foldiers, or other perfons, upon private houses, unlefs by the free confent of the owners. Of what advantage it is to be exempted from this burthen, any one may judge, from his own imagination of the inconveniences of them. In the two first reigns after the conqueft, it feems to have been the practice to give Free quarter in private houfes, againft the will of the owner: we hear of it again in the times of Edward III. and Henry IV. and in the reign of Charles I. this quartering of foldiers was not only practifed, but that in fuch a degree, that the house of Commons complained loudly of it to the king (f); "that in apparent violation of the ancient and undoubted right of all your majefty's loyal fubjects in this your kingdom in general, and to the grievous and infupportable detriment of many countries and perfons in particular, a new and almoft unheard-of way hath been invented, and put in practice, to lay foldiers upon them, fcattered in companies here and there, even in the heart and bowels of the kingdom, and to compell many of your majefty's fubjects to receive and lodge them in their own houfes, and both themfelves and others to contribute to their maintenance; to the exceeding great detriment of your majefty, the general terror of all, and the utter undoing of many of your people (g)."

Left it might be imagined that this was permitted only amidst the confufion of civil war, or practifed upon fuch as were enemies to the royal caufe, our Author judiciously adds a quotation from the fame hiftorian, relating what happened only in the fecond year of that unfortunate prince.

"The foldiers broke out into great diforders, they mastered the people, difturbed the peace of families, and the civil government of the land: there were frequent robberies, burglaries, rapes, rapines, murders, and barbarous cruelties. And unto fuch places, as did not tamely fubmit to the counfellors of this prince, (though there was very little oppofition to the measures the court at that time) the foldiers were fent for a punishnt; and wherever they came there was a general outcry: the ways were dangerous, and the markets unfrequented." But in oppofition to thefe practices, the commons in parlia nt affirmed, that every fubject in this kingdom had a full proty in his goods; and in the petition of right, they demand as their known freedom, to have the foldiers and mariners arted upon any private perfons, contrary to their confent,

of this realm, of what degree, quality, or profeffion foever, without his confent. And the quartering which is now allowed, upon public houfes, victuallers and the like, is only by virtue of a claufe in the mutiny act, which is made every year, and expires at the end of it; fo that it is entirely at the will of the parliament whether this power fhall be continued in the crown or not: and in all the mutiny acts, provifion is made, that the "provifions given to the foldiers or their horfes, fo quartered, shall be paid for duly at the fettled rates. In a word, there is at prefent no way left for the crown to raise money upon any of the fubjects, except by confent of parliament."

Thus was our happy conftitution gradually improved; one provifion being made after another, as the circumftances of things required, and permitted, until it was carried to that ftate of maturity in which we have fo long enjoyed it: a conftitution, justly admired by fenfible and thinking men of every nation under heaven; and though perhaps not in all refpects abfolutely perfect, yet, when administered with juftice and fidelity, well adapted to enlarge the wealth, extend the power, fecure the property, and maintain the freedom and independency of our people.

We could with pleafure follow our Author through the remaining part of this tract, wherein he speaks of the times appointed for the meetings of parliament, its privileges, the order and effect of its proceedings, the peculiar powers of the houfe of commons as to raifing of money and levying taxes upon the people, the nature of parliamentary reprefentation, the unequal manner in which the fubjects of England are reprefented, and the means used to obviate that and other inconveniencies; but this would extend the prefent article beyond the limits we have affigned it, having feveral curious and interefting fubjects before us in the remaining part of this work, with which our Readers will be glad to be acquainted.

In his third tract, our learned Writer confiders the means by which the free conftitutions of other nations have been impaired, while that of England has been preferved and improved; and he apprehends that the divifions and animofities, which fubfifted between the nobility and commonalty, were the chief cause why feveral European nations loft their liberty. This he illuftrates from the hiftorics of France, Spain, Sweden and Denmark. It will, however, be more interefting to the generality of our Readers, to fee in what manner he accounts for the prefervation of the liberties of this country, whofe conftitution was likewife of a Gothic model, but in a great measure avoided tho animolities, to fatal to many neighbouring nations. He begins with obferving, That the commons of England, from the most early times, have had more freedom and wealth, and confe

quently

quently more intereft in the government, than the commonalty, or third eftate, in any other of the countries we have mentioned. For, from the first inftitution of the Saxon government, the Saxon ceorles, i. e. thofe of the lower rank of people, who were employed in husbandry, were by law fecured, in their own perfons and in thofe of their wives, from injuries and affronts.The quantity of rent they were to pay for their lands, which they farmed, was afcertained by law. If they paid their rents duly, they could not be turned out of their farms ().—The lower freeholders, or freemen, were bound indeed to be fecurity for each other in their feveral tythings; and fome of them were under the protection of earls or other great men; but these engagements were owing merely to the unfettled condition of those times, when there was hardly any fecurity to be had except by force. They did not abate of their freedom in point of law. Á cearle, or freeholder, might be as free as the greateft thane; nay, he might come to be a thane himself, if he could but get wealth enough. By a law made in the reign of Athelftan, it was provided, that, Si villanus excreviffet ut haberet plenarié quinque hydas terræ fuæ propria, ecclefiam, et coquinam, tympanarium, et januam, et Jedem, et funder notam in aula regis, deinceps thani lege dignus fit. The fame law fays, that if a thane increased proportionably, he might come to be an earl. Jufte etiam nos fapientes diximus, quod Dei providentia fervus fit thanus et colonus comes.-The freeholders, in their county-courts, generally chose their sheriffs and coroners. And the inhabitants of burghs and cities were upon a ftill more advantageous footing than the ceorles.

The trade of England, in thofe times, was not quite fo inconfiderable as fome writers have represented it. On the contrary, it appears by feveral good proofs, that there was trade fufficient to enrich and make diftinguifhed the cities that had it. Tacitus fpeaking of London, mentions it as copia negotiatorum et commeatuum maxime celebre :—in the fame manner William of Malmbury fpeaks of Exeter, in fomewhat latter times indeed. The author of Geft. Gul. Cong. apud Duchefne, fpeaking of the Conqueror's returning the first time to Normandy, fays, Attulit quantum ex ditione trium Galliarum vix colligeretur argentum atque aurum: chari metalli abundantiâ multipliciter Gallias terra illa (i, e. Anglia) vincit. The city of London was fo confiderable, in the Danish times, as to pay 11,000l. as their proportion of 70,cool. impofed as a tax upon the whole nation; and its citizens were anciently called barons.

All these circumftances of advantage were accompanied with a very high and free fpirit, in our lower and middling kind of people, beyond thofe of other countries. The Kentimmen, in

(1) Leg, 33. Will. Conq. Edit. Wilkins.

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the time of William the Conqueror, fay, that they were born freemen: that the name of bondage was never heard of among them. Their leaders therefore exhorted them manfully to fight for the laws and liberties of their country; chufing rather to lofe an unhappy life by fighting valiantly for them, in the field. It is not certainly known what fhare the commons had in the legiflature, nor by whom it was 'managed; but there are fufficient grounds to believe they had fome thare: and what the fpirit of the times was, appears pretty plainly from the obtaining magna charta in the reign of king John, and contrary to the repeated refolutions of that prince: a charter, fuch as was never granted at once to any nation in Europe, in thofe, or in modern times: fuch a one as fecured them against all the grievances they complained of. And in obtaining it, the nobility and commonalty acted so much in concert, that there was no less provision made for the privileges of citizens and burgeffes, than for the nobility and gentry.'

Our Author goes on to obferve, that the English commonalty were upon better terms with the nobility than in moft other nations; and that the power which the nobles loft, generally fell into the hands of the people: indeed there was a claufe in the great charter which helped to preferve and increase this good understanding. This was the provifion, that the greater barons fhould have their feveral diftinct writs to parliament; whereas the leffer barons were only to be called by a general fummons. The confequence of this was, that the leffer barons, by degrees, difcontinued their attendance in parliament; and and from being of the body of the nobility, they naturally fell into the body of the commonalty, by which they augmented the weight and dignity of that body, and engaged the nobility to Have much greater regard for them, and the confervation of their liberties, than probably they otherwife might have had : and we fee all along that there was a proportionable regard had to the privileges and happiness of the commons, as well as to the nobleffe. Some perfons have thought, that before Henry the Seventh's time, the commons in parliament were quite governed by the houfe of lords; but the contrary is very evident from many inftances: they were not only of high fpirit originally, but being increafed, by having great numbers of the ancient gentry fall into them, and make one body, came to have great weight in parliament, and in the balance of the conftitution. The noBility neither could, nor were they fo much difpofed to opprefs them, as they would otherwife have been. They were, on the contrary, willing to have their affiftance at all times against the Crown; and the commons, on their fide, were at all times willing to give it, and to act heartily in concert with the nobility in favour of liberty and yet in other refpects they were not

much

much under their influence; on the contrary, their reprefentatives often oppofed the houfe of Lords in points of importance. Of this our Author gives feveral remarkable inftances much to the purpofe, from which it appears, that the commons had a remarkable fpirit of liberty, and a good deal of weight in the ba lance of the conftitution, even before the civil wars between the houfes of York and Lancaster.

In the courfe of thofe wars, the power of the nobility was very much weakened, by the extinction or ruin of many of the chief families. The nobility was still much more weakened in the reign of Henry VII, by the acts of parliament then, made, giving them liberty to alienate fo much of the cftates of thofe that remained. In the mean time the power of the commons was increafing, fo that in Henry the Eighth's time, they were grown, in fome meafure, able to act that part of fupporting the liberties of the nation against the attempts of the crown, which the nobility had hitherto done, but were hardly capable of doing any longer effectually.'

The reign of Henry VIII. was indeed the greatest crifis, with regard to the prefervation of our liberties, that ever happened to this nation. That prince had great advantages and means to wards making the crown abfolute; but, happily for the nation, being governed by his paffions, especially his vanity and.felf-fufficiency, he imagined that his fuccellors might govern as he had done; but never took any measures that might enable them to do it on the contrary, he took measures, which, in the natural courfe of things, muft prevent them from doing it. He diffi pated the church-lands among his courtiers, fome of whom were commoners, by abfolute gift, without referving any confiderable quit-rents or payments to the crown. He gave way to the clergy's being brought upon a very low foot, even with those lands that were left to them; because he caufed feveral laws to be made to their difadvantage; and it is moft probable, he was the means of hindering the inferior clergy from being received into the house of commons, as a part of the legislature. At the fame time, trade beginning to increase very much, after the dif covery of both the Indies, and the wealth arifing from thence coming chiefly among the commons; and the estates of the nobility having been made alienable, many of their eftates, and thofe of the church, came, in no long time, into the hands of the commons, whofe power and dependencies, as well as their fpirits, were thereby much exalted.

Upon the death of Henry VIII, the protector in the reign of Edward VI. took the part of the people against the noblefle, and gave way to the repealing the act which gave the force of law to the proclamations of the crown; and to the making fome others not very favourable to the prerogative. The prefbyterian

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