The Hiftory of 1777, continued. [131.]

CANADA.

We now turn from exemplifying victory without equivalent advantage in one quarter, to behold the moft mifchievous confequences of defeat in another. The war upon the fide of Canada and the lakes, was committed to the charge of Lt-Gen. Burgoyne; an officer whofe ability was unqueftioned, and whofe fpirit of enterprife, and thirst for military glory, however rivalled, could not poffibly be exceeded.

This appointment, however palliated or juftified by the propriety or supposed neceflity of the Governor'sconftant refidence in his province, could not fail of being fenbly felt, and could scarcely be fuppofed not to give umbrage to Gen. Carleton, to whofe abilities and refolution this nation in general acknowledged, and the world attributed, the prefervation of Canada [40. 290.]. It was faid, that his powers had been diminished in propor. tion to the greatness of his fervices. His military command extended before to every part of America, whither he might find it fitting to conduct the army under his direction. It was now fuddenly reftrained to the narrow limits of his own province. He had, faid his friends, in the preceding campaign, not only driven the enemy out of Canada, but a great naval armament had been formed, the chemy's force on Lake Champlain deftroyed, and Crown-point recovered, under his authority. The latenefs of the feafon only prevented him from attacklag Ticonderoga, and immediately profecuting the war to the fouthward. He had, during the winter, exerted his ufual induftry, and applied his military kill and judgement, in the forwarding of every preparation which might conduce to the fuccefs of the defign in the enfuing campaign. At the opening of the communication with England, inftead of the reinforcement which he had required and expected for the completion of his purpofe, he received an arrangement totally new, which, as it had been framed withont any reference to his judgement, or attention to his approbation, left nothing to his difcretion or opinion in the execution. Two expeditions were to be formed, in each of which the number and nature of the troops to be employed, the particular fervice of each corps, with its fubdivifions, and the fmallest detachment VOL. XLI.

to be made from it, had been minutely

and precifely specified by the minifter.

He was not even confulted as to the number or nature of the troops which were to remain in his hands for the defence or fecurity of Canada. In a word, the army which he had lately commanded was taken out of his, and placed in other hands; and officers who lately acted under his direction, were, by a detraction from his authority, virtually placed in independent commands: for their inftructions to put themselves under the orders of Sir William Howe, feemed little more than a mockery; as that General had informed Sir Guy Carleton, that the concerted operations of the campaign on his fide would lead him to fuch à diftance as to render any communica tion of that nature impracticable.

That the Governor felt and understood this arrangement and these appointments in the manner we have related from the complaints of his friends in England, feems evident from the immediate refig nation of his government, which then took place [39. 509, 624.]; but as the notification, the appointment of another, and the paffage of his fucceffor from Europe, were all works of time, he was ftill, however ungrateful the task, obliged to continue in the exercife of his office during a longer period than that of which we are treating.

Under thefe circumftances, and in this trying and difficult fituation, he endeavoured to fhew, that refentment could not warp him from his duty; and he applied himself with the fame diligence and energy, to forward by every poffible means, and to fupport in all its parts the expedition, as if the arrangement was entirely his own. This conduct, however praife-worthy, was not lefs neceffary, from the peculiar nature of the fervice which was to be performed; a fervice exceedingly complicated in the arrangement, uncommonly numerous in the parts, and very unufual in practice. It will not be difficult to conceive how effectually negligence, diflike, obftinacy,. or even a colourable and rational difference of opinion in some disputable points,. might fruftrate all the hopes founded upon fuch a fyftem.

Nothing of this fort intervened, to. damp the fpirit or to defeat the fuccefs of the expedition. The preparations were carried on with vigour,

We have before taken notice, that the minifters

minifters, and more particularly the Noble Lord at the head of the American department, were not only particularly interefted in the event, but had founded the moft fanguine hopes upon the fuccefs of this expedition. Nothing was accordingly left undone on their fide, which, in proportion to the number of regular troops that could be spared for that particular fervice, might conduce to give efficacy to their operations. Befides, Canada it was hoped would supply a warlike though undisciplined militia, well calculated for, and acquainted with, the peculiar nature of the' fervice and country.

Toftrengthen and increase this irregular but necessary aid, arms and accoutrements were amply provided, to fupply thofe numerous loyalifts who were expected to join the royal army as foon as it approached or penetrated the frontiers of the adjacent provinces. As a powerful artillery is confidered to be the great and effec. tive arm in an American war, where a numerous and undifciplined enemy is to be continually attacked in difficult pofts, and driven out of woods and faftneffes; fo this part of the fervice was particularly attended to; and the brafs train that was fent out upon this expedition, was perhaps the fineft, and probably the moft excellently fupplied as to officers and private men, that had ever been allotted to fecond the operations of any army which did not far exceed the prefent in number.

Befides these forces, feveral nations of favages had been induced to come into the field. This measure was defended upon the fuppofed neceffity of the cafe; as, from their character, it was prefumed they could not lie ftill; and if not engaged in the King's service, would have joined the Americans. Whatever advantages were hoped from them, Gen. Carleton did not in the preceding year make much ufe of them; but civilly difmiffed them at the clofe of the campaign, on a promise of their appearing in the next if required. There has been a good deal of difcuffion, which we want materials to fettle, how far he approved of their employment at all. The friends of miniftry faid, that he had recommended and forwarded the measure. Others faid, that, partly from humanity, partly from his forming a juft eftimate of their fervices, and knowing by experience the extent of their powers and ability in

war, he was unwilling to use them, knowing that they were capricious, inconftant, and intractable; that as their ideas of war and of courage were totally different from those of civilized nations, fo, notwithstanding their ferocity of character, and the incredible specimens of paffive valour which they fometimes exhibited in cafes adapted to their own o pinions, they not only abhorred, but dreaded, whatever is confidered as fair and generous fervice among Europeans, wherein the contending parties bravely seek and are included in one common danger, trufting only for fuccefs to their superior skill and courage; that their object and design in all wars, was not to fight, but to murder; not to conquer, but to deftroy in a word, that their fervice was uncertain, their rapacity infatiate, their faith ever doubtful, and their action cruel and barbarous.

Whatever his reafons were for not em ploying them in a more early and effec tual manner, if it were in his power to do it as early and effectually as was magined, this conduct was far from be ing generally approved of at home. Thofe who were particularly warm in their zeal against the colonies, began fomewhat to forget their natural humanity in their an ger. They infifted, that every appearance of lenience in fuch circumftances was ac tual cruelty in the effect, by acting as an incentive to difobedience, and increafing the objects of punishment; that, on the contrary, partial severity was general mercy; as timely exertions of justice, and ftrict inflictions of punishment, were at all times the fure means of preventing crimes; that the only method of speedily crushing the rebellion, was to render the fituation of the actors in it fo intolerable, that a ceffation from danger, and the bleffings of repofe, fhould become the only objects of their contemplation and hope; that the means were but little to be attended to, when they led to the ac complishment of fo great and happy a purpose, as the destruction of rebellion, and the restoration of order and legal government; and that, in all convulfions of states, the innocent were too frequently involved in the calamities which were intended or wished to be confined entirely to the guilty; but fuch was the lot and condition of mankind, and this evil, however deplored, could not, in numberlefs inftances, be avoided or prevented. This doctrine was fupported by the a

vowed

rowed friends of government, whether out of office, or in the subordinate departments of the state; it was alfo generally fuppofed to be confonant to the opinions of the ministers, and that Gen. Carleton's fcruples or niceties upon this point were by no means acceptable.

However this was, in the prefent arrangement 'the aid of the favages was confidered as a principal member of that force which was deftined to the profecution of the northern war, and the Governor of Canada was accordingly enjoined to use his utmost weight and influence in bringing the Indian nations forward in fupport of the expedition. His zeal was as active in fulfilling this duty, as it was in every other which appertained to the prefent fervice. Nor was his fuccefs difproportioned to his zeal. Whether it proceeded from the Governor's influence with the Indians, their avidity to feize the prefents which were now liberally diftributed amongft them, from their own innate thirst for war and plunder, or more probably from the joint operation of all these causes, their remote as well as near nations poured forth their warriors in fuch abundance, that he became at length apprehenfive, that their numbers might render them an incumbrance rather than an aid to the army.

The regular force allotted to the expedition conducted by Gen. Burgoyne, confifting of British and German troops, amounted to 7173 men, exclufive of the artillery-corps. Of thefe, the German corps (confifting moftly of Brunswickers) amounted to 3217. The force required by that General in the proposals which he laid before the minifter, confifted of 8000 regulars, rank and file, befides the artillery, a corps of watermen, 2000 Canadians, including hatchetmen, and other workmen, with a thoufand, or more, favages. We have no certain information what numbers of thefe auxiliaries were in actual service upon the expedition.

Canada was largely rated, and its inhabitants must have fenfibly felt the proportion which they were allotted to contribute towards this fervice. In the proposals laid before the minifter, befides the militia, and various fpecies of workmen, fuppofed neceffary to be immediately attached to the army, and to accompany it on the expedition, chains of their militia, patroles, and pofts, were ex

pected to occupy the woods in the frontiers on the rear of the army, partly to intercept the communication between the enemy and the ill-affected in Canada, partly to prevent desertion, and to procure intelligence, and for various other duties neceffary towards keeping the country in quiet. Another great call upon them, was for workmen to complete the fortifications at Sorel, St John's, Chamblee, and Ifle au Noix, which it was fuppofed would amount to 2000 men. A ftill greater call upon the Canadians, and the more grievous, as it was at their feed-fowing feafon, was for the tranfport of all the provisions, artillery, ftores, and baggage of the army, from the different repofitories to the water, and afterwards at the carrying-places, befides the corvees for making the roads. It was eftimated that this fervice would, for fome time before, and at the opening of the campaign, require no less than 2000 men, befides a very large proportion of horses and carts.

Gen. Burgoyne was feconded by able and excellent officers. Of thefe, Maj.Gen. Philips of the artillery, who had gained fuch diftinguifhed renown by his conduct in that fervice during the late war in Germany, deferves to be particularly mentioned. He was likewife affifted by the Brig.-Gens Frafer, Powel, and Hamilton, all diftinguished officers, with the Brunswick Maj. Gen. Baron Reidesel, and Brig.-Gen. Speeht. The army was, in every respect, in the best condition that could poflibly be expected or wifhed, the troops being in the higheft fpirits, admirably difciplined, and uncommonly healthy.

The detachment on the expedition to the Mohawk river under Col. St Leger, did not probably exceed feven or eight hundred men, confifting of 200 drawn from the 8th and 34th regiments, a regiment of New-Yorkers, lately raised by, and under the command of, Sir John Johnfton, being mostly emigrants from his own country adjoining to the intended scene of action, with fome Hannau chaffeurs, a company of Canadians, and another of newly-raised rangers. Thefe were joined by a ftrong body of favages, in part conducted, or if it may be termed officered, by a number of British and Americans. The regular force left in Canada, including the Highland emigrants under that denomination, amounted to about 3700 men.

22

The

had alfo two new blockhouses, with other works.

On the eastern fhore of the inlet, and oppofite to Ticonderoga, the Americans had taken ftill more pains in fortifying a high circular hill, to which they gave the name of Mount Independence. On the fummit of this, which is Table-land, they had erected a ftar fort, inclofing a large fquare of barracks, well fortified and fupplied with artillery. The foot of the mountain, which on the weft fide projected into the water, was ftrongly Entrenched to its edge, and the entrenchment well lined with heavy artillery. A battery about half-way up the mount, fuftained and covered these lower works.

The Americans, with their ufual induftry, had joined these two pofts by a hridge of communication thrown over the inlet. This was, like many other of their performances, a great and moft la borious work. The bridge was fupported on twenty-two funken piers of very large timber, placed at nearly equal diftances: the fpaces between thefe were filled with fenarate floats, each about fifty feet long, and twelve feet wide, ftrongly faftened together with chains and rivets, and as effectually attached to the funken pillars. On the Lake-Champlain fide of the bridge it was defended by a boom, compafed of very large pieces of timber, initened together by rivetted bolts and double chains, made of iron an inch and half fquare. Thus not only a communication was maintained between these two posts, but all accefs by water from the northern fide was totally cut off.

It is to be observed, that as the inlet, immediately after paffing Ticonderoga, allumes a new form, fuddenly widening to a confiderable breadth, and becoming navigable to veffels of burden; fo from thence it also holds the name of Champlain, although it is not yet properly a part of the lake. On the other hand, the fouthern gut from Lake George, beLides being narrow, is alfo rendered unnavigable by fhallows and falls; but on its arrival at Ticonderoga, it is joined by a great body of water on the eastern fide, called, in this part, South river, but higher up towards its fource, before the junction of the elder branch with the younger, which runs from South bay, it is known under the appellation of Weed creek. The confluence of thefe waters at Ticonderoga, forms a fmall by to the fouthward of the bridge of com

munication; and the point of land formed by their junction is composed of a mountain called sugar hill.

Notwithstanding the apparent ftrength of Ticonderoga from what we have hitherto feen, it is entirely overlooked, and its works effectually commanded, by Sugar hill. This circumftance occafion ed a confultation among the Americans as to the fortifying of that mount; but their works were already far too exten five for their powers of defence, and would require ten or twelve thousand men to be effectually manned. It was likewise hoped, that the difficulty of accefs to the Sugar mount, and the favage inequality of its furface, would prevent the enemy from attempting to profit of its fituation.

It would be exceedingly difficult, from the information before us, to form any authentic eftimate of the number of Americans that were in the actual defence of thefe two pofts. It appears by the commander in chief, Gen. St Clair's exculpatory letter to the congrefs, as well as by the refolutions of the council of war, which accompanies it [39. 473 475.], that his whole force, including 900 militia, who were to quit him in a few days, was only about 3000 men; that thefe were ill equipped, and worfe armed, particularly in the article of bayonets, an arm fo effential in the defence of lines, that they had not one to ten of their number. This account would seem not only fatisfactory but conclufive, if it had not been contradicted by others. In a detail of the tranfactions of the campaign, tranfmitted by the war-office of Maffachuffet's-bay to the American deputies in France, and for the conveyance of which a light fhip was fent out on purpofe, they ftate St Clair's force at near 5000 men well equipped and armed, It is, however, to be obferved, that they talk with great bitterness of that General's conduct, as he had done, in his first letter to congrefs, with respect to the behaviour of two of their regiments. It may alfo be fuppofed, that in a statement of their affairs, intended to operate upon the fentiments and conduct of a court from which they already received effential benefits, and looked forward to much greater, they would rather increase the weight of blame upon an unfortunate officer, than detra& from the public opinion of their own conduct and power, by attributing weaknefs to their coun cils, or inefficacy to their arms.

As