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tends to strengthen the power and international influence of the United States must tend, speaking generally, to promote the welfare of Great Britain, merely because of the community of interests and ideas existing to a large extent between the two nations, and because of the great improbability of hostilities between them; and the risk of incurring the enmity of a declining power like Spain could well be incurred for an object of such Importance. That this service on the part of Great Britain materially influenced at the time not only the present Administration but American opinion generally in her favor was only natural.

Taking into account, then, the fact that we are entering the Asiatic arena in a spirit of entire good-will, if not of actual friendliness, to Great Britain, at least as far as President McKinley, his Cabinet and his party are concerned, and the further patent fact that the commercial policy of that country in the Orient is peculiarly favorable to the trade interests of the United States, let us briefly consider the position of the different Powers in the Far East as it stood prior to the Boxer outbreak, and as it will in all probability again stand after that movement has been suppressed-if haply it is going to be suppressed.

The Chinese question has become largely a Russian question; recent events on the Amur only emphasize this fact. The extraordinary extensions which have taken place within the last half-century in the Russian dominions in Asia; the intense racial and national ambition of the Slavs, with their steady and, as some believe, irresistible movement towards more southern climes and ice free waters; the patient and consistent policy of that Power, and the extraordinary diplomatic ability displayed in carrying it forward; the peculiar talent of Rus

sians to take part successfully in that network of intrigue which seems to be the normal form of Oriental government; the military and political power possessed by that great autocratic empire, together with the remarkable success already achieved by her-first, in depriving Japan of an important part of the fruits of her victory over China and excluding her from the mainland of Asia, and second, in controlling to no small degree the action of the Pekin Government, weakened and disorganized by that war, and in obtaining from it such extraordinary rights as those conveyed by the lease of Port Arthur and the adjacent territory, and by the Manchurian Railway agreement; that imposing and wonderful project, already carried so far towards success, the Trans-Siberian Railway;all these things indicate that Russia is thus far not only the strongest, but actually the dominant, factor in the Far East. She approaches China from behind, by land, while all the other Powers except France-and France is her ally-now approach that empire in front, and by the sea. With the active assistance of France and the assured neutrality of Germany, Russia, in spite of the insignificance of her present trade interests, and in spite of the control by Great Britain of over two-thirds of the foreign commerce of China, has been able thus far to checkmate the latter Power at almost every point, and to make her own policy prevail.

Great Britain has been obliged to abandon the policy of endeavoring to preserve intact the full territorial integrity of China, to recognize the rights of Germany in Shantung and of Russia in Manchuria, and even to participate herself in the partial dismemberment of China by taking Wei-Hai-Wei, as a small offset to the infinitely more valuable acquisitions of the other two Powers; SO that Secretary Hay is

obliged to speak of preserving the "entity" of China, her integrity being already gone. It might not be courteous for an American to describe the vacillation and weakness of British policy, or rather lack of policy, in the East since the appearance of Russia on the scene, though he would only have to quote language used by the English authorities best informed upon China. Whatever the explanation or excuse may be, it is a fact too plain to be denied that British influence, formerly preponderant, has sunk almost to the zero point in China, and American diplomacy cannot be expected to ignore this patent truth in shaping its own policy. The question whether it is desirable to maintain British influence in China, or whether this can be done without incurring too great burdens there, or too great dangers in other quarters, is one for the people of England to decide for themselves, and they do not need any foreign advice on the matter; but the United States should frame her course in Asia according to the situation which she finds existing. If it is the destiny of a large part of China and of most of Asia to be Russianized-and Great Britain, perhaps with the aid of Japan, seems to be the only Power which can interpose any effective resistance, whether by diplomacy or by force of arms, to prevent this resultthen in the not distant future the United States must depend upon her established friendship with Russia to secure access to markets of the greatest value to her commerce. The reply of Count Mouravieff to the proposals of the United States in reference to the open-door policy, even if leaving much to be desired in fully meeting them, at least contains something of value, and indicates the desire of Russia to accept our commercial views as far as she feels she can afford to do so. Moreover, if the principle of commercial preference is at any time adopted, Rus

sia would certainly be likely, for sentimental and political reasons, to give the preference to American products over British.

While the United States has recently entered upon a policy of insular expansion, both in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, it would be a great mistake to infer that we desire more territory wherever we can get it, or that because we are in the Philippines-and even now one of our great political parties favors a practical withdrawal from these islands-we are going to become engaged in the general politics of Asia, or to throw our weight into her political scales, except to the extent of safeguarding, as far as possible, our own commercial interests. To put the matter more plainly, if, as some of the best-informed authorities believe, there are two irreconcilable conflicts approaching in Asia-first, a struggle be tween Russia and Japan over the control of Corea, and second, a larger, but perhaps more remote, conflict between Great Britain and Russia as to the advance of the latter power in Asia, and ultimately as to the possession of India itself, already threatened by the rapid growth of Muscovite power and influence upon its borders-the United States, wherever the sympathies of a majority of her people might be, should, and doubtless will, maintain a strict neutrality. The development of her own continental territories, with the newly-acquired islands, together with the maintenance of the Monroe doctrine throughout the Western hemisphere, affords a large enough scope for some time to come for her ambitions. To join with England, or with Japan, or both, in settling the politics of Asia, in which they are both vitally concerned while we are not, would be to allow ourselves to be used to promote the interests of other Powers instead of conserving our own-an act of folly so great that it need not be con

templated as a probability. Commercially, the United States has a definite policy in Asia, that of the open door, and she will doubtless join with any Powers which have the same policy so far as diplomatic action within reasonable bounds is concerned; politically, neither having nor desiring any territory upon the continent of Asia, she should keep entirely free from the gov ernmental complications of the Orient. By so doing we shall not only best conserve the interests of our own people, but may continue to occupy such a happy relation to all the other Powers that when the Asiatic crisis comes, if unfortunately come it must, we may be able to render a great service to the world by mediating to preserve its peace. All Americans must hope that out of the horrors of the present situation in China may at least come that better understanding of one another, that larger regard for the interests of all, which may establish a lasting and assured concord among the Powers now allied in the interests of Western civilization. China and Asia are large enough to satisfy the reasonable ambitions of all of them.

Finally, let us consider what alternative settlements of this dread problem of the future of China seem possible. The actual partitioning of that great empire among the Powers, its full incorporation within their respective political systems and under their flags, seems so utterly impossible that it need not be considered. To rule the Chinese people otherwise than through a Chinese government of some sort is a task beyond the power even of the combined nations. Yet it is equally clear that if the Chinese question is indeed to be settled, if the fire is really to be put out, and not left to smoulder and break out again, there must be some sort of effective control by the representatives of Western civilization. Only two courses seem practicable; the

maintenance of a central government, whether it be that of the Manchu dynasty or some other, which should be provided with the means of preserving order, and should be to a considerable extent subject to the control of the representatives of the Powers, whether acting as a council or merely as a diplomatic body; or the division of Chinese territory into separate political districts, within each of which some one Power should have its sphere of influence, and should be responsible, acting through such native rulers as might be constituted, for the maintenance of law and order. If the first course is followed, the recent note of Secretary Hay would seem to lead to the participation by the United States in such diplomatic control; if the latter, she will ask only for the assurance by treaty that the open door will be preserved by the Powers concerned, and that other existing treaty rights will be safeguarded. Each of these courses is full of difficulties, but it would seem that one or the other of them must be followed in order to re-establish lasting order in China and keep the world's peace. The only third course would seem to be the practical control of China by Russia-and this is threatening.

From one great error at least the Christian Powers, and the United States most of all, should keep scrupulously free. Whatever may have been the outrages committed in China, or whatever the moral complicity of the Empress and her officials, some stronger and higher motive than that of inflicting revenge, even for such an unexampled atrocity as the attack upon a whole Diplomatic Corps, must inspire the action of the Powers. It is almost inconceivable that any organized government, even in China, should have committed, or permitted unless powerless to stop it, such an act of insane political folly, to say nothing of its

moral character; whatever may be the responsibility of the Empress for the Boxer movement, the murder of Ministers must, at least, be considered an act of uncontrollable anarchy until the contrary is clearly proved. The governments concerned have been wise thus far in refraining from any declaration of war against the Chinese nation, and it is to be hoped that they will persist in this course under all provocations. To hold the whole people

of China, differing as greatly as they do in race, religion and ideas, and bound together by such loose political ties, responsible for all that has occurred, would be unjust as well as foolish. However the lives, property and interests of foreigners may suffer through the movement now in progress, the Chinese themselves must in all these respects suffer much more seriously. Even the barbarities which shock civilization are inflicted alike upon the native and the foreigner, and China herself must be the chief sufferer by the convulsion which has seized her.

We can even afford to recognize that the Boxer movement itself, in spite of its excesses, is a patriotic, even if an ignorant one, and, from a Western standpoint, mistaken in its purposes. Europe and America have denied to China the right to remain in isolation from the rest of the world, have persistently forced upon her their missionaries and their trade, and have undermined her ancient civilization; and in recent years they have despoiled her of territory, while furnishing her with the best modern guns and rifles, and teaching her how to use them. The present The Contemporary Review.

result may be terrible, but it is certainly not unnatural. It is doubtless a great misfortune for China herself, as well as for the world at large, that she should at last have learned so well the great lessons in the art of creating destructive forces which Western civilization has successfully taught her, while almost vainly endeavoring to impart its Christianity, that the invader of her soil now finds himself "hoist with his own petard." The Western nations will not withdraw from their self-assumed task of imposing their civilization and their trade upon China, and probably in the end the Chinese will be the better for it. But let us at least show them that we can ourselves not only accept, but put in practice, one of the cardinal principles of the religion which we have endeavored to teach them, by proving that our national action is not inspired by one of the most base and savage passions. Punishment there must no doubt be, if guilty individuals can be reached; but to meet barbarism with barbarism, to pursue a policy of mere revenge for the loss of foreign lives, even though these be numbered by the thousand-a revenge which would fall as heavily upon the innocent as upon the guilty-this, in the midst of such a political cataclysm as has burst upon China, would be a course as unworthy of enlightened statesmanship as it is inconsistent

with the principles of Christianity. If Western civilization has grim work to do in China, let it at least be done in justice, not in anger, and for the final good of the Chinese people themselves, as well as for that of the world.

Josiah Quincy.



The flat box was on the middle of the kitchen table. Lisbeth stood bent over it with both arms outstretched, as if to protect her property.

"Now," said the old cook, Wea, "if you won't, then let some one else."

"Yes, am I to open it or not?" growled Hinrich Meyer, the doctor's coachman, who was already prepared with his chisel and pincers to open the lid.

"But Lisbeth, what ails you? Now, what! First you were as glad as could be to get something from Paris and danced around in the kitchen, and now!"-Wilhelmina, the chambermaid, shook her head-"of course it can't be a hat."

"No, not so new fashioned a one as yours, with the high feathers," broke in the cook.

"And you wanted a hat? But, even if the box is flat-what kind of things cannot be found in Paris? Stuff for a dress. And gloves. And gowns, I tell you, lace under-petticoats! At my place before the last, the countesshere with the doctor's wife things are not so advanced, and the last place also was not-but the one before that---if you could only have seen the washings."

"Ah," sighed Lisbeth, "he would not send me anything like that, so it is not that."

"So? What do you know about what such a gentleman will do, who considers that everything should be fine underneath, not only a little bit outside. And you must thank him for it. So, and can you do that when you do not even know what is in there? So,

* Translated for The Living Age by Adene Williams.

that I say flat. Why will you not let us see?"

"I have such a fear," whispered the young thing, looking from one to the other with tears in her eyes.

"Such a fear!" cried Wilhelmina, "what of? What should be there? It won't bite you. No, such a fine gentleman who knows not at all who you are, and betroths himself to you in an honest way, and sends you presents from Paris, and you are still afraid?" "If he should betroth himself to you, Wilhelmina, you wouldn't do so?" said the cook, "you would show him how much better for him."

"Stupid! What are you talking about. I don't begrudge him to Lisbeth, I don't even know him. Besides such a young man who must ask his mamma-no, no, ut for me."

"Now, shall I open the box or shall I not?" asked Hinrich, "otherwise I must go to the stable, for it is time to harness."

"Now, Lisbeth, how is it, yes or not?"

"Lisbeth," said Wilhelmina, "if you don't want to see yourself, then let us see; you can go outside." "Couldn't I-I might take it up to my room-" begged Lisbeth.

"No, no, that won't do."

"What will you do all alone there?"

"It is not so easy to betroth one to such a gentleman; we will see what he sends from Paris. Now, go on, Hinrich, open the box."

And Wilhelmina pushed the young housemaid energetically aside with both hands, so that the coachman could come. Hinrich did not need to be told twice. He was not so curious as the women, of course not. Butwhat would such a young gentleman send the little Lisbeth from Paris? He

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