dition to which the grand army was reduced.

"I think it my duty to announce to you, as our good and faithful Ally, that having been sent to this Army of the Centre, to endeavour to hasten its arrival to the Capital, in order, if possible, to save it; but not having been able to succeed in my design, and preparing in consequence to join the Supreme Junta, I have found myself obliged by the Generals, and forced by circumstances, to take the command of the Army till I receive the decision of the Junta. It was unfortunately the spirit of insurrection and discontent among the soldiery which placed me at the post I now occupy; and it is certainly a very disagreeable situation, to have to correct inveterate evils, and to set out with the measures necessary to re-establish that order and discipline which have been totally neglected,

I cannot describe to you the state in which I found this body of famished troops-without shoes, most of them without uniforms, wanting ammunition, having lost the greatest part of their baggage, reduced to about nine thousand infantry and two of cavalry, and, to crown all, having totally lost all confidence in their commanders. From these circumstances I thought it right to follow the plan adopted by my predecessor, of coming to this mountainous country for a few days, in order to reorganise a little the troops; to give an opportunity to some stragglers and recruits to join me, to give shoes and repose to the men and horses, and then to set forward on some new operations. But it is very important for their success, that these should be in concert with those of the other armies, especial ly of the English; and it would be, consequently, indispensably necessary that we should be made acquainted with each other's plans. Colonel Whittingkam is ill at this moment; I therefore wish that H. E. General Moore, the Commander in Chief, should send me an experienced and confidential officer, who can give me an account of the plan adopted by the General for this campaign, and inform him of what we shall have agreed upon together, relative to the part which this division of the army can take in its execution. I shall be delighted if he choice should fall upon

Colonel Graham, whom I had the ho nour of knowing at Mr Stuart's.

App. p. 76.

Immediately before receiving the intelligence which induced him to re, treat, Sir John writes to Mr Frere;

"Buonaparte is dating his proclamations from Madrid; and as to the British army, if it were in a neutral, or enemy's country, it could not be more com. pletely left to itself. If the Spaniards are enthusiasts, or much interested in this cause, their conduct is the most extraordinary that ever was exhibited.

"The movement I am making is of the most dangerous kind. I not only risk to be surrounded every moment by superior forces, but to have my communication intercepted with the Gallicias. I wish it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to every individual of the army, that we have done every thing in our power in support of the Spanish cause, and that we do not abandon it, until long after the Spaniards had abanP. 162. doned us.

The following account is given of the positions, at this time, of the Bri tish army, and of that under Soult:

The British were collected between Sahagun, Grahal, and Villada, consist. ing of twenty-five thousand four hun. dred men.

The Duke of Dalmatia, after the defeat of his cavalry at Sahagun, had withdrawn a detachment from Guardo, and concentrated his troops, to the amount of eighteen thousand, behind the river Carrion. Seven thousand were posted at Saldana, and five thousand at the town of Carrion; and detachments were placed to guard the fords and bridges. It was also known that the head columas of Junot's corps (the Sth) were between Vittoria and Burgos.

P. 161.

The following is General Moore's answer to the letter from Romana, announcing the intelligence which he had received of the movement of the French army from Madrid:

“I had the honour of your Excellency's letter of the 22d this afternoon, and have to thank you for the information which it contains the probability of

tion.

66

My movement has in some degree answered its object, as it has drawn the enemy from other projects, and will give the South more time to prepare. With such a force as mine I can pretend to do no more. It would only be losing this army to Spain and to England to persevere in my march on Soult, who, if posted strongly, might wait, or if not, would retire and draw me on until the corps from Madrid got behind me: in short, single handed, I cannot pretend to contend with the superior numbers the French can bring against

me.

"I received your Excellency's letter at six, and the troops were to have marched from this to Carrion at eight this evening. I countermanded them, and shall take immediate measures for retiring on Astorga. There I shall stand; as my retreat thence, if necessary, will be secure. I shall be in the way to receive the supplies and the reinforcements which I expect from Eng., land. At the worst I can maintain myself, and, with your Excellency's aid, defend the Gallicias, and give time for the formation of the armies of the South, and that which you command to be prepared, when a joint effort may be made which can alone be efficacious. It is playing the Enemy's game to draw him to attack our armies in rotation.

"I hope this plan will meet your approbation; you may rest assured that I shall not retreat a foot beyond what is necessary to secure my supplies from

being intercepted; and that I desire nothing more than to meet the Enemy upon any thing like equal terms. P. 165.

A particular account, probably cor rect, of the views and intentions of Buonaparte was received through Major Napier, who, having been taken prisoner at the battle of Corunna, was treated with the utmost politeness by Generals Soult and Ney, and dined frequently at their table. They talked with apparent frankness, and there does not appear any motive which they

could then have had to deceive.

When Buonaparte received intelligence that the British were moving to the Duero, he said, "Moore is the only General now fit to contend with me; I shall advance against him in person."

Orders were then sent to the Duke of Dalmatia to give way, if attacked, and to decoy the British to Burgos, or as far Eastward as possible; and at the same time to push on a corps towards Leon, on their left flank. And should they attempt to retreat, he was ordered to impede this by every means in his power. The corps on the road to Badajos was stopt, and ordered to proceed towards Salamanca; while he himself moved rapidly with all the disposable force at Madrid, and the Escurial, directly to Benavente. Neither Buonaparte nor any of his Generals had the least doubt of surrounding the British with between 60 and 70,000 men before they could reach Gallicia. P. 168.

A retreating army is not easily preserved from disorder; and there were at present several circumstances which augmented this tendency. Our troops were indignant at the want of Spanish co-operation, and not less at the unwillingness the natives shewed to afford our army supplies, either of provisions, or of any description. On the other hand, the Spaniards, it may be supposed, were not in the best humour, at seeing themselves abandoned by the English army, The General employed every means in his power to put a stop to these irregularities. Several proclamations are given, in which re

monstrances

monstrances and threats are addressed both to the officers and men; the latter for committing, and the former for not doing all in their power to prevent them. The following may serve as a specimen of these:

"Head Quarters Benavente, 27th Dec.

"The Commander of the Forces has

observed with concern, the extreme bad conduct of the troops at a moment when they are about to come into contact with the Enemy, and when the greatest regularity and the best conduct are the most requisite. He is the more concerned at this, as until lately, the behaviour of that part of the army, at least, which was under his own imme. diate command, was exemplary, and did them much honour.

"The misbehaviour of the troops in the column which marched by Valderas to this place, exceeds what he could have believed of British soldiers. It is disgraceful to the Officers; as it strongly marks their negligence and inatten

tion.

"The Commander of the Forces refers to the General Orders of the 15th of October, and of the 11th of November. He desires that they may be again read at the head of every company of the army he can add nothing but his determination to execute them to the fullest extent. He can feel no mercy towards Officers who neglect in times like these essential duties, or towards Soldiers who injure the country they are sent to protect. The Spanish forces have been overpowered; and until such time as they are re-assembled, and ready again to come forward, the situation of the army must be arduous, and such as to call for the exertion of qualities the most rare and valuable in a military body. These are not bravery alone, but patience and constancy, under fatigue and hardship, obedience to command, sobriety, firmness and resolution, in every different situation in which they may be placed. It is by the display of such qualities alone, that the army can expect to deserve the name of Soldiers; that they can be able to withstand the forces opposed to them, or to fulfil the expectations of their Coun

P. 176.

It seems to have excited greatly the indignation of our officers, that no attempt should have been made, by the armed Spaniards, to retard the approach of the enemy. We cannot help looking upon this expectation as somewhat unreasonable. That troops, constituted as they were, should encounter the allies who were flying from them, enemy, merely to cover the retreat of would have required a very extraordinary degree of intrepidity. The activity with which they removed to a distance every thing which could be of use to the English cannot be so easily excused.

As no official detail has appeared of the action at Cacabelos, the following account will be interesting:

The reserve halted at Cacabelos, and the greatest part of the cavalry at Villafranca. On arriving at this town the General heard with vexation, that great irregularities had been committed there by the preceding divisions. The Commissaries reported that the Magazines had been plundered, stores of wine had been broke open, and a great quantity of forage and provisions spoiled. One man who was detected in committing these atrocities was made an example of, in the hope of preventing such crimes in future: and to convince the soldiers of the miserable consequences of their drunkenness, and of quitting their corps, some of those stragglers who had been shockingly mangled by the cavalry, were shewn through the ranks. Thus every measure was adopted that prudence could devise, to put a stop to this bad conduct.

On the 3d of January four or five thousand French cavalry were seen (at one o'clock in the forenoon) advancing cautiously within a league of Cacabelos. The 95th and a detachment of British cavalry occupied a hill about half a league in front of the town, through which a shallow river ran, and part of the reserve was posted on the opposite bank.

Sir John Moore commanded the 95th to retire through the town and over a bridge. But while the two rear.companies were passing along a narrow street, the cavalry piquet retreated pre

cipitately through them, and the Enemy's cavalry pursued so closely that some few soldiers of the 95th were made prisoners. The Enemy's dismounted chasseurs immediately advanced rapidly, crossed the river in great force, and attacked the 95th, the cavalry joining in the onset.

The 95th were directed to retreat up some hills among vineyards; which they did slowly in a very gallant manner, galling the Enemy with a wellaimed fire from their rifles.

The French cavalry charged up the road, but were driven back with considerable slaughter by the 95th. General Colbert, who commanded the advanced guard of the French, was among the slain.

A large column of the enemy was next observed descending the hill on the opposite side of the river. Immediately the artillery attached to the reserve opened upon this column a severe fire, which stopped their movement. In this attack the enemy suffered much. Sir John Moore towards the evening withdrew the reserve to Villa-franca; and being aware that the greater part of the enemy's army were very near, he resolved to make a night march to Herreri

Although there was a position at Villa Franca, Sir John did not conceive it advisable to stop there, as there was another road by which the enemy might have entered Gallicia, and taken him in the rear. He determined, however, to offer battle at Lugo, as the only way of retarding the enemy's progress. He sent orders, therefore, for all the divisions to stop at that place. Unfortunately, the orderly dragoon whom Sir David Baird sent forward to General Fraser, got drunk, and lost his dispatches; so that his division had the fatigue of marching a day on the Vigo road, and afterwards returning.

Nothing, however, took place at Lugo beyond a mere skirmish, of which the following is an account :

On examining the ground near Lugo,

a position was found on which he would have been happy to have engaged. The

Enemy appeared about mid-day, but nothing serious occurred.

Next morning (January 7th) the French planted four pieces of artillery on the front of the British, and commenced a cannonade. The fire was returned by the British Artillery, which dismounted one of the Enemy's guns. Towards the evening some French regiments attacked the right of the Bri tish, and were chiefly opposed by the Guards and General Leith's brigade.

Sir John Moore then observed the Enemy moving to his left, his light troops skirmishing with the picquets. He conceived that the principal attack would be made on that point, and the proper orders were immediately given.

The divisions were all at their posts, and he galloped to the spot.

A part of the 76th regiment at first retired before a strong column of the Enemy, at the head of which was their much esteemed ad light infantry battalion, which advanced rapidly.

The General, by accident, found himself in front of the 51st regiment, in which he had served as an Ensign. He addressed them in an animated tone, and commanded them to advance; when the light company of the 76th rushed forward with charged bayonets, and drove the enemy down the hill with considerable loss.

In this sharp skirmish, Captain Roberts of the 51st was shot in the hand, but before the Frenchman could recover his musket he was transfixed by a sol

dier of the 6th named Canner. This brave fellow bayoneted 2 other Frenchmen, and was rewarded by promotion.

The General having witnessed this gallant attack, bestowed deserved praises upon the 76th.

P. 195.