of Auftria threatened him with final ruin, but likewife even the court of Drefden, as he could incontestably prove, had formed defigns to depress his royal and electoral house, and deprive it of all the acquifitions which it had made for a century paft, in recompenfe of the fervices it had done to its country; he afferted it was highly probable, that a fcheme was formed to inflave all the ftates of the empire, and that if they were not all subjected at once, they could not, however, avoid fharing this fate one after another, if he fhould not vigorously oppofe fuch enterprises; that therefore he was perfuaded the states of the empire would open their eyes to the unjust infinuations of the court of Vienna, as well as the complaints and illfounded grievances of the court of Drefden, and courageously keep off the yoke which was endeavoured to be put upon them. This was intended to prevent the ftates giving their approbation to fome decrees addreffed to them by the Emperor, requiring their affiftance against his Pruffian Majefty. In the end of the year they had not come to any refolution with refpect to thofe decrees.

Even after the Auftrian and Pruffian armies went into winter-quarters, fome fkirmishes happened between fmall parties of them; but nothing of confequence was done. On both fides great preparations have been making for early and vigorous action in the spring. Confiderable numbers of the Saxons which entered into his Pruffian Majesty's fervice having deferted, he obliged the country to furnish between 9 and 10,000 recruits, in order to complete ten regi ments, which we may reckon to consist

of

bove 200,000.

of at least 20,000 men. The Pruffian Notwithstanding this reftriction, and troops are faid to be augmented to a fome others mentioned in the act, feveThofe of the Empress- ral evangelical ftates of the empire, Queen are computed at about the fame fearing that fuch a conceffion might be number; befides which fhe is to have productive of confequences dangerous to fwarms of auxiliaries from feveral quar- the Protestant cause, laid the affair beters. Both fides are still bufy in nego. fore the general diet at Ratisbon. What tiations, the effects of which time alone was done in the diet, we have not heard; can certainly discover. but the evangelic body of the empire at Ratisbon highly cenfured the permiffion, afferting, that, according to the treaty of Weftphalia, their confent should have been previously obtained; and that this fovereign had not only affronted them, and violated the pacta religionis between sovereign and subject founded on that treaty, but in the highest degree abused his Proteftant fubjects, to whom he had folemnly promifed, nay fold, the exclufive privilege of exercising their religion in his territory. The Count ftrenuously maintained the juftice of his proceedings; and appealed to the Emperor on the head. This did not hinder the evangelic body from taking fome refolutions laft year with regard to the religious grievances of his Proteftant fubjects, the execution of which was left to the King of Pruffia, as director of the circle of Weftphalia. That monarch caufed his minifter at the diet declare foon after, that he not only accepted of the commiffion, but had also written in the strongest manner to the Count, exhorting him to conform to what the laws and constitution of the empire required of him. We would probably have heard more of this affair, had it not been for the public disturbances that enfued in Germany.

Laft fpring a difference arose between his Pruffian Majefty and the Duke of MECKLEMBURG SCHWERIN. The latter complained to the Emperor, that the officers and foldiers of the former ufed force to raise recruits in his territories; that his Pruffian Majefty wanted to oblige him to recall his prohibition of fuch levies, and had fent a large detachment of huffars into his dominions, who had violently carried off fome of his bailiffs and officers of juftice that were entirely innocent; and that he had not been able to procure their liberty, but on condition of revoking that prohibition, and difcharging the Pruffian inrollers whom he had taken into cuftody. His Imperial Majefty fent a refcript to the King of Pruffia, admonishing him to do juftice, and make proper reparation to the Duke of Mecklemburg, and certify his having done fo to his Imperial Majefty within two months from the 2d of April, the date of the refcript. In what light the Pruffians represented this affair, we do not know; but were fome time after informed, that it was far from being in a fair way of being adjusted.

In fummer 1755 the Count of WEID RUNKEL, having been long folicited by his Roman-Catholic fubjects for permiffion to exercife their religion more commodiously and freely, granted them liberty to build a convent of Capuchins at Dierdorf, the place of his refidence, with very large privileges. The Count, in his act for this eftablishment, declared, that in making ufe of the right which he had to tolerate in his dominions each of the three religions allowed in the empire, namely, the Proteftant, Reformed, and Popife, his intention was to maintain inviolably the rights and prerogatives of the Proteftant, which is the religion eftablished in his country.

It was observed in our laft fummary, with refpect to TURKY, that fince the acceffion of the prefent Grand Signior to the throne, which happened in December 1754, fo many changes had been made of the ministry, as feemed to indicate, that the Sultan did not think himself well fixed in his exalted station; and rendered it evident, that no fyftem of the Porte, in regard to politics, could be depended on. Several alterations alfo took place during the laft year, among which the depofition and banish ment of the grand vizir and of the mufti

made

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