the respect of the soldiers placed under his command, but to rob him of that confidence which his Majesty had been pleased to repose in him. The object of this paragraph was to defame his character, and to rescue that of a more favoured Officer; but, in what he was about to say on the subject, he was far from wishing to shrink from the responsibility, and still less to disclaim the share he had in making an armistice, which, in the event, the more it was considered, the more it would be approved. [Sir Hew Dalrymple here read the paragraph to which he alluded-insinuating that he (Sir Hew) had torn the laurels from the brow of an Officer (Sir A. Wellesley) who had deserved the admiration of his country for a splendid victory; and that he compelled that same Officer to sign an armistice which would for ever remain on record as a disgrace to his Majesty's arms.] Sir Hew Dalrymple begged leave most solemnly to affirm, on the word and honour of an officer, that the conference with General Kellerman, which lasted from two o'clock in the day, till nine at night, on the 22d of August, was carried on by Sir A. Wellesley, Sir H. Burrard, and himself; during the whole of which Sir A. Wellesley made what observations he thought proper upon the treaty, and took that prominent part in the discussion which the victory he had recently gained, and the local knowledge he possessed of the country, seemed to justify. The conference was held in the French language; and when he (Sir H. D.) advanced to the table, in order to place his signature to the armistice, he was informed by Gen. Kellerman, that he, as a General of Division, was unable to treat with the Commander in Chief of the British forces; and, therefore, it was proposed that Sir A. Wellesley should place his name to the armistice, and Sir H. Dalrymple did not recollect that a single objection was at that time made by Sir Arthur to the provisions of the treaty, excepting far as related to the duration of the armistice. Şir Hew Dalrymple did not mean, upon any account, to avail him self of any other means of retrieving his character than what the established laws of the country allowed; his interest, SO and the interest of truth were so nearly connected, that they could not be separated; nor should he enter into any details which could not regularly come before this tribunal. to He was extremely happy that he was placed in the situation in which he now stood; but if any individual had chosen prefer specific charges against him, he had no doubt but he could have justified his conduct with regard to the transactions in Portugal; and there was not a single officer of whose services his Majesty had been deprived by him with a view to the present investigation. Sir Arthur Wellesley hoped, that in delivering in his narrative to the Board, he should be justified in making a few observations upon what had fallen from Sir Hew Dalrymple. Certain paragraphs had appeared in the newspapers, which had ventured to speak upon his conduct in the late transactions in Portugal, as if the writers of them had received any authority or information from him or from his friends, as to the truth of the facts there stated. He had never authorized any person connected with him in the service, or any of his friends, to give an authority to publishers of newspapers to state that he was compelled, or even ordered, to sign the armistice in question. Sir Arthur Wellesley then delivered in his statement, and the Court adjourned at a quarter before four o'clock till Saturday. Third day, November 19. The Judge Advocate rose, and was about to read some documentary evidence he held in his hand, when Sir Arthur Wellesley observed, that as he was not prepared to answer the statement made by Sir Hew Dalrymple on Thursday, so explicitly as he could have wished at the moment, he entreated permission now to give that answer, and that the same might be considered as a document in the Board's proceedings.Sir Arthur then tendered a paper to the President, who signified the propriety of his first reading it aloud to the Board. Sir Arthur immediately acquiesced, and the contents of the statement were to the following effect:-" I cannot but lament with Sir Hew Dalrymple that any attempts should have been made, through the medium of the public prints, to to wound his feelings or injure his reputation; but I have also cause to complain, as well as the Commander in Chiet, and I do solemnly protest, that I never authorised any publisher, nor did any of my friends authorise any publisher to state that I had been compelled to sign the treaty of armistice by the orders of my superior officer. It is true I was present when the terms of that armistice were discussed with Gen. Kellerman, and it is also true that I took part in that discussion; but I never did, nor ever will say, that I signed it by the order of my superior officer, and that it was not in my power to disobey. At the same time I must state, that I did differ in more points than one, respecting that armistice, but I fully concurred in the principle and the necessity of the French evacuating Portugal.When I spoke of the Commissariat be ing ill-composed, I had no intention whatever of casting a reflection upon any persons employed in that important department of the army, and it was not my wish that my remarks on that oc. casion should go forth to the public. My motive for giving this explanation is to remove the impression, if any has been made, that I meant to reflect on the individuals connected with the department in question.". Sir Arthur having finished his statement, the paper was handed in, and -placed before the Members of the Board. The Judge Advocate then read some dispatches from Sir Hew Dalrymple to Lord Castlereagh; one dated the 3d of September, was published in the Gazette; others stating, that the terms of the armistice had been communicated to the Portuguese General, and who had not objected to them until after the conclusion of the negociation, and the convention had been signed. A letter in French, from the Portuguese General, objecting to the terms of the convention, and an answer from Sir Hew Dalrymple, stating, that the good faith of the country was pledged to carry these conditions into effect. Some other letters were also read relating to points of detail. In one of these letters, Sir Hew Dalrymple expresses his surprise that so large asum as 40,000l. mentioned in the protest, should have been carried off, and declares his intention of ordering restitution. : A variety of other documents were then read; some addresses from the Portuguese expressed satisfaction at the removal of the French from Portugal, and others protested in the strongest terms against the articles of the convention. After the conclusion of the documentary evidence, Sir Arthur Wellesley rose, and read a narrative of the proceedings from the time that he took the command of the army. Sir Arthur sailed from Cork on the 12th July, landed at Corunna on the 30th; heard there of the defeat of the Spaniards at Rio Seco; had frequent conferences with the Junta of Gallicia, offered them the assistance of his army, but was expressly told that they did not want men, but money, arms, and ammunition, and that the most valuable service that he could render to Spain would be to drive the French from Portugal. After leaving Corunna, he went to Oporto, learnt from the Bishop that the Portugueze force consisted of about 5000 regulars and militia, about 1500 scattered over the country, and 1500 Spaniards. The Bishop promised mules for the conveyance of the artillery and ammunition waggons. Sir Arthur next visited Sir C. Cotton, to consult with him on the means of entering the Tagus, and attacking the forts in the vicinity of Lisbon. When there, he received a letter from General Spencer off Cadiz, intimating that he waited his orders. It bein It being Sir Arthur's opinion that the first object was to drive the French from Portugal, and understanding that the Junta of Seville did not think Gen. Spencer's presence absolutely necessary to the operations in Andalusia, he ordered the General to join him. He was at first informed that the French force in Portugal was about 16,000 or 17,000 men, of which about 14,000 were in Lisbon and the forts in the neighbourhood, and the remainder dispersed in small garrisons in the different strong places; but he afterwards learnt that they were nearly 24,000. In these circumstances, he conceived that it would be extremely dangerous to attempt a landing in any of the small bays to the north of the Tagus, where he would be immediately exposed to an attack from the main body of the French army. He therefore resolved on landing at Mondego Bay, where he could speedily co-operate with the Portugueze force which had proceeded to Coimbra. When off the Bay, he was informed, by a letter from Lord Castlereagh, thar 5000 men under General Anstruther, and above 10,000 more under Sir John Moore, were proceeding to join him. He also heard of Dupont's defeat, and that Loison, with 4000 or 5000 French, had been detached to the province of Alentejo, to suppress an insurrection in the south of Portugal. The landing in Mondego Bay was effected on the 5th, with considerable difficulty. General Spencer landed on the 7th and 8th. Having ascertained the enemy's force, he wrote a letter to Sir H. Burrard, with a plan of operations for the corps that he was to bring into Portugal, and on the 9th the advanced guard of the army marched forward towards Lisbon. On that day he heard of Joseph Bonaparte having left Madrid, and of the probability of Marshal Bessieres making an irruption into the north of Portugal. It was necessary to gain some important advantages before this plan should be effected, and the army continued its march. The Portugueze Generals soon demanded to be supplied with provisions from the British stores, which it was impossible to comply with. The Portugueze separated, and continued to remain separate from the British till after the 22d of August. Sir Arthur did every thing to induce them to co operate; he demanded only a reinforcement of 1000 infantry, 400 light troops, and 200 cavalry, and promised that they should receive provisions from the British stock; but even to this the Portugueze General would not consent! We have then the battle of Roleia, with a reference to the Gazette for particulars. Before that action, Sir Arthur had thought of attacking the French posts upon the coast, but being so miserably disappointed of the Portugueze co-operation, and having wit. nessed the gallantry of the French in the action of the 17th, he resolved to change his plan, and to make towards the French position of Torres Vedras. General Anstruther's force landed on the 20th. We have then the battle of Vimiera, with a reference to the Gazette for particulars, and with it terminated Sir Arthur's command, and of course his narrative ends. hausted, when the troops halted more than scribed the dangerous nature of the coast, Sir Hew Dalrymple then came forward. and read his narrative of the operations of the army under his command. On the 15th of July, he received dispatches announcing his appointment to the chief command of the armies in Spain and Portugal, with instructions, not only to expel the French from Portugal, but to outline of measures to be pursued when cut off their retreat from Spain, with an these objects were accomplished. On embarking on the 13th of August, he was informed by Lord Collingwood of probably with a view to more active othe French having abandoned Madrid, perations in conjunction with Bessieres. He also heard of the landing of Sir Arthur Wellesley in Mondego Bay. On the 19th he had an interview with Admiral Cotton, who informed him that read to a number of questions in writing the coast, and that he relied chiefly on Sir A. Wellesley was proceeding along Fourth day, Nov. 21.-Answers were given in to Sir Arthur Wellesley by President, in which there is nothing of importance. Lord Moira asked whether Sir Arthur thought the force under his command sufficient to drive the French from Lisbon and the forts on the Tagus? The answer was in the affirmative. His Lordship then asked to what extent provisions had been supplied by the country, and whether it could have afforded a sufficiency for the wants of the army, if means had been employed to collect them? Sir Arthur replied, that no exertions would have drawn from the Portugueze a supply of bread sufficient for the army. The country afforded no provisions but beef and wine; of these there was at first abundance, but wine was afterwards frequently exFeb. 1809. the victualling transports for provisions. The Admiral thought lightly of the French force at Lisbon, but Sir Hew did not think with him. He also resolved to land at Mondego Bay, but not to interfere with the plans of Sir Arthur in that separate command for which he had been selected, as he had been recommended to his particular confidence; great confidence was expressed in his well-known talents, and a sort of wish was expressed that every attention which the rules of the service would allow, should be paid to his advice and opinion. On learning that Sir H. Burrard had taken the command of the the army, he landed on the 22d, perfect ly ignorant of the state of the Portugueze insurgents, their numbers, discipline, and efficiency, and had shortly after an interview with Sir Arthur Wellesley. He found the army in the same position that it occupied the day before, and his first order was for it to move forward. He knew not why other officers thought that, if the army had advanced on the 21st, the result of the action would have been more important; it was true that the French had lost more men than we in the battle of Vimiera; but the great loss which we sustained in our very small body body of cavalry in a great measure balanced that advantage. None of the officers saw any difficulty in forcing the French to cross the Tagus; but he himself had not had time to learn the strength of the Portugueze or of the French, or the state of the British ordnance, orofthe Commissariat. A short time after his landing, the French appeared to be moving forward, and it was expected that another action was to be fought on the same ground; but it proved to be the cavalry attending General Kellerman, who came to solicit an armistice. There were few objections made to the conditions of the armistice, As to the article respecting private property, about which such a clamour had been raised in this country and in Portugal, it was nothing different from the customary articles on all similar occasions; he might instance the capitulations of Malta, Alexandria, and Egypt. It never was intended to include any sort of merchandise or public property; it was declared by Kellerman himself to mean nothing but what was strictly the private property of the French; but it was not to be expected that we should be able to restore to the Portugueze the full effects of eight months of French plunder; when he (Sir Hew) heard of some attempts to carry off plunder, he declared that any persons, whatever their rank, presuming to carry off what was not strictly private property, should be detained as prisoners of war. If the armistice had not been agreed to, the greed army must have marched forward, not exceeding 16,000 men, exposed perhaps to the horrors of famine as well as those of war, and, being once embarked in so hazardous a service, rapidity of movement was every thing; but this was im possible, as many of the artillery horses were insufficient; and if it had been resolved on to attack the enemy, the British army must have been confined to a position near the sea, to ensure the junction of Sir John Moore. (Some uninteresting conversation with a Portugueze General respecting the armistice is then detailed.) On the 24th Col. Murray returned from Sir C. Cotton, and was sent off to Lisbon to report the Admiral's objection to the article respecting the Russian fleet. The French Commander agreed that the article should be expunged. On the 29th Captain Dalrymple returned with the convention. Of some of the articles he disapproved, and assembled all the principal officers for their advice. The armistice expired next morning, so that he must either have ratified the conven. tion or recommenced hostilities. With the approbation of Generals Burrard, Wellesley, Moore, Hope, &c. he did ratify it. He conceived the chief respon sibility of the measure to lie upon him, and he should therefore give his reasons for agreeing to it. The first was the probability of a scarcity of provisions, in consequence of which, and of the danger of the surf, it had been deter. mined that Sir J. Moore's corps should be landed gradually, and that each division should bring along with it provisions sufficient for its own use. Such was the state of the weather, that on the very day after the signature of the convention, the whole British feet was driven out to sea, and there was no calculating how long such weather might last; thus was the provisioning of the army most uncertain, for no supply of corn could be had from the Portugueze, and the sole dependence was on our own victualling ships. Farther, the attack of the forts on the Tagus was not the light matter that had been represented. Fort St Julien was in the best state of defence, and could not have been reduced without battering cannon; and if it had been resolved to attack the French in their strong positions, much time must have been required for making the necessary preparations-much more for reducing the enemy to such a condition as would have obliged him to surrender at discretion. A battle must have been fought almost in the city of Lisbon, and Kellerman's threat of destruction struction to that city would most pro. bably have been realised. But, if Por tugal was the only object of the expe. dition, the convention was no doubt most improper, for certainly, by a delay of some months, the French force might have been completely reduced; but he always understood that the expulsion of the French from Portugal was a mere preliminary to the great and the ultimate object of the expedition-a co-operation of the British army in the defence of Spain. If he was right, there was no room for delay; if the British force had been detained a month or two longer, the heavy rains would have ren. dered it impossible for them to join the Spaniards before the middle of spring, These were his reasons for ratifying a convention, which would be the more approved the more it was investigated. He received dispatches from Ministers after the convention, which induced him to think that they approved of his conduct, He had a letter from Lord W. Bentinck approving of the convention. He had letters of thanks from the chief Magistrate of Lisbon, from the Bishop of Oporto, from General Castanos, and from various public bodies, and he felt that he had done his duty to his coun. trv. Fifth day, Nov. 22.-Sir Arthur Wellesley read some observations on the narrative of Sir Hew Dalrymple. After a defence of his military operations, he made the important declaration, that "At the moment when his command ceased, it had been his object to have turned the enemy's position at Torres Vedras, and he could assert that, at that moment, however much the difficulty might have been, the means existed in his hands of bringing the contest to a fortunate conclusion." But this plan not having been adopted, Sir Arthur again expressed his approbation of the principle of the convention, although he totally dissented from particular points in it. He wished, for instance, that the negotiation should not extend beyond the suspension of hostilities; that, instead of " private property," the words "arms and baggage" might be substituted; and that nothing should be introduced about the Russian fleet. In none of these did the Commander agree with him; and he certainly appeared, instead of cultivating his friendship, to be pre. judiced against him. When Kellerman's approach was announced, Sir A. asked Sir H. if he should go to the outposts to speak to him? The answer was, no; that Kellerman had inquired for the Commander of the Forces, and that he must be brought to headquarters. Sir Arthur corrected a statement of Sir Hew's, in which he stated, that it was in consequence of a suggestion of General Kellerman, and not by any desire expressed from Sir H. Dalrymple himself, that he (Sir A.) signed the preliminary articles, Sir Arthur declared that he was in another room, when Sir H. came to him, and informed him that Kellerman had said, when he (Sir H.) was going up to sign the preliminary treaty, that it was not proper for him, the Commander of the Forces, to sign such a paper with a General of Division. He (Sir H.) therefore asked Sir A. if he had any objections to sign the paper, when he said he would sign it as any other paper that he might be desired to sign by his authority. But Sir Arthur disclaimed all responsibility, when his superior officer, the Commander of the Forces, was himself present; was in fact the negotiator of the treaty, had stepped forward to sign it himself, and was only prevented by General Kellerman on a point of etiquette. Upon the whole, he declared that Sir H. Dalrymple decided for himself on every proposition, and he (Sir Arthur) never saw the convention till be landed in England. Sir H. Dalrymple replied, that in the negotiation of the armistice, Sir Arthur certainly discussed the points for some time at the table with General Kellerman. Sixth day, Nov. 24.-Colonel Torrens and Captain Malcolm were called by Sir A. Wellesley, chiefly to prove that Sir A. disapproved of many points of the armistice; that he had not the confidence of Sir H. Dalrymple ; and that the latter had paid no attention to his recommendation of advancing the army, until the necessity of it was again urged by Sir A. to Col. Murray. Sir Hew Dalrymple then read answers to a number of written questions given him by the President, chiefly relating to his proceedings on landing; the steps he took to obtain information, and the knowledge he obtained of the comparative state of the British and French force, their numbers and resources, previous to the armistice. The |