only use this manner of expression, but even the Greeks themselves; and that not only before, but after* Pythagoras + had accustomed them to one name. As therefore under the single name of World or Universe, so also under the conjunctive expression of heaven and earth, are contained all things material and immaterial, visible and invisible. But as the apostle hath taught us to reason, "When he saith all things are put under him, it is manifest that he is excepted which did put all things under him :" (1 Cor. xv. 27.) so when we say, all things were made by God, it is as manifest that he is excepted who made all things. And then the proposition is clearly thus delivered: All beings whatsoever beside God were made. As we read in St. John concerning the Word, that "the world was made by him;" (John i. 10.) and in more plain. and express words before," All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made." (John i. 3.) Which is yet farther illustrated by St. Paul: "For by him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by him." (Col. i. 16.) If then there be nothing imaginable which is not either in heaven or in earth, nothing which is not either visible or invisible, then is there nothing beside God which was not made by God. This then is the unquestionable doctrine of the Christian. faith, that the vast capacious frame of the World, and every thing any way contained and existing in it, hath not its essence from or of itself, nor is of existence absolutely necessary; but what it is, it hath not been, and that being which it hath was made, framed, and constituted by another. And as "every house is builded by some man ;" (Heb. iii. 4.) for we see the earth bears no such creature of itself; stones do not grow into a wall, or first hew and square, then unite and fasten themselves together in their generation; trees sprout not cross like dry and sapless beams, nor do spars and tiles spring with a natural uniformity into a roof, and that out of stone and mortar: these are not the works of nature, but superstructions and additions to her, as the supplies of art, and the testimonies of the understanding of man, the great artificer on earth: so, if the World itself be but a house,§ if the earth, which "hangeth * Εἷς ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν, εἷς ἐστὶν θεός, * Πυθαγόρας πρῶτος ἀνόμασε τὴν τῶν ὅλων περιοχήν, κόσμον, ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τάξεως. Plutarch, de Plac. Philosoph. 1. ii. c. 1. Si Mundum dixeris, illic erit et cœlum, et quæ in eo, sol, et luna, et sidera, et astra, et terra, et freta, et omnis census elementorum. Omnia dixeris, cum id dixeris, quod ex omnibus constat.' Tertull. de Virg. Veland. c. 4. Φασὶ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώ πους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν, καὶ φιλίαν, καὶ και σμιότητα, καὶ σωφροσύνην, καὶ δικαιότη τα καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν. Iamhl. Protrept, but the words are Plato's in Gorgia, p. 132. ed. Bipont. † Ὁ αἰσθητὸς αὑτοσὶ κόσμος οὐδὲν ἄρα ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ οἶκος Θεοῦ. Philo de Insomn. p. 648. Κόσμος εὐπρεπὴς καὶ ἔτοιμος, αίσθητος upon nothing," (Job xxvi. 7.) be the foundation, and the glorious spheres of heaven the roof (which hath been delivered as the most universal hypothesis), if this be the habitation of an infinite intelligence, the temple of God; then must we acknowledge the world was built by him, and consequently, that “he which built all things is God." (Heb. iii. 4.) From hence appears the truth of that distinction, Whatsoever hath any being, is either made or not made: whatsoever is not made, is God; whatsoever is not God is made. One uncreated and independent essence; all other depending on it, and created by it. One of eternal and necessary existence; all other indifferent, in respect of actual existing, either to be or not to be, and that indifferency determined only by the free and voluntary act of the first Cause. Now because to be thus made includes some imperfection, and among the parts of the world, some are more glorious than others; if those which are most perfect presuppose a Maker, then can we not doubt of a creation where we find far less perfection. This house of God, though uniform, yet is not all of the same materials, the footstool and the throne are not of the same mould; there is a vast difference between the heavenly expansions. This first aerial heaven, where God setteth up his pavilion, where "he maketh the clouds his chariot, and walketh upon the wings of the wind," (Psal. civ. 3.) is not so far inferior in place as it is in glory to the next, the seat of the sun and moon, the two great lights, and stars innumerable, far greater than the one of them. And yet that second heaven is not so far above the first as beneath the "third," (2 Cor. xji. 2.) into which St. Paul was caught. The brightness of the sun doth not so far surpass the blackness of a wandering cloud, as the glory of that heaven of presence surmounts the fading beauty of the starry firmament. For in this great temple of the World, in which the Son of God is the high-priest, the heaven which we see is but the veil, and that which is above, the Holy of Holies. This veil indeed is rich and glorious, but one day to be rent, and then to admit us into a far greater glory, even to the Mercy-seat and Cherubim. For this third heaven is the " proper habitation"+ (Jude ver. 6.) of the blessed angels, which constantly attend upon the throne. And if those most glorious and happy spirits, those "morning stars which sang together, those sons of God which shouted for joy when the foundations of the earth were laid," (Job xxxviii. 7. 4.) if they and their habitation were made; then can we no ways doubt of the production of all other creatures so much inferior unto them. elnoç ToŨ BEOũ. Id. de Plant. Noe, p. 337. Θεῖόν τι μέγεθος ὁ κόσμος, καὶ οἶκος θεοῦ alonris. Id. de Mundi Incorr. p. 509. Lucretius calls the heavens: Mundi magnum et versatile templum.' 1. v. v. 1435. Τὸ ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν Forasmuch then as the angels are termed "the sons of God," it sufficiently denoteth that they are from him, not of themselves; all filiation inferring some kind of production: and being God hath but one proper and only-begotten Son, whose propriety and singularity consisteth in this, that he is of the same increated essence with the Father, all other offspring must be made, and consequently even the angels created sons; of whom the Scripture speaking saith, "Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire." (Psalm. civ. 4.) For although those words, at first spoken by the Psalmist, do rather express the nature of the wind and lightning yet being the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews hath applied the same to the angels properly so called, we cannot but conclude upon his authority, that the same God who "created the wind," (Amos iv. 13.) and "made a way for the lightning of the thunder," (Job xxviii. 26.) hath also produced those glorious spirits; and as he furnished them with that activity there expressed, so did he frame the subject of it, their immaterial and immortal essence. If then the angels and their proper habitation, the far most eminent and illustrious parts of the world were made; if only to be made be one character of imperfection; much more must we acknowledge all things of inferior nature to have dependence on their universal Cause, and consequently this great Universe, or all things, to be made, beside that One who made them. This is the first part of our Christian faith, against some of the ancient philosophers, who were so wildly fond of those things they see, that they imagined the Universe to be infinite and eternal, and, what will follow from it, to be even God himself. It is true that the most ancient of the heathen were not of this opinion, but all the philosophy for many ages delivered the World to have been made.t Mundum, et hoc quod nomine alio cœlum appellare libuit, cujus circumflexu teguntur cuncta, numen esse credi par est, æternum, immensum, neque genitum, neque interiturum unquam.' Plin. Nat. Hist. l. ii. c. 1. † Γενόμενον μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν, says Aristotle, De Cœlo, l. i. c. 10. confessing it the general opinion that the world was made.-Which was so ancient a tradition of all the first philosophers, that from Linus, Musæus, Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, and the rest, they all mention the original of the world, entitling their books, Κοσμογονία, οι Θεογονία, or the like. Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἵ φασιν οὐθὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι· γενόμενα δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄφθαρτα διαμένειν, τὰ δὲ πάλιν φθείρεσθαι· μάλιστα μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον, εἶτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πρῶτοι puoiohoyńsavres, says Aristotle, De Cœlo, I. iii. c. 1. In which words he manifestly attributes the doctrine of the creation of the world not only to Hesiod, but to all the first natural philosophers: which learning, beginning with Prometheus the first professor of that science, continued in that family amongst the Atlantiada, who all successively delivered that truth. After them the Ionian philosophy did acknowledge it, and the Italian received it by Pythagoras, whose scholars all maintained it beside Ocellus Lucanus, the first of them that fancied the world not made, whom Plato, though he much esteemed him, yet followed not; for there is nothing more evident than that be held the world was made. Λέγωμεν δή, δι ̓ ἣν αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε ὁ ξυνιστὰς ξυνέστησεν, ἀγαθὸς When this tradition of the Creation of the World was delivered in all places down successively by those who seriously considered the frame of all things, and the difference of the most ancient poets and philosophers from Moses was only in the manner of expressing it; those which in after-ages first denied it, made use of very frivolous and inconcluding arguments, grounding their new opinions upon weak foundations. For that which in the first place they take for granted as an axiom of undoubted truth, that* Whatsoever hath a beginning, must have an end,' and consequently, 'Whatsoever shall have no end, hath no beginning,' is grounded upon no general reason, but only upon particular observation of such things here below, as from the ordinary way of generation, tend in some space of time unto corruption. From whence, seeing no tendency to corruption in several parts of the World, they conclude that it was never generated, nor had any cause or original of its being. Whereas, if we would speak properly, future existence or non-existence hath no such relation unto the first production. Neither is there any contradiction that at the same time one thing may begin to be, and last but for an hour, another continue for a thousand years, a third beginning at the same instant remain for ever: the difference being either in the nature of the thing so made, or in the determinations of the will of him that made them. Notwithstanding then their universal rules, which are not true but in some limited particulars, it is most certain the whole world was made, and of it part shall perish, part continue unto all eternity; by which something which had a beginning shall have an end, and something not. The second fallacy which led them to this novelty was the very name of Universe, which comprehended in it all things; from whence they reasoned thus: If the World or Universe were made; then were all things made; and if the World shall be dissolved, then all things shall come to nothing;+ which is impossible. For if all things were made, then must either all, or at least something, have made itself, and so have been the . p. 301. ed. Bipont. In which words he delivers not only the generation of the universe, but also the true cause thereof, which is the goodness of God. For he which asks this plain and clear question : πότερον ἦν ἀεὶ, γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἡ γέγονεν, ἀπ ̓ ἀρχῆς τινὸς ἀρξάμενος; and answers the question briefly with a yiym, p. 302; he which gives this general rule upon it: τῷ δ ̓ αὖ γενομένω φαμὲν ὑπ ̓ αἰτίου τινὸς ἀνάγκην εἶναι γενέσθαι and then immediately concludes: τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον, καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν p. 503. cannot (notwithstanding all the shifts of his Greek expositors) be ima gined to have conceived the world not made. And Aristotle, who best understood him, tells us clearly his opinion iv τῷ Τιμαίω (from whence I cited the precedent words)· ἐκεῖ γάρ φησι τὸν οὐρανὸν (where by the way observe that in Plato's Timus οὐρανὸς and κόσμος are made syno nymous) γενέσθαι μὲν, οὐ μὲν φθαρτόν. De Calo, 1. i. c. 10. * Ocellus Lucanus, Περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως, which book Aristotle hath madle use of, and transcribed in many parts. † Τὸ πᾶν γινόμενον σὺν πᾶσι γίνεται, και τὸ φθειρόμενον σὺν πᾶσι φθείρεται· καὶ τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον. ἄναρχον οὖν καὶ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ grav. Ocellus, c 1. p. 506. ed. Gal. cause of itself as of the effect, and the effect of itself as of the cause, and consequently in the same instant both have been and not been, which is a contradiction. But this fallacy is easily discovered: for when we say the Universe or all things. were made, we must be always understood to except him who made all things, neither can we by that name be supposed to comprehend more than the frame of heaven and earth, and all things contained in them; and so he which first devised this argument hath himself acknowledged.* Far more gross was that third conceit, That, if the World were ever made, it must be after the vulgar way of ordinary natural generations: in which+ two mutations are observable, the first from less to greater, or from worse to better; the second from greater to less, or from better to worse. (The beginning of the first mutation is called generation, the end of it perfection: the beginning of the second is from the same perfection, but concluded in corruption or dissolution.) But none hath ever yet observed that this frame of the World did ever grow up from less to greater, or improve itself from worse to better: nor can we now perceive that it becomes worse or less than it was, by which decretion we might guess at a former increase, and from a tendency to corruption collect its original generation. This conceit, I say, is far more gross. For certainly the argument so managed proves nothing at all, but only this (if yet it prove so much), that the whole frame of the World, and the parts thereof which are of greater perfection, were not generated in that manner in which we see some other parts of it are: which no man denies. But that there can be no other way of production beside these petty generations, or that the World was not some other way actually produced, this argument doth not endeavour to infer, nor can any other prove it. The next foundation upon which they cast off the constant doctrine of their predecessors, was that general assertion, That it is impossible for any thing to be produced out of nothing, or to be reduced unto nothing :§ from whence it will inevitably follow, that the matter of this World hath always been, and must always be. The clear refutation of which difficulty * Τὸ δέ γε ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὀνομάζω τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ἔτυχε, ἐκ τῶν ἁπάντων δὴ κοσμη Θείς. Ocellus, c. 1. p. 508. † Πᾶν τὸ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν εἰληφὸς καὶ διαλύσεως ὀφεῖλον κοινωνῆσαι δύο ἐπιδέχεται μεταβολάς. μίαν μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μείονος ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον· δευτέραν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον. Ἐὰν οὖν καὶ τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν γεννητόν ἐστι καὶ φθαρτὸν, γενόμενον, ἀπὸ τοῦ μείονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον μετέβαλε, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον. Ocellus, c. 1. p. 506. † Τὸ δέ γε ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ παρέχεται τεκμήριον τοιοῦτον· οὔτε γὰρ γενόμενον αὐτὸ εἴδομεν, οὔτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ μεῖζον μεταβάλλον, οὔτε χεῖρόν ποτε ἢ μεῖον γενόμενον· ἀλλ ̓ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως διατελεῖ, καὶ ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ. Ocellus, c. 1. p. 507. § ̓Αμήχανον γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἀποτολέσθαι, ἐκ τῶν μὴντων, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐν ἀναλυθῆναι. ἄφθαρτον ἄρα καὶ ἀνώλεθρον τὸ πᾶν. Ocellus, c. 1. p. 511. |
