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I must own there appeared to me no great probability of preserving Minorca at this time; but, however, have the fatisfaction to find, that the minifters at home, for once at least, agreed in opinion with me. Since the moment intelligence came that the Toulon fleet was failed, and the troops landed upon the ifland, there was not a man who did not defpair of Minorca.

Hence I difpatched an exprefs with this account; which was at firft hushed up in filence, afterwards reprefented (without producing it) as the defponding letter of a man who would not fight.What authority thefe gentlemen had for this invidious prophecy, I am yet at a lofs to account for, unless a declared refolution in its contents to meet the French fleet, may be deemed a juftifiable foundation for it.- But the letter has been laid [xviii. 497.] before the

court.

,this reinforcement I received the 6th, and shipped them the 7th; which day the Experiment arrived, the Portland and Dolphin two days before. Thefe, with the rest of Mr Edgcumbe's fquadron, were manned and equipped in the beft manner I was able. And without waiting to fully water the fhips, I failed in the morning of the 8th, though the wind was eafterly, and arrived off Minorca the 19th.

Thus far I will prefume upon my innocence. But why (it may be asked) was not Minorca at this time relieved? I answer, Because I was not fent time enough to prevent the enemy's landing; and that when I was fent, I was not ftrong enough to beat the enemy's fleet, and raise the fiege. Let others answer, why I came fo late, and why I came fo weak, with a force not culculated for fuch an expedition.- -But after the en

It has also been given out, no doubt with the fame uniform malicious intention to defame every circumstance of my conduct, that I made unneceffary delays at Gibraltar, and this fuppofed to be folely on the account of watering.I prefume the propriety, and indeed the neceffity will readily appear, of furnifhing the fleet with a fufficiency of water and provifions, which was proceeding upon an expedition where the only port capable of fupplying its wants was known to be in the enemy's poffeffion, and who by intelligence appeared to be well fupplied with all kinds of neceffaries. This was not the caufe, but the effect of my stay at this place, and tranf acted during the execution of other affairs directed by my inftructions.I arrived at Gibraltar the 2d of May after noon; and failed thence the 8th in the morning; a space of five days only; in which time I communicated my or ders to the governor relating to a detachment from the garrifon, waited the result of a council of war held the 4th, then folicited a reinforcement to fup. ply the deficiency of men in Mr Edgcumbe's fquadron, occafioned by the lofs of those who had been difimbarked for the fuccour of St Philip's. A lift of VOL. XIX.

gagement, it may be faid, I might have reattacked the enemy, and landed the fuccours.I might indeed have done the first, with a certainty almost of being defeated. I could not have done the last though I had been victorious. Had I been defeated, what refuge would have been left for the fhattered fleet?what fecurity for Gibraltar? which must have been expofed to the hazard of a fudden fiege, without a fingle ship to defend it, and which place was equally recommended to my protection.- -But it feems (fuch is the fatality attending my conduct) that I am even held blameable for calling a council of war in fo critical a conjuncture. Yet when is advice fo neceffary as on fuch an occafion? I admit, where orders are pofitive to fight at all events or all hazards whatever, it is criminal to deliberate. But was I under fuch orders? Let my inftructions fpeak for me. Is a commander expected to fight in all fituations, and under all difadvantages? Surely all extremes are culpable; and where nothing is to be gained, and all may be loft, fighting becomes prefumptuous rashness or phrenfy.- - I therefore beg leave to recommend to your particular confideration the different fituation of the two fleets at this time, and fhall refer you to the miU

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nutes of a council of war held on board fection: for though he should fail to enthe Ramillies the 24th of May, already gage or affift, &c. unless this failure aplaid before the court [88.]; and when parently proceeds from one of these you shall have duly weighed the opinion caufes, he is not guilty. Negligence of this council, the unanimity of its cannot be taken in fo large a fenfe as to members, and their characters, what mean every fort of neglect and omiffion, apprehenfion can I have of my beha- but fuch grofs negligence only as eviviour on this occafion falling under your dently indicates cowardice or difaffeccenfure, fince it would neceffarily imply tion. Such, and fuch only, can be petheir guilt? nal, and was intended to be made capital. Any other conftruction might expofe the bravest man that ever commanded to the fevereft penalties, fince a fingle error in judgment might render him liable to the moft capital punishment.

What I have now offered being verified by the teftimony of the witneffes, will, I flatter my felf, be abundantly fufficient to exculpate me from the firft general charge; and that the court will be of opinion, that I never retreated from the island, till it was impracticable to make any further attempt; and that the place was not loft by me, who was too weak to fave it, but by thofe who might have fent double the force two months earlier, and neglected it.

Yet permit me to complain, that in order to render me criminal in the eyes of the people, the fame authorised paper before mentioned was likewife proftituted to mangle and curtail my letter to the admiralty on this occafion, and fubfcribed my name to my own defamation. [xviii. 294. 498.]

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I fhall now proceed to the fecond part of the charge against me, that of cowardice and though I have already taken up fo much of your time, fhall make no apology for your farther patience, as I am convinced, gentlemen of your impartiality will think no indulgence of this kind too much, where the life, and, what is ftill much more, the honour of an officer of my rank in the fervice, is at ftake. I fhall forbear to point out the confequence to the fervice in general, not to furnish even my enemies with an opportunity of conftruing it an endeavour to befpeak a partiality.

The 12th article of war is that which provides a proper punishment for cow ardice, and runs in the following words. Every perfon in the fleet, who, through cowardice," &c. [46.].

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I would first beg leave to obferve, that in order to bring any perfon within the peril of this article, he must be convicted of cowardice, negligence, or difaf

By this rule I must defire my conduct may be judged; and if my intentions appear to be good and my courage clear, I ought to ftand acquitted by all good men, even though my abilities should be deemed deficient.

And I muft beg leave to observe, that this article of my charge can only relate to my perfonal courage and conduct during the action; and therefore any dif pofition (admitting it could be corrected) can only be accounted an error of judgment. -I do not mention this to avoid entering into that part of my conduct, fince I flatter myself that I fhall be able to fhew, confidering the circumstances, feveral difpofitions of the two fleets, and unavoidable accidents, that the whole, as far as could depend upon me, was conducted with that propriety and naval military fkill which is requifite in a commander in chief.- -But the court will please to remember, this is no part of the charge against me.

[The Admiral then gives a long narrative of the tranfactions of the fleet from the 19th of May to the 24th, and produces feveral letters, among which are fome that paffed betwixt the admiraltyboard and him when a prifoner at Greenwich. In thefe, it must be confeffed, as was faid on a former occafion, he discovers a spirit very different from that of a man confcious of guilt, and confused and intimidated by the fear of punishment. They are writ in the fame ftrain with the one he wrote on being fuperfeded [xviii. 497. 500.].

We fhall infert only one paragraph more, viz.]

No fymptom of cowardice, that odious and capital part of my charge, has hitherto appeared to the court. And my in

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nocence, and confcious discharge of my duty, makes me confident that none will appear. Yet have I already fuffered the feverest penalties that can be inflicted on it, being hung up in effigy, traduced by libels, tortured by mifreprefentations and calumny, difgraced and fuperfeded, upon no better authority than the gafconade of the French Admiral [xviii. 500.], arrefted and confined beyond the example of former times, treated like a felon with every indignity, and my life purfued with the moft inveterate malice. But all this I have had fortitude enough to despise, and treat with the contempt it deferves, the refult of a confcience clear of all crimes.

After reading the Admiral's defence, the court proceeded to examine his witneffes. On the 19th the evidence was closed. The remaining part of that day, and the two following, the court employed in reading the evidence and the prifoner's defence. On the 22d, 24th, 25th and 26th, they agreed to thirty-fix refolutions, and on the 27th to one more.They follow verbatim. It does not appear, That any unneceffary delay was made by Adm. Byng, in the proceedings of the fquadron under his command, from the time of their failing from St Helen's, on the 6th April, to the time of their arrival off Minorca on the 19th of May.

" I.

*

2. It That upon appears, the fleet's getting fight of Minorca, on the morning of the 19th of May, the Admiral detached three frigates (the Phoenix, Chesterfield, and Dolphin) ahead, with orders to Capt. Hervey of the Phoenix, to endeavour to land a letter, from the Admiral, to Lt-Gen. Blakeney, and to make observations of what batteries or forts the enemy might be poffeffed of along the shore.

3. It appears, That thofe frigates were got ahead of the fleet and in shore, and the Phoenix close to the Lair of Mahon, and were endeavouring to execute * [The word Unanimously is prefixed to every refolution, except the 7th, to which thefe words are prefixed, 12 Yeas for all the officers, 1 for the general and field officers only.]

thofe orders till they were called off, be. tween II and 12 o'clock, by fignal from the Admiral, upon discovery of the French fleet in the fouth-east quarter.

4. It appears, That the feet ftood towards the enemy the remaining part of the day, with calms and little winds, till they tacked in the evening.

5. The court are of opinion, That the Admiral proceeded properly, upon difcovery of the French fleet, to ftand towards them.

6. It appears, That Maj.-Gen. Stuart, Lord Effingham, and Col. Cornwallis, with about thirty officers, and some recruits, amounting in the whole to about 100, belonging to the different regiments in garrifon at St Philip's, were on board fhips of the fquadron.

*The court are of opinon, That 7. as fo great a number of officers were on board the fleet, belonging to the garrifon of St Philip's, where they must neceffarily be much wanted, the Admiral ought to have put them on board one of have been landed, if found practicable; the frigates he fent ahead, in order to and if not landed before he saw the French fleet, he ought to have let the frigate have endeavoured to land them, notwithftanding he did fee the enemy's fleet.

8. It appears, That from the time of first feeing the French fleet in the morning of the 19th of May, till our fleet weathered the French, about noon of the 20th, the Admiral took proper meafures to gain and keep the wind of the enemy, and to form and close the line of battle.

9. It fleet

appears, That the yan of our upon the starboard tack, ftretched beyond the rear of the enemy's fleet, and that Our whole fleet then tacked all toge. ther, by fignal; the enemy's fleet lying at the fame time to leeward, in a line of battle ahead, on the larboard tack, un

der their topfails, with their maintopfails fquare.

10. It appears, That immediately after our fleet was about upon the larboard tack, our rear was confiderably farther to windward of the enemy's rear, than our van was of their van.

11. The court are of opinion, That W 2 when

when the British fleet on the starboard tack were stretched abreast, or about the beam of the enemy's line, the Admiral fhould have tacked the fleet all together, and immediately have conducted it on a direct course for the enemy; the van fteering for the enemy's van, the rear for their rear, each fhip for her oppofite ship in the enemy's line, and under fuch a fail as might have enabled the worst failing fhip, under all her plain fail, to preferve her station.

12. It appears, That foon after the fleet were upon the larboard tack, the Admiral made fignals for leading two points to ftarboard, which brought the wind upon or abaft the beam; and the fhips continued that courfe, nearly ahead of each other, till the Admiral made the fignal for battle.

13. It appears, That the Admiral made the fignal for battle about twenty minutes after two o'clock.

14. It appears, That at the time the fignal was made for battle, the French fleet was still lying to leeward, with their main opfails fquare, as before mentioned, and that our van was confiderably nearer to their van than our rear was to their

rear.

15. It appears, That upon the fignal being made for battle, the fhips of our van divifion bore down properly for the fhips opposed to them in the enemy's line, and engaged them, till the five headmoft fhips of the enemy went away to leeward, out of gunshot.

16. It appears, That the fternmost fhip of our van divifion, the Intrepide, having hauled up, and engaged about ten minutes or a quarter of an hour, loft her foretopmaft, a little before three o' clock.

17. It appears, That the Revenge, the headmott fhip of the rear divifion, bore down (after the fhips of the van bore down) for the fhip oppofed to her in the enemy's line, and that she brought up, upon the weather quarter of the Intrepide, upon the Intrepide's foretopmaft going away; and that the quickly afterwards, upon the Intrepide's fetting her forefail, bore down under the Intrepide's lee quarter, and brought up there.

18. It appears, That upon the fignal being made for battle, and the van putting before the wind, the Admiral in the Ramillies edged away fome points, and the Trident and Princefs Louisa thereby becoming to windward of him, the Admiral thereupon hauled up his forefail, backed his mizentopfail, and endeavoured to back his maintopfail, to allow of their getting into their ftations, and continued in that fituation for five, fix, or seven minutes.

19. It is the opinion of the court, That the Admiral, after the fignal was made for battle, feparated the rear from the van divifion, and retarded the rear divifion of the British fleet from closing with and engaging the enemy, by his fhortening fail, by hauling up his forefail, backing his mizentopfail, and backing, or attempting to back his maintopfail, in order that the Trident and Princefs Louifa might get ahead again of

the Ramillies.

20. It is the opinion of the court, That inftead of fhortening fail, the Admiral ought to have made the Trident's and Princefs Louifa's fignals to make more fail; and that he ought alfo to have fet fo much fail himself as would have enabled the Culloden (the worft failing fhip in his divifion) to have kept her station will all her plain fail fet, in order to have got down with as much expedition as poffible to the enemy, and thereby have properly fupported the van divifion.

21. It appears, That the Admiral, after fhortening fail, as before mentioned, again fet his forefail, and filled his topfails, and fteered, with the wind abaft the beam, a flanting course towards the enemy, under that fail, till about three o'clock, when the people in the Ramillies began to fire without orders, at too great a distance for engaging; but the firing was continued by the Admiral's directions.

22. It appears, That fome little time before this firing began in the Ramillies, the Princefs Louifa was feen from the Ramillies flung up in the wind, with her topfails fhaking, and the Trident paffing her to leeward, the Trident being then a little upon the weather bow

of

of the Ramillies; and that the Revenge had been also seen to bring to under the Intrepide's lee quarter.

23 It appears, That when the firing had been continued a little while in the Ramillies, an alarm was given of a ship being clofe under her lee bow, imagined to be one of our fhips, and which proved to be the Trident: That, upon this alarm, the Admiral immediately ordered the helm to be put alee, the forefail hauled up, and the topfails to be backed, and firing to cease, till the men fhould fee French colours; and made the fignal for the fleet to brace to, the rear to brace to first, in order that the fhips aftern might not run on board him; but to prevent this fignal taking effect upon the ships ahead, he ordered it to be hauled down in a very few minutes, and caused the fignal to be hoifted for the fleet to fill and stand on, the van to fill first.

24. It appears, That the Princess Louifa was alfo feen about the fame time, with her maintopfail fhivering, or aback, upon the weather bow of the Ramillies. 25. The court are of opinion, That while the Ramillies was firing, in going down, the Trident, and fhips immediately or ahead of the Ramillies, proved an impediment to the Ramillies continuing to go down.

26. The court are of opinion, That the Admiral acted wrong, in directing the firing of the Ramillies to be continued, before he had placed her at a proper distance from the enemy; as he thereby not only threw away fhot ufelefsly, but occafioned a fmoke, which prevented his feeing the motions of the enemy, and the pofition of the fhips immediately ahead of the Ramillies.

27. It appears, That fhortly after the hauling up of the forefail and backing the topfails, all firing ceafed on board

the Ramillies.

28. It appears, That when the fmoke cleared up, upon the Ramillies ceafing to fire, the centre and rear of the French fleet had filled their maintopfails and fet their forefails.

29. It appears, That the French centre and rear stood on, and as they

came near the three then fternmost ships of our van, gave them their fire; that fome of their fhot fell fhort, and fome did the Defiance damage; and then the French edged away to join their own van to leeward.

30. It appears, That from the time the Admiral firft hauled up his forefail and backed his topfails to get clear of the Trident, to the time of his filling his topfails, and setting his forefail again, was about twenty minutes.

31. It appears, That about the time of the Admiral's filling, he made the fignal for the rear of the fleet to make more fail and close the line, caufed the Princefs Louifa and Trident to be hailed to make fail into their ftations, and then fetting his mainfail, jib, and staysails, paffed to leeward of the Intrepide, ordered the Deptford to take the Intrepide's place in the line, and the Chefterfield to take care of the Intrepide, and ftanding on towards our van, joined them a little after five o'clock in the evening.

32. The court are of opinion, That after the fhips which had received damage in the action, were as much refitted as circumftances would permit, the Admiral ought to have returned with the fquadron off St Philip's, and have endeavoured to open a communication with that castle, and to have used every means in his power for its relief, before he returned to Gibraltar.

33. The court are of opinion, That Adm. Byng did not do his utmost to relieve St Philip's caftle, in the ifland of Minorca, then befieged by the forces of the French King.

34. The court are of opinion, That Adm. Byng, during the engagement between his Majefty's fleet under his command and the fleet of the French King, on the 20th of May laft, did not do his utmost to take, feize, and destroy the (hips of the French King, which it was his duty to have engaged, and to assist fuch of his Majefty's fhips as were engaged in fight with the French fhips, which it was his duty to have affifted.

35. It appears, by the evidence of Lord Robert Bertie, Lt-Col. Smith,

Capt.

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