ble for a finite agent, possessed of certain supposable attributes, and placed in certain supposable circumstances, to be free in the absolute sense.

"I shall take this for granted; because otherwise, the objection, itself, and the debate founded on it, can have neither place nor meaning. We will suppose, then, such an agent to exist; and to act, while he lived, in a manner perfectly free: while at the same time, no being knew, at all, in what manmer he would act in any case whatever, until his actions had existed. In this case, he would undoubtedly be allowed to possess all possible advantages for acting with perfect freedom. Lest I should not be thought to be sufficiently particular, I will suppose his actions to be all absolutely contingent; because some philosophers suppose contingency to be an indispensable and inseparable attribute of free action. We will now in the second place, suppose this agent, without any change in his powers, or his circumstances, in any other respect, to have all his actions, which according to the former supposition are the freest possible, foreknown by God, or some other being. I ask, whether they would be at all the less free, in consequence of being thus foreknown? The powers, the circumstances, and the actions, of this agent, remain exactly the same, as before the agent himself (for that is included in the supposition) being perfectly ignorant, that his actions are thus foreknown. Can it be perceived, that

this foreknowledge affects the nature of the actions in any manner, or the freedom of the agent? To me it is clear, that it cannot; because in the case supposed, the foreknowledge has not the remotest influence on the agent, nor on his actions: but he and they continuing to be exactly the same in every respect whatever. On the contrary, all the possible influence of this foreknowledge is confined to the bosom of him, by whom it is possessed.

"But if this agent would thus continue free, and his actions would still be perfectly free, notwithstanding they were foreknown; then it is clear, that a preceding certainty, that the actions of a voluntary agent will exist, does not at all, of itself, lessen or affect their freedom. Foreknowledge renders the future existence of that, which is foreknown, certain : therefore the actions of the agent supposed are all rendered certain, and will of course exist: yet it is, I think unquestionably clear from this statement, that their freedom will not be affected. Lest I should be thought guilty of an absurdity in suppos. ing events absolutely contingent to be capable of being foreknown; I shall justify myself by observing, that Dr. Gregory has asserted, that the voluntary actions of mankind are foreknown as mere contingencies; and he is declared by a writer of respectability to have merited the thanks of the learned world for his discovery. For myself, I confess, that I not

only discern no indispensable connexion between contingency and freedom of action; but no connection at all; nor any possibility that human actions, or any thing else, should be contingent. So far as I can see, the admission of casual, or contingent existence, must, if we would make our principles consistent, be by consequence the admission of it in all cases whatever." 1 Theology, 249, 250.

But an objector may say, if God does not produce our volitions; he cannot foreknow their existence to foreknow a thing there must be clear evidence in the Divine Mind of the future existence of the thing foreknown; and there can be no such evidence, unless God, himself, is to produce the thing.

I believe it is true, that for God to foreknow the existence of our volitions, there must be clear evidence in the Divine Mind, that our volitions will exist; but what this evidence is, I do not know; nor can it be proved, that God cannot have this evidence, without his causing our volitions.

IV. Decrees." It is observable," says Dr. Dwight "that the scriptures rarely speak of this subject under the name, Decree. This word, and others de*** rived from it, are used in the Old Testament twelve times with a reference to God. In each of these instances, a particular determination, or sentence concerning a particular thing is spoken of; and in no instance, that general determination, or system of

determinations, usually denoted by this term in Theological discussions. In the New Testament, the word, as referring to God is not used at all. Wherever the subject of this doctrine is mentioned in the Scriptures, the words, counsel, purpose, choice, pleasure, will, or some other equivalent words are employed to express it." 1 Theol. 228.

I would add, that I believe foreknowledge is never used in the scriptures, as synonymous, with decree, counsel or purpose; therefore I would not unite, what God in his word has separated. By decree, I understand what God wills to be, and produces; or what God wills not to be, which if it should exist, would be an effect of his power. These volitions of the Most High, that things shall, or shall not be, I call his eternal decrees; not that God exerted his power from eternity in the production of his works; but from eternity, He knew every thing, that He should produce by his power, and it was agreeable to the Divine Mind, that his power should be exerted in the production. Here I would remark upon one text of scripture by way of illustration." Him: being delivered by the determinate counsel, and fore. knowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." Acts, ii. 23.

God decreed, and produced the human soul and body of Jesus Christ, and put him in the way of the Jews; but they willed with liberty in taking, cruci

fying and slaying him. God foreknew they would do this; therefore the fact was as certain in the Divine Mind, as it could have been, if God had decreed, and caused their sinful volitions. But this foreknowledge did not affect the Jews, they acted freely, and all the wickedness in the transaction was theirs; God produced none of their sinful volitions, nor approbated their conduct. Yet God suffered their wickedness to be; for " He so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life." John, iii. 16. By sin man freely and volun tarily ruined himself; and by sin, men, who did not design it for good, freely and voluntarily contributed to open the door of salvation.

What objection can there be to this interpretation of the text? This does not make God the ac tive cause of the sinful volitions of the Jews; but leaves them entirely at liberty in willing the greatest sin that ever was. But some hold, that God produced their sinful volitions, and still they were free in the sense I use freedom. This is certainly most absurd; for it is believing, that God did, and did not produce their sinful volitions. Those who believe in this absurdity say they cannot reconcile the decree with the freedom of the Jews: No wonder at it, for contradictions can never be reconciled; therefore let us adopt a construction of the decree consistent with the freedom, or liberty of