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Physical Cause is something that acts independent of the mind, and is contiguous, and acts upon the mind, or some other substance at the time a mutation or change, takes place in the mind, or other substance.
Effect is the mutation, or change in the mind, or other substance, produced by a physical cause. These may also be called natural cause and effect.
Moral Cause and Effect is the mind willing, and thereby producing a mutation or change in a substance,
Remote, Intermediate, and Immediate. Causes. Suppose the first link of a chain has an active power, and by exertion, moves itself, and the other links with which it is connected. The first link is is the Remote Cause, the links between the first and the one next the last, the Intermidiate causes, and the link next the last, the Immediate cause of the motion of the iast link in the chain. The first link may be called the Active Cause; because it moves itself, and the other links by an active power within itself. The links between the first and the last, may be called Passive Causes ; because they have not an active power, but act only as they are acted upon by the first link;
their actions may be more properly called passions. I shall use the terms, cause and effect, in this restricted sense, in my enquiry after the cause of volition.
Physical Necessity. When a physical cauce operates on the mind, and is sufficient to produce a mutation, or change in the mind, this mutation or change, I consider to be physically necessary. We get the idea of the necessary existence of the effect, from the power, or sufficiency of the cause to produce it. I consider that all the pleasure and pain the inind feels from external objects operating on it by way of the bodily senses, are physically necessary. So when the mind has compared two or more things and sees that one thing is more pleasing or agreeable to the mind than another or others, this seeing is choice in the understanding, and it is physically necessary. The Choice may be varied by the volitions of the mind in attention, and examen about the ob. jects in the comparison ; but whatever the choice is in them, for the time being, it is physically necessary. The choice is an effect produced by the operation of motives on the Understanding. In what way external objects act on the mind I do not know; but suppose there is such a connexion be
; tween mind and matter, that external objects do
operate on the mind through some medium, and in', this way the objects are contiguous to the mind, or to the medium through which they act on the mind. This kind of physical necessity has been called by some, though I think improperly, moral necessity, because the mind is the object, in which the effects are produced.
Moral Necessity is choice, as it exists in the understanding; this gives the inind a bias or inclination toward the strongest motive or thing chosen. By bias, or inclination, I do not mean a degree of willingness, for willingness does not belong to the understanding; but I mean a degree of pleasure ; that is, the understanding is not indifferent in regard to the thing chosen, it is better pleased with it, than with the thing not chosen. But moral necessity is never so great as to subject the will, and controul it irresistibly. Whether the mind wills according to its choice in the understanding, or a. gainst its choice, it wills freely; choice does not produce its volitions.
Virtuous Objects. By virtuous objects, I mean God; and every being; mode of existence, action, or non-action, that possesses, in any degree, the vir. tuous nature of God, or tends directly to promote
the interests of his kingdom, or is not directly opposed to it.
Vicious Objects are those that possess a nature or tendency directly opposed to the virtuous nature of God, and the interests of his kingdom.
Spiritual Goods mean the same as virtuous objects.
Spiritual Evils mean the same as vicious objects.
OF THE UNDERSTANDING AND WILL.
I consider the understanding and will to be two distinct powers of the mind, one called the passive power, and the other the active power. Most metaphysicians, who have defined the understanding, and will, have defined them in this way. This is the definition Mr. Locke gives of them, as any one may see, in his first Essay, chap. 21, s. 5: In the 2d section of this chapter, he says, "power is two fold ; viz., as able to make, or able to receive any change: the one may be called active, and the other passive power.
Whether matter be not wholly destitute of active power, as its author God is truly above all passive power; and whether the intermediate state of created spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active, and passive power may be worthy of consideration." In thie seventy first section of the same chapter, he says,
Before I close this chapter, it may, perhaps, be