feel that elevation which threatened perils excite in generous minds. Instead of looking forward to future difgraces or difafters, they reflect on the glory of for. mer times. The posterity of those who conquered at Poitiers, Creffy, and Agincourt, and annexed France itself to the English crown, cannot form to themfelves any fears from a French invafion. On the contrary, when they have fufficiently prepared for fecurity at home, they will act offenfively abroad; and car ry back to the bofom of the enemy that terror which he vainly hopes to cre

ate.

If we are are at war in America, we have not the burden of a continental war; that fink. in which cur treafure has always disappeared, without any hope of return. The money laid out on our na vy, or expended on our colonies, will return to the centre of the kingdom, through all the veins of commerce. Our trade has been protected, against the cnemy, to a degree unknown in any for. mer war. We have loft, in no quarter of the world, any territory without an equivalent; in fome we have gained. In the Weft Indies, we are ftill fuperior to our enemies (1). We have eradicated them entirely from the East Indies; and we have a flattering profpe&t of a speedy termination of refinance in North America. In the first stage of a war, the advantage of attack is poffeffed by that nation who firft breaks the peace. The difadvantages of defence muft, for fome time, remain with its opponent. A ftate poffeffing fuch extenfive dominions as Great Britain, cannot be fuppofed to be invulnerable on every fide. We may fuffer fome loffes at the beginning; for what people was ever uniformly fuccefsful in war? The Romans themselves were not always invincible. They frequently loft provinces and armies; yet they rofe fuperior to all nations. The profits and Toffes of war can only be estimated on the day which concludes a peace. Let us be unanimous among ourselves, and that day cannot be diftant, difadvantageous, or dishonourable; on the contrary, it will be attended with that glory which the spirit and exertion of a great ftate cannot fail to acquire.

(1) [We had not loft St Vincent's and Grenada at the time of writing, or accounts of the lofs of them were not arrived.]

PARLIAMENT. [543-]

Mr Thomas De Grey, under fecretary of ftate in the American department, laid before the Commons, Feb. 19. the papers moved for by Sir William Howe Feb. 17. [540.]; and the Houfe re. folved itself into a committee, May 6, to confider of them, Frederick Montagu, Efq; in the chair.

Earl Cornwallis was called in. His Lordship feated himself in a chair which had been prepared for him, covered; but in two or three minutes, when the examination began, he rofe, and gave his answers uncovered.-The examination was begun by Sir William Howe.

Q. Was not the knowledge of the face of the country of America, for military purpofes, extremely difficult to be obtained from the inhabitants?

A. I am happy to take this public op portunity to declare my great regard and veneration for the character of Sir William Howe. I think he has deferved: greatly of his country; I think he has ferved his country with fidelity, ale duity, and with great ability. After having given this public teftimony of my opinion of the General's conduct, I beg this Houfe will understand, that I do not come here to answer to questions & opinion, but merely to queftions of ma ter of fact. The private opinions of a fubordinate officer can give very little fatisfaction to this Houfe; they may po fibly not do juftice to the character of the Hon. General, or my own. I therefore truft in the candour of this Hou that they will put no queftions to me but fuch as relate to matter of fact.

The question was then repeated; and to that, and other questions, his Lorefhip anfwered, That the country in ge neral is fo covered with wood, that it is very difficult to obtain a knowledge ết it by reconnoitring: That he never fa a ftronger country, or one better calce lated for the defenfive: That the movements of the King's army were much embarraffed and retarded, by the diffculty of getting provifions when in the field, and from the closeness of the cour try: That he never heard it fuggefted by any one, that the lines at Brookly could have been carried by affault: That! it was univerfally fuppofed that the ene my's principal ftrength was at that time on York illand: That he did not knew that any time was loft in making prepa

rations.

ons for landing on York island: That re was no unavoidable delay prior to movement of the army from York id: That he was acquainted with W. Howe's reafons for not attacking enemy's intrenchm ats at White na on the 28th of October, after the at of the corps on the enemy's right, that the attack was impoñible: at the country in the rear of the ene did appear very ftrong: That his hip could not, with that part of corps which first reached Brunfwick, purfued the enemy with any prot of material advantage, or without atly digreffing those troops: That the eral, the night he arrived at Trenton, ached his Lordship with a confiderable ps from Maidenhead to Corriel's Ferwhere it was hoped they fhould have nd boats to cross the river, but no ts were found; and that as the Deare was not fordable, and they could no boats, it was impracticable to Is it at that time: That his Lordship the person who firft fuggefted to the neral the idea of taking Trenton and denton into the chain of his cantonnts; the advantage that muft natural. rife from holding fo large a part of the feys, the great encouragement they t with from the inhabitants, 3 or 400 of om came in and took the oaths every for at leaft ten days, and the great antage they should derive from ob lag forage and provilions, made his rdthip think it advifeable to riff that ended cantonment: That as to poftthe Heffians on the left of the canments, his Lordship ever had, and has, the higheft opinion of thofe ve troops; the misfortune at Trenwas owing entirely to the impruce and negligence of the commanding cer; that on all other occafions thofe ps behaved with the greatest intrepithat the behaviour of this very briof Col. Rall on the attack of Fort thington [38.645.] was the admira. of the whole army: That his Lorddid not obferve any unneceffary dein moving the army from the Jerfor the imbarkation from Staten iH: That his Lordship declined aning the question, Did not the expeon to Pennsylvania prove a powerful Gion in favour of the northern army? ufe it was a matter of opinion: That as understood that the army under . Washington marched into Penn

fylvania to oppofe the corps on that fervice: That his Lordship heard, that about 2000 men marched from the highlands under the command of Gen. Maxwell to reinforce Gen. Withington immediately after the battle of Brandywine: That the manoeuvre that brought on the action at Brandywine [39. 598.] reflects the highest honour on the General: That he did not obferve that any advantage was loft which might have been taken in confequence of that battle: That the Schuylkill is not fordable on the route of Derby; and as the bridge was broke, it would not have been caly to have paffed there: That the reafons that induced Sir W. Howe to give the command of the attack on Red-bank to Col. Donop were these : Soon after the army landed at the head of Elk, Col. Donop wrote to his Lordship, to reprefent to the General, that he thought he had not been fufficiently confidered; that he had no feparate command, and confequently had had no opportunity of diftinguishing himfelf; Sir W. Howe then directed his Lordship to affure the Colonel, that he would take the first opportunity of giving him a fuitable feparate command: That his Lordship communicated to Col. Donop Sir W. Howe's orders for the attack of Red-bank (39.605.], and they were entirely difcretionary; and Col. Donop appeared to be perfectly fatisfied with his orders: That they were much retarded in the poffeffion of the fort on Mud-iland [40. 11.] by an extraordinary ftorm of rain which broke down the dikes, and did great damage to their works.

On a queftion put by Vice-Adm. Lord Howe, Earl Cornwallis affured the House, that during the whole time that Lord Howe commanded the naval department in America, as well while Sir W. Howe commanded the army as afterwards, the troops met with all poffible affistance and co-operation from the navy, and the greateft harmony subsisted between them; and that Lord Howe's character cannot be more revered by the feamen than it is by the foldiers of the American army.

To queftions put by other members of the committee, Earl Cornwallis anfwered, That there was not a poffibility of getting behind the enemy's lines at Brooklyn without forcing them: That it was reported the enemy had 6 or 800. men on Long island. To the question, In what refpect would the pursuit of the

enemy

in any danger from the King's troops that day. Being asked, "What was the impediment to purfuing the march from Brunfwick, as his Lordship faid the troops were undoubtedly able before the 6th?" he anfwered, "As the enemy had so much the start of us, I do not fee there was any great object for the march. We wanted reinforcement in order to leave troops for the communication be tween Brunswick and Amboy. It was likewife neceffary to pay fome attention to a confiderable body of troops then paffing the North river under Gen. Lee.” To other questions his Lordship anfwered, That he knew of no offers or promifes made by perfons of intereft among the rebels in Pennsylvania to Gen. Howe about Dec. 20. 1776, for furnishing him, with any aid or affiftance, in cafe of his entering Pennsylvania with his army: That he knew of no other circumftances exifting about that time which could warrant a confidence of a peaceable or friendly difpofition in any very confider able part of the Pennsylvanians towards G. Britain: That after the action Brooklyn the army was incamped a lit tle out of cannon-fhot of the lines; and he knew of no place where they could have taken post so as to difcern what wa paffing at Brooklyn ferry: That the ar my was very well fupplied with provi fions on the march from the head of the Elk to Philadelphia, partly by what was carried in the provifion-train, and partly by the cattle and flour found in the country; and received no provision from the Delaware before they reached Ph delphia: That Sir William Howe wa highly esteemed by the officers and f diers of his army: That his Lordihi understood it to be the General's dire tions, that he should halt at Brunswick from the 1ft to the 6th; but had he fee that he could have ftruck a mater ftroke by moving forward, he certa ar fhould have taken it upon him to have do it.—His Lordship refused to anfed many questions relating to opinion, to private conferences and confultatio

enemy from Brunswick have diftreffed the troops under his Lordship's command he answered, "We arrived at Brunswick the night of the 1ft of December; we had marched that day twenty miles through exceeding bad roads; we fubfifted only on the flour we found in the country, and as the troops had been constantly marching ever fince their first entry into the Jerfeys, they had no time to bake their flour; the artillery-horses and baggage horfes of the army were quite tired: that fufficiently proves that we were not in a good condition to undertake a long march: the bridge over the Rariton was broken, which caufed a neceffary delay of one day; if the enemy could not have paffed at Trenton, they might have marched down the east side of the Delaware. What I have said I believe is fuf. ficient to prove, that we could not reap any confiderable advantage from fuch a purfuit."-To other questions he answered, That he took no notes or memorandums of the number of troops that arrived the firft day at Brunfwick; but thinks there arrived two battalions of the light infantry, two battalions of British grenadiers, three battalions of Heffan grenadiers, and he believes the 42d and 33d regiments, but is not quite clear; the fourth brigade, under Ġen. Grant, were halted at Bonham town, about feven miles in their rear; there were like. wife two companies of Heffian yagers, and the 16th regiment of light dragoons: That the troops under his Lordship's command would undoubtedly have been in a condition to have marched forward before the 6th: That the left column of the King's troops reached Princetown an hour before fun-fet of the 7th, and the fecond column between nine and ten at night: That he understood (but could not fpeak with certainty) that a detachment of the enemy quitted Prince town that morning, he did not know what time: That he did not know what the number of the enemy was, but they were reprefented to be without artillery or baggage; nor did he recollect the number of the King's troops: That he could not fay how long the enemy's rear-guard had paffed the Delaware, on the 8th, when the first divifion of the King's troops, which advanced to Trenton, reached that river; they kept a fmall detachment in Trenton till the King's troops got near it; he did not apprehend the enemy's rear-guard were

Maj.-Gen. Gray, to questions pat Gen. Howe, anfwered, That the in bitants of the country in general were very much against us, that they deferte the country where-ever the British ars came, fo that no intelligence that con be depended upon could be got: T that part of America in which the wh nefs was, is the ftrongest country be

ver was in; every where hilly, and covered with wood; interfected by ravines, creeks, and marshy grounds; every quar ter of a mile a poft fitted for ambufcades; every hundred yards of it might be difputed; little or no knowledge could be obtained of it by reconnoitring: That the expedition to Philadelphia proved a powerful diversion in favour of the northern army, as it drew Gen. Wathing: ton and the whole continental army near 300 miles off: That the divifion of the army before the battle of Brandywine [39 599] was a mafterly movement, deceived the enemy, and brought on the ction with almoft a certainty of fuccefs: That he knew of no advantage loft that might have been taken in confequence of that battle: That, all circumftances confidered, the choice of difficulties in carrying on a war in the frongeft country in the world, with almoft an unaninous people to defend it, and the num ber of troops the commander in chief had to overcome thofe difficulties, he knew of no inftance wherein Sir W. Howe omitted attacking the enemy, or of his not doing every thing that was poffible to be done to promote his Majety's fervice, and the honour of the Briith arms.

To questions put by other members Gen. Gray anfwered, That he believes Gen. Washington's army were as ftrong ↑ Middle Brook and Brandywine as they were at any time while he was in Ameca; and that the American army at Brandywine he supposed to be about 15 r 16,000 regulars, befides militia: That he order for the evacuation of Philadelhia had the very worst effect on the well-affected inhabitants; it alienated he minds of many from us, and feveral at had held out till then, took oaths the States; and that it threw an unifal damp over the whole army. Sir Andrew Snape Hammond, exained May 11. to questions put by Sir William and Lord Howe, anfwered, hat he commanded a detached fquaron, to watch the motions of the rebels the Delaware, for feveral months an cedent to the arrival of the British eet off the entrance of that river on the oth of July 1777: That the British fleet onfifted of 250 fail: That the navigaon of the Delaware is very hazardous, pecially from the fhoals, and rapidity the tides: That the rebel water-guard, force, on the river, to obftruct the VOL. XLI.

free navigation, confifted of two frigates at Philadelphia, not complete as to men; at Mud ifland, where the fort was, the Province fhip, which mounted eighteen eighteen-pounders; the Delaware frigate, of twenty-eight twelve-pounders; two xebecks, mounting each two twenty-four-pounders in their bow, two eighteen pounders in their stern, and four nine-pounders in their waist; a brig mounting fixteen fix-pounders; two floating-batteries, the one of twelve eighteen pounders, the other of ten, thefe guns all moveable on either fide; thirteen row-gallies,' each carrying one gun from thirty-two pounds to eighteen; thirtyfix row-boats, or half gallies, carrying a fix pounder or a four-pounder: these were the whole, he believed; except fire-rafts, of which there were twentyfive or thirty, each compofed of five ftages chained together; and that the proper boats of the fhips of war were not of a conftruction and force well adapted to oppofe the rebel-water-guard on nightfervice; nor were the fmall armed veffels of the fleet adequate to that purpose, the Cornwallis galley excepted.

To queftions put by other members Sir Andrew anfwered, That when the rebels burnt any fire-rafts, the rebelgallies never quitted them until they were within half-gun fhot: That they feveral times attacked with fire-rafts the fquadron under the witness's command; the first time, off Chefter, where the channel is not above one third of a mile wide; that the ships were employed in taking men on board when the enemy came down with their fire-rafts; that they came within half gun fhot before they lighted their fire-rafts, and they at the fame time difcharged their guns from the gallies; that the tide running very ftrong, the fhips were obliged to flip their cables, to prevent the fire-rafts being on board them, and to give the boats an opportunity to tow the fire-rafts off; that when the fhips caft, their guns reached the gallies, which drove off the gal lies, and permitted the boats to tow the fire-rafts on fhore; and that at this time the fhips run a great risk of running a ground, but fortunately escaped: That he never knew an inftance of any fireraft laying hold of any of our fhips, and fetting it on fire, the precautions taken having prevented it; but that if all our fleet had arrived off Wilmington, in or der to a landing of the troops, it would 4 G

the